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Abstract 
The World Wide Web has had a significant impact on basic operational economical 
components in global information rich civilizations. This impact is forcing organizations to 
provide justification for security from a business case perspective and to focus on security 
from a web application development environment perspective. This increased focus on 
security was the basis of a business case discussion and led to the acquisition of empirical 
evidence gathered from a high level Web survey and more detailed industry surveys to 
analyse security in the Web application development environment. Along with this 
information, a collection of evidence from relevant literature was also gathered. Individual 
aspects of the data gathered in the previously mentioned activities contributed to the proposal 
of the Essential Elements (EE) and the Security Criteria for Web Application Development 
(SCWAD).  
 
The Essential Elements present the idea that there are essential, basic organizational 
elements that need to be identified, defined and addressed before examining security aspects 
of a Web Engineering Development process. The Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development identifies criteria that need to be addressed by a secure Web Engineering 
process. Both the EE and SCWAD are presented in detail along with relevant justification of 
these two elements to Web Engineering. 
 
SCWAD is utilized as a framework to evaluate the security of a representative selection of 
recognized software engineering processes used in Web Engineering application 
development. The software engineering processes appraised by SCWAD include: the 
Waterfall Model, the Unified Software Development Process (USD), Dynamic Systems 
Development Method (DSDM) and eXtreme Programming (XP). SCWAD is also used to 
assess existing security methodologies which are comprised of the Orion Strategy; 
Survivable / Viable IS approaches; Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security 
Process (CLASP) and Microsoft’s Trust Worthy Computing Security Development 
Lifecycle. 
 
The synthesis of information provided by both the EE and SCWAD were used to develop the 
Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology. WES is a proactive, flexible, process 
neutral security methodology with customizable components that is based on empirical 
evidence and used to explicitly integrate security throughout an organization’s chosen 
application development process. 
 
In order to evaluate the practical application of the EE, SCWAD and the WES methodology, 
two case studies were conducted during the course of this research. The first case study 
describes the application of both the EE and SCWAD to the Hunterian Museum and Art 
Gallery’s Online Photo Library (HOPL) Internet application project. The second case study 
presents the commercial implementation of the WES methodology within a Global Fortune 
500 financial service sector organization. The assessment of the WES methodology within 
the organization consisted of an initial survey establishing current security practices, a 
follow-up survey after changes were implemented and an overall analysis of the security 
conditions assigned to projects throughout the life of the case study. 
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1 Introduction 
The World Wide Web (WWW) has been predominantly responsible for instigating 
radical paradigm transformations in today’s global information rich civilizations. 
Many societies have basic operational economical components such as health care, 
government agencies, and financial services that depend on Web enabled systems in 
order to support daily commercial activities. E-commerce has achieved global 
acceptance as a valid channel for conducting business. Researchers estimate revenue 
results from e-commerce activities in 2005 will be in the trillions of dollars [113]. 
The money spent on e-commerce applications to support this new revenue stream is 
in the billions. The criticality of the Web can also be demonstrated via organizational 
budgeting practices. The percentage of an organization’s total information 
technology budget that is designated to e-business initiatives has increased from 17.5 
% in 2001, to 19.3% in 2002, to 20.3 % in 2003 [122]. E-business continues to grow 
in significance in today’s business environment. The economic, legal and societal 
interest in the growth of e-business has created a demand for a more secure Web 
enabled business environment. Despite the critical role that security plays in the 
potential growth of e-commerce, reports are repeatedly produced by CSI/FBI [83-
85], Deloitte [47, 49, 50] and PricewaterhouseCoopers [157, 158] illuminating the 
fact that security breaches continue to cost organizations millions of dollars yearly.  
Over the past several years, security has become a focal point of interest in the 
industry. This is evident through the statements announcing major security initiatives 
and their commitment to security from large corporations like Microsoft [121], 
Oracle [29, 165], and IBM [101, 102]. This is also supported by industrial investment 
in Information Technology (IT) security. The latest Deloitte survey revealed that 
ninety-five percent of their respondents experienced an increase in their IT security 
budgets [50]. PricewaterhouseCoopers takes this a step further by stating that the 
portion of the IT budget spent on information security has increased significantly 
[158].  
This upward trend directly affects the Web Engineering community. Web 
Engineering is: 
“the application of systematic, disciplined and quantifiable approaches to 
development, operation, and maintenance of Web-based applications” [53, 55].  
It is important to recognize that ‘Vanilla - Off the Shelf’ Web Engineering 
methodologies do not inherently make any direct references to security, consequently 
today’s Web applications face increased susceptibility to major security problems. 
There have been increasing academic and commercial discussions highlighting the 
need for security integration into the software development life cycle. This battle cry, 
echoed by many in the industry, generally fails to detail how this integration can be 
effectively achieved. The market is producing economic support for an idea, as 
quoted by Steven R. Rakitin, that W. Edwards Deming put forth several years ago 
stating  that “The quality of a product is directly related to the quality of the process 
used to create it” [160]. One of the major differences between Web application 
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development and conventional software development is a greater emphasis on 
security [55]. Hence, the increase in costs associated with security issues should raise 
concerns over the way security is addressed in the Web application development 
process. Application development for the World Wide Web has specific security 
needs that are broader and more complex than those normally experienced in 
traditional software development processes. The following sections in this chapter 
cover the thesis statement, a dissertation overview and the research contribution that 
this dissertation presents. 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
Organizations need to strengthen security in their web application development 
processes to address security threats that are increasingly impacting e-commerce 
activities leading to potential financial losses and to meet escalating global legislative 
requirements. The thesis proposition is that developing a process impartial security 
methodology applicable to different Web Engineering development processes will 
help organizations strengthen security in their Web application development process. 
To achieve this, security should be built into the Web application development 
process up-front by explicitly integrating a process neutral security approach, which 
is specifically applicable to Web application development, throughout the 
organization's Web development process. 
At the time of writing, nobody has designed a security process based on criteria that 
are specifically applicable to a Web Engineering development process. Therefore, a 
flexible process neutral security methodology with customizable components, 
complementing the organization’s chosen application development process is 
necessary for the development of this research. The utility of the new methodology 
will be determined through commercial case studies requiring close collaboration 
with industry to test the methodology in the ‘real world’.   
This thesis attempts to answer the following research questions regarding the above 
hypothesis: 
1. Is it possible to define a set of criteria that a Web Engineering Security 
process must fulfil? 
2. Can a new development process be defined to meet the criteria for a Web 
Engineering Security process? 
3. Can it be argued that the introduction of this new process strengthens security 
within Web Engineering application development processes? 
4. Is it possible to demonstrate that this new Web Engineering Security Process 
can be successfully used in industry? 
1.2 Dissertation Overview 
The objective of this research was to define the criteria that a secure Web 
Engineering process needs to address, to develop and to evaluate a process 
specifically for Web Engineering Security. A chapter breakdown is provided 
detailing the various areas of research conducted to achieve this objective. 
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Chapter two details the methodology that was used in the construction of this 
dissertation. 
Chapter three examines the evolution of security methodology research. It also sets 
the scope for the dissertation in terms of the definition of security and focuses the 
scope of the discussion on Web Engineering. 
Chapter four provides the business justification in terms of economic incentive and 
legislative incentive for conducting research into a Web engineering security 
methodology. 
Chapter five analyzes Web application development from a security perspective. 
This analysis starts with a discussion of the results of a Web survey that attempts to 
determine how security is realistically perceived and implemented in industry during 
Web application development. The results analysis, of the Web survey, identifies 
five elements that organizations appear to fail to address. 
The chapter also presents the results from a survey conducted in a Global Fortune 
500 financial organization that endeavoured to examine security from the overall 
application development perspective and from the perspective of security within the 
process. An analysis of the results of the Global Fortune 500 financial organization 
survey derives six Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
that can be used to assess the security of an existing Web engineering process and 
also to guide Security Improvement Initiatives in Web Engineering.      
Chapter six evaluates existing application development processes and security 
processes employed in Web engineering using the Security Criteria for Web 
Application Development (SCWAD). 
Chapter seven describes the Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology in 
detail. The description covers both the principles behind the methodology and the 
actual process. This includes a brief discussion on the WES process stakeholders, 
deliverables and goals along with an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the methodology.  
Chapter eight reviews existing security methodologies that have been proposed by 
both industry and academia. The chapter highlights the differences between the 
existing solutions and the WES methodology. 
Chapter nine examines the life cycle compatibility of the Web Engineering Security 
(WES) methodology with traditional and agile Web engineering application 
development methodologies. 
Chapter ten describes a practical case study application of the Security Criteria for 
Web Application Development (SCWAD). The practical application of SCWAD was 
part of a case study, in which the author participated, with the Hunterian Museum 
and Art Gallery at the University of Glasgow from February of 2005 to January of 
2006. 
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Chapter eleven describes the first commercial implementation of WES in a Global 
Fortune 500 financial organization. The implementation was part of an internship on 
which the author worked from July of 2005 until September of 2006. The internship 
consisted of several stages that included an initial survey / process analysis design 
stage, a recommendation stage, an implementation and data gathering stage, a data 
analysis stage and a write up stage. The first two stages and the implementation 
aspect of the third stage were conducted from July, 2005 to October, 2005. The data 
gathering portion of the third stage was carried out from November, 2005 until the 
end of the project in August of 2006. The data analysis stage and write up stage 
ensued from that point. Chapter eleven also presents the results of a second survey 
conducted with the individuals who participated in the implementation of the various 
aspects of the WES. 
Chapter twelve presents the conclusions to the research questions detailed in the 
introduction and discusses further work. The following sections include the 
Appendices, Abbreviations, Glossary, References and Index.  
1.3 Research Contribution 
This research presented in the dissertation presents several contributions to the body 
of knowledge that include: 
Web Engineering Security Essential Elements (EE)  
Web Engineering Security Essential Elements are elements that need to be 
acknowledged and resolved before examining a Web Engineering process from a 
security perspective. These elements can be used to help guide Security 
Improvement Initiatives in Web Engineering. The Web Engineering Essential 
Elements are presented in chapter five and published in a paper titled Web 
Engineering Security: Essential Elements in The Second International Conference on 
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) Conference 2007 [81] and in a technical 
report published by Glisson and Welland [82]. 
Secure Web Engineering Process Recognition of Legislation 
A high-level review of United States and United Kingdom legislation that impacts 
the World Wide Web is included in this document. This body of research establishes 
the increasing need to acknowledge legislative compatibility in secure Web 
application development methodologies. This research is presented in chapter four 
and published in a paper titled Secure Web Application Development and Global 
Regulation in The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and 
Security (ARES) 2007 [76]. 
The Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
The Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) can be used to 
assess the security of an existing Web engineering process. SCWAD can also be 
used to guide future Security Improvement Initiatives in Web Engineering. The 
criteria are presented in chapter five and published in a paper titled Web Engineering 
Security: A Practitioner's Perspective in the International Conference on Web 
Engineering (ICWE) 2006 [77] and in a technical report published by Glisson and 
Welland [79].      
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The Web Engineering Security (WES) Methodology 
The WES process is the first security methodology for Web Engineering that is 
specifically designed to address the Web Engineering Essential Elements and the 
Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD). The WES 
methodology is presented in chapter seven and published in a paper titled Web 
Development Evolution: The Assimilation of Web Engineering Security in the 3rd 
Latin American Web Congress 2005 [78] and in a technical report published by 
Glisson and Welland [80]. The WES methodology also specifically acknowledges 
the legislative obligations that are mounting in Web application development as 
discussed above. 
Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery (Hunterian) Case Study 
The Hunterian case study demonstrates the practical application of the Essential 
Elements and the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
during the construction of the Hunterian Online Photo Library (HOPL) Internet 
application. The results gained from this analysis can help organizations establish the 
environmental context and analyze a development process facilitating informed 
secure managerial decisions. The results of this research are presented in chapter ten 
and discussed in a paper titled Picture this: developing a museum online photo 
library in the International Conference on Hypermedia and Interactivity in Museums 
(ICHIM) 2007 [56].  
Industrial Case Study 
The industrial case study presents, in chapter eleven, the commercial research that 
was conducted in a Global Fortune 500 financial service sector organization. The 
study presents the results gained from conducting research in a business environment 
through the application of a section of the WES methodology, the hurdles that were 
experienced and the results.  
Future Work 
The dissertation concludes, in chapter twelve, with a discussion of possible future 
research in the area of Web Engineering Security. Future areas identified during the 
course of this research include legislative issues, development issues and in-depth 
practical investigation into specific aspects of industry development practices.  
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2 Research Methodology 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology utilized in this dissertation. 
Several approaches to research were utilized in the construction of this dissertation. 
These approaches included literature reviews, surveys, and case studies. Section 2.1 
discusses case studies, section 2.2 examines the literature review and the surveys. 
Section 2.3 discusses the combined perspective while section 2.4 summarizes the 
chapter. 
2.1 Case Study 
Initial research in 2004 revealed a paper by Zelkowitz and Wallace [218] that put 
forth a taxonomy, for software engineering experimentation, that comprises twelve 
different experimental approaches. The twelve experimental approaches described in 
the taxonomy are categorized into one of three broad categories: observational 
methods collect data as a project develops; historical methods collect data from 
projects that have been completed and controlled methods provide for multiple 
instances of an observation for statistical validity of the results. Out of the twelve 
approaches that were described, three were used in the construction of this research 
and they are summarized in Table 1. 
It should be noted that Zelkowitz and Wallace do not accurately account for a 
situation where the Experimental Approach utilized is a case study and the Category 
is a ‘Real’, live business environment. Zelkowitz and Wallace simply classify the 
category for the case study as observational without accurate recognition that a 
change has been injected into the environment. The closest that they get to 
acknowledging this issue is noted when they discuss a weak experimental approach 
that they define as “Assertion” [218]. Zelkowitz and Wallace classify this as 
observational and define it as a situation where the developers are “both 
experimenters and subjects of (the) study” [218]. They do qualify this situation with 
the following statement.   
“However, if the developer is using a new technology on some larger industrial 
project, we classify it as a case study, since the developer of the technology 
does not have the same degree of control over experimental conditions” [218]. 
Table 1 - Experimental Approaches Reproduced from Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998). 
Experimental 
Approach 
Category Description Weaknesses Strengths 
Lessons Learned Historical Examine 
qualitative data 
from completed 
projects 
No quantitative 
data; cannot 
constrain 
factors 
Determine 
trends; 
Inexpensive 
Case Study Observational Monitor project 
in depth 
 
Poor controls 
for later 
replication 
Can constrain 
one factor at low 
cost 
Literature Search Historical Examine 
previously 
published 
studies 
Selection bias; 
treatments 
differ 
Large available 
database; 
Inexpensive 
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However, more recent research published in 2006 by Oates [140] presents a more 
detailed idea of a conceptual framework that is derived and justified by a literature 
review. This conceptual framework attempts to provide a structure for research 
topics that addresses ideas like: 
• Different factors that contribute to the research topic 
• Any relevant theories on the research topic 
• The research methodology comprised of the research strategy and the data 
generation methods  
• Data analysis approach, i.e., qualitative or quantitative analysis [140]. 
Oates expands the idea of a strategy as the “overall approach to answering your 
research question” [140]. She goes on to define six strategies that include: survey, 
experiment, design and creation, action research, ethnography and case study [140]. 
The two strategies that were utilized in this research are surveys and case study. 
Oates defines these research strategies in Table 2 – Research Strategy: 
Table 2 - Research Strategy 
Research Strategy Definition 
Survey Focuses on obtaining the same kinds of data from a 
large group of people, in a standardized and 
systematic way. 
Case Study Focuses on one instance of the ‘thing’ that is to be 
investigated. The aim is to obtain a rich and detailed 
insight into the ‘life’ of that case and its complex 
relationships and processes. 
Oates defines data generation as the “means by which you produce empirical data” 
[140] and she defines the following four methods in which to achieve this goal: 
interview, observation, questionnaire and documents. All four data generation 
methods, as defined by Oates, were used in the course of this research and are 
defined in Table 3 – Data Generation Methods. The research presented in this 
dissertation uses two different data generation methods which Oates defines as 
“Method Triangulation” [140]. The research in this dissertation also uses more than 
two research strategies which Oates defines as “Strategy Triangulation” [140]. The 
multiple strategies that were implemented along with the multiple methods used in 
data generation, in this overall research approach, attempts to corroborate or 
highlight differences in findings and enhance research validity.  
Oates cites Yin’s [215] definition of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”[140]. 
Oates goes on to define the three types of case studies; exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. The case studies that were conducted as part of this dissertation utilized 
the exploratory and the descriptive approaches. The Hunterian case study is a 
descriptive case study in that it provides a detailed account of the project and a 
detailed analysis of the project through the use of the Essential Elements (EE) and 
the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD).  The Fortune 500 
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Industry case study uses the results of the initial survey to define the WES 
methodology. The WES methodology is then implemented in the organization and 
the data is gathered through one-on-one semi structured interview, observation of the 
governing committee and collection of relevant documents. Both case studies 
conducted as part of this dissertation can be classified as longitudinal studies due to 
the fact that they were conducted over long periods of time. The Hunterian case 
study lasted from February of 2005 to January of 2006. The Fortune 500 Financial 
case study lasted from July of 2005 to August of 2006.  
Table 3 - Data Generation Methods 
Data Generation 
Method 
Definition 
Interview A particular kind of conversation between people 
where, at least at the beginning of the interview if 
not all the way through, the researcher controls 
both the agenda and the proceedings and will ask 
most of the questions. 
Observation Watching and paying attention to what people 
actually do, rather than what they report they do. 
Questionnaire A pre-defined set of questions assembled in a pre-
determined order. Respondents are asked to answer 
the questions, often via multiple choice options 
thus providing the researcher with data that can be 
analysed. 
Documents Documents that already exist prior to the research 
and documents that are made solely for the 
purposes of the research task. 
The selection of both case studies can be explained from two perspectives which 
include typical instance and convenience. The Hunterian is a small organization that 
has limited resources, i.e., time money, expertise, etc., to devote to internet 
development which is a typical issue for small organizations. The Fortune 500 
financial industry case study is representative of other organizations, in that financial 
category, from the perspective of size, bureaucracy, project resource constraints, and 
interest in security. From a convenience perspective, both organizations agreed to 
give the author access to the respective organizations. The opportunity to work with 
both organizations also coincided with the author’s research time lines. The idea 
behind the Hunterian case study was to test the application of the theory behind the 
EE and SCWAD. The idea behind the fortune 500 case study was to gather data that 
would contribute to the construction of a methodology and test it in a real-world 
environment. 
Another prospective of a case study process is provided by Yin [215]  and 
summarized by Host et al. as: 
1. Case study design: objectives are defined and the case study is planned. 
2. Preparation for data collection: procedures and protocols for data 
collection are defined. 
3. Collecting evidence: execution with data collection on the studied case. 
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4. Analysis of collected data 
5. Reporting [95] 
The Hunterian case study attempts to answer two questions. The first question is 
‘Can it be demonstrated that parts of the WES methodology, i.e., the Essential 
Elements (EE) and the Security Criteria for Web Application Development 
(SCWAD), can be successfully applied in a business environment?’ The second 
question is ‘How?’ The Fortune 500 Industry case study attempts to answer two 
similar questions. The first question is ‘Can it be demonstrated that WES can be 
successfully implemented in industry?’ The second question is ‘How?’  
In the Hunterian case study, the author interacted with the development team and 
attended several meetings. However, it should be noted that the author only advised 
and observed the development team. The author did not directly implement 
suggested changes into development.  The objectives of the study were to show how 
EE and SCWAD could be used by an organization. The data collection for the 
Hunterian case study was collected via meetings with the Hunterian staff. The 
analysis of the information from the interaction took place through the application of 
this information against both the EE and SCWAD. The results are reported in chapter 
ten. 
In the industry case study, the first stage is where the initial negotiation with the 
financial organization took place to determine their perceived problem and relevant 
activities were researched in the market.  Observations and the initial survey were 
also conducted at this time to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the problem. 
Once these issues had been agreed upon, the project moved to its second stage. The 
second stage outlines specific organizational actions designed to relieve or improve 
the problems that were agreed upon in the first stage. This is where several 
recommendations were made to the organization. A collaborative negotiation 
between the researcher and the organization ensued resulting in a decision detailing 
which recommendations were acceptable for implementation.   
The third stage implements the agreed upon changes into the organization. The 
author implemented the changes into the financial organization’s production 
environment making it a direct intervention case study. The effects of the 
implemented changes were observed for a period of time. At the end of that time 
period, the financial case study used data collected from a survey and security 
condition data as sources of information to evaluate the effectiveness of the changes. 
This evaluation took place in the fourth stage and the results are reported in the last 
stage. 
2.2 Literature Reviews and Surveys 
Relevant literature was examined from a variety of sources which included industry 
papers, the International Conference on Web Engineering, the Journal of Web 
Engineering, IEEE, ACM conferences, ACM journal publications and relevant 
books. Relevant literature is discussed throughout the dissertation where appropriate. 
The literature revealed that the overall topic of security is a popular area of research 
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and that there is a lot of technical research in specific areas of security. However, the 
analysis of this information revealed that at the time of this writing nobody had 
designed a security process based on criteria that are specifically applicable to a Web 
Engineering development process. This information was the major driver behind the 
surveys.  
2.2.1 Web Survey 
The Web survey endeavoured to determine practitioner opinions [161] and acquire 
practical information regarding their experience with security and development 
methodologies. In order to acquire information, a Web survey was hosted at the 
University of Glasgow during June and July of 2005. In an attempt to ensure that the 
Web survey was “effective” [115] which means mitigating researcher bias, the 
instrument was validated [114, 115] in an attempt to ensure that the instrument is 
appropriately understood and that it is cost-effective for the participants. The Web 
survey was validated by two different individuals in the financial industry. The first 
individual is a Technical Lead for a major financial institution in the United States 
and the second individual is a Security Specialist for a financial institution in the 
United Kingdom. These individuals were used to check for question comprehension 
and to evaluate instrument reliability and viability. They did this by taking the survey 
and providing feedback. This was conducted twice due to suggested changes. These 
changes included simplifying questions and adding options to closed questions. The 
survey was designed to encourage participation so that the majority of the questions 
had specific answers utilizing, as much as possible, a closed question survey design 
[116]. The Web survey targeted computing industry professionals via an e-mail 
request sent by the Glasgow chapter of the British Computing Society and 
communications with colleagues. This aligns with the purpose and relevance of the 
study while supporting the selection of the individuals who validated the survey. 
The sample size was relatively small, (fifty-three initial respondents) and a high 
number of respondents did not complete all of the sections (eighteen), reducing the 
value of any statistical data that could be derived from the survey results. The 
product of the survey was determined from the analysis of query results. The idea 
behind the analysis of the results was to attempt to identity trends, anomalies, and 
patterns. 
2.2.2 Industry Surveys  
A small survey was conducted at the beginning of the Hunterian Case study to learn 
more about the project and the Hunterian development environment. The Hunterian 
survey questions are available in Appendix XII. The initial industry survey 
conducted in the Fortune 500 Organization endeavoured to attain a more in-depth 
understanding of security from the overall application development perspective and 
from the perspective of security within the process. The second survey attempted to 
ascertain the impact of the changes implemented into the development process. In an 
attempt to mitigate researcher bias, the initial Fortune 500 industry survey and the 
follow up survey were both validated by two different individuals in the financial 
industry. One individual was an architect and one individual was a security expert. It 
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should be noted that this validation for both surveys was only conducted once due to 
participant time constraints. Again, questions were simplified through the course of 
the conversation.  
The survey style for both industry surveys and the Hunterian survey is best described 
as semi-structured interviews [140]. In that there was a list of questions that were 
asked in the same manner. In other words, there were a set number of survey 
questions that were read to each participant. However, if the participant wanted to 
talk about related issues, at any level of detail, during the course of answering 
questions, this line of thought was allowed to go to completion. The idea was to get 
the participant to speak honestly and openly about the questions. However, when the 
participants completed voicing their thoughts and answered the question that had 
been put forth they were directed to the next question. The question format for both 
of these surveys were open ended questions [116].  
The participants, for both industry surveys, were read a statement at the being of the 
interview thanking them for participating, explaining the reason for the research and 
reassuring respondent anonymity. The interviews were conducted in conference 
rooms or coffee shops depending on participant time constraints and preference. The 
responses to the individual questions were initially recorded by hand. It should be 
noted that voice recording the interviews was considered but dismissed due to 
cultural resistance to the idea. The hand written results for both of the surveys were 
digitally recorded as soon after the interview as reasonably possible, typically within 
an hour. The results were recorded in a large spread sheet that was then examined by 
hand to identify trends, patterns, and anomalies.  
2.3 Combined Perspective 
The application of the individual data generation activities that were employed 
during the construction of this research, in conjunction with the appropriate 
experimental activity and research strategies presents a more accurate picture of the 
overall research methodology and is available in Table 4. The research methods and 
experimental approaches implemented during this work can be summarized as 
follow: 
Lessons Learned. Two groups of surveys were conducted during the summer of 
2005 contributing to the understanding of the role security plays in the ‘real world’.  
• Web Survey. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Web survey conducted 
during the summer of 2005 attempts to determine how security is realistically 
perceived and implemented in industry during application development. The 
survey questions are available in Appendix I and the answers are available in 
Appendix II. 
The approach taken with the Web survey was a qualitative approach rather than a 
quantitative approach.  Due to the fact that the survey was capturing current / 
past information, as noted earlier in this chapter, Zelkowitz and Wallace 
categorized this approach as a historical “Lessons Learned” approach to software 
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engineering experimentation [218]. The idea with the Web survey was to attempt 
to identify trends. As Oates noted, the benefit to the survey approach is that it 
presents the opportunity to acquire a lot of data at a reasonably low cost [140]. 
One of the drawbacks is that it provides a picture at a particular point in 
time[140]. Another drawback is that surveys are good at showing associations, 
but not good at establishing cause and effect [140]. There is also a lack of 
control, in Web surveys, over the validity of the respondents and their answers.   
• Global Fortune 500 Financial Organization Surveys (GFFFOSs). Two GFFFOSs 
were conducted by the author during the course of the case study. The initial 
survey was conducted at the beginning of the case study, in July of 2005, and 
attempted to determine the state of security within the organization’s 
development process. A second GFFFOSs was conducted, in May of 2006, 
following up on the security changes that were implemented in the organization. 
The survey questions are available in Appendices III and VI. The answers for the 
respective surveys are available in Appendices IV and VII. 
Both of the surveys conducted in the financial organization adopted Zelkowitz 
and Wallace’s [218] Lessons Learned approach, from the historical category that 
“examines qualitative data from completed projects” [218]. This took the form of 
a series of structured interviews using a qualitative one-on-one interview 
technique for gathering the opinions and experience of others during Web 
application development. This approach has the advantages of enabling the 
determination of trends and is inexpensive [218]. However, it does not allow for 
the production of quantitative data and constraining factors [218]. A historical 
approach was selected to help the author understand how security challenges and 
issues had been perceived during recent projects within the company.  
Case Study. The author’s personal experience in Web development for a Fortune 
500 Financial Organization based in the US pre-commencement of Ph.D. research 
1999 – 2004 contributed to the foundational ideas behind the research. Two case 
studies were conducted during the three years devoted to the Ph.D. research. One 
case study was conducted with the Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery at the 
University of Glasgow and another with a Global Fortune 500 financial organization. 
Literature Search. Literature reviews were conducted to acquire supporting 
evidence establishing the business case for the research, to examine Web 
Engineering development processes and for the criteria that were established during 
the research. Reviews were also conducted for the application of the criteria 
established during the research and the analysis of the Web Engineering Security 
(WES) methodology against established Web engineering development 
methodologies. Ideally, the foundation for these evaluations would include a 
combination of empirical evidence and first hand detailed reports of the processes 
being used in the working world. However, an empirical study has not been 
attempted due to constraints that include willing participants, time, and consistent 
experimental conditions. These fundamental evaluation constraints apply to chapters 
six, eight and nine. 
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2.4 Summary 
The qualitative research provided in this dissertation consists of a review of the 
literature, a Web survey, a case study with the Hunterian museum, and two surveys 
that were conducted as part of a case study in a Global Fortune 500 financial 
organization. The industry case study can be summarized as follows:  
• A problem was diagnosed in conjunction with the organization and used to 
determine the objectives of the case study.  
• Potential solutions were examined and debated that would attempt to solve 
the organization’s issues.   
• The changes were implemented within the organization based upon an 
agreed course of action and data was collected.  
• The data was evaluated and the results reported. 
An overall picture of the methodologies implemented during the course of this 
research is available in Table 4 – Applied Research. 
Table 4 - Applied Research  
Data Generation Method Experiment Activity Strategy 
Interview Initial GFFFO Survey 
GFFFO Follow-up Modified Process Survey 
Hunterian Case Study 
Case Study 
Observation GFFFO Process Observation 
Hunterian Case Study 
Case Study 
Questionnaire Web Survey Survey 
Documents GFFFO Case Study 
Hunterian Case Study 
Case Study 
* GFFFO – Global Fortune 500 Financial Organization 
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3 Security in Web Engineering 
This chapter examines security methodology evolution in section 3.1. Section 3.2 
provides a working definition of security for the dissertation. Section 3.3 focuses on 
the aspects of Web application development that make it unique. Section 3.4 
provides a functional understanding of Web engineering security and section 3.5 
summarizes the chapter. 
3.1 Security Methodology Evolution 
In order to appreciate the current state of the security methodology research, it is 
necessary to acknowledge previous research in the field of information security 
design methods. Baskerville’s analysis separated numerous system methods into 
three generations [13]. The first generation consisted of check list and risk analysis. 
This stage focused on actual physical systems specifications. The second generation 
engineering methods focused on complex customization through the use of 
engineering concepts and mechanistic procedures that relied heavily on functional 
requirements. Baskerville cites Waters in his explanation of mechanistic engineering 
methods; stating that mechanistic engineering methods  
“focus on the production of mechanical specification of input, storage, and 
output formats, along with details of procedures needed to transform input or 
storage into outputs” [13].  
Baskerville goes on to indicate that common tools implemented with these 
methodologies include system and program flow charts, record layouts and print 
charts. Baskerville notes that the waterfall methodology [164] is an example of a 
mechanistic engineering application development approach. The second generation 
security development methods are summed up by Baskerville as top-down 
engineering, rapid prototyping system and logical flow chart methods. This summary 
would include solutions like Fisher’s approach, Parkers’ security diagram and the 
U.K. Government’s Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency’s (CCTA) 
Risk Analysis Management Method (CRAMM)[13]. The third generation of security 
methods are model driven. Baskerville sited Structured Systems Analysis and Design 
Methods (SSADM) and the Logical Controls Design method as examples of third 
generation security models. Even though Baskerville’s analysis of the security design 
methods did not directly examine the applicability of the security methodologies to 
the Web development, he did make an important point that is applicable to Web 
Engineering application development. Baskerville’s analysis did suggest that 
 “systems methods will neither be trustworthy nor successful unless the general 
research regarding systems methodology incorporates security analysis design 
as an explicit objective” [13].  
Siponen updates and expands on Baskerville’s analysis of information security 
development approaches declaring that there are five information system security 
generational classifications [171]. Siponen arrives at his conclusion after an 
examination of the contributing research disciplines and an evaluation of seventeen 
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modern information system security methodologies. Security is a highly diverse 
research subject that has been an area of interest for a variety of disciplines. Siponen 
identifies four research communities as contributors to information security research 
including Management Information Systems (MIS), computer science, software 
engineering and mathematics. According to Siponen’s research, MIS accounts for the 
social and the organizational aspects of a problem. Computer science has a 
‘positivist’ [93, 171] orientation, which is understood to be the application of 
scientific methods, to solving computing problems. Software engineering has both a 
positivist and an interpretive approach while mathematics takes a quantitative 
approach to solve problems. An interpretive approach, in this context, is read to 
mean that the researcher is attempting to understand the data and the results generally 
within the social context and the context of the information system [117, 171]. The 
reality is that research from any of the contributing disciplines can be classified as 
interpretive or positivist depending on the specifics of the research. The evaluation of 
seventeen modern information systems contributed to the creation of the two 
additional security methodology generations. 
Siponen’s first three generations correspond with Baskerville’s generational 
classifications. Siponen explains that the first and second generations include: 
checklist, management criteria and maturity criteria [173]. Checklist attempts to 
solve security problems through the identification and implementation of 
countermeasures via a list [173]. An example of a checklist is the Security Audit and 
Field Evaluation (SAFE) for Computer Facilities and Information Systems [172]. 
According to Siponen, the idea of standards evolved from checklist into 
recommendations that the organization should implement. Siponen explains that by 
meeting specific standards and / or achieving certifications, organizations are able to 
display a level of management and trustworthiness to business partners and 
customers [173]. Some well known standards in use today include the International 
Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission 
standard (ISO/IEC) 17799 / 27002 [36, 104, 173], the Systems Security Engineering 
- Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CCM) [183] and the Common Criteria (CC) [35].  
ISO/IEC 17799 / 27002 attempts to provide fairly comprehensive information 
security management recommendations in regards to initiating, implementing and 
maintaining systems that are concerned with information security [36]. ISO/IEC 
17799 consists of several sections that contain information on everything from 
security policies, to asset management, to human resource security, to business 
continuity management [36]. ISO/IEC 17799 does define information security in 
terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability [36]. It should be noted that there 
is an ISO 9000 category of standards that includes software development in its remit. 
The standard tries to address a broader scope that this dissertation covers by 
examining aspects of the following areas: Project initiation and planning; Functional 
requirements; System design specifications; Build and document; Acceptance; 
Transition to production; Operations and maintenance support; and Revision and 
system replacement [90].  
SSE-CCM presents a document intensive best practices highly structured model 
solution designed to support statistical process control to all forms of software 
engineering [183]. The SSE-CCM version of the life cycle includes concept, 
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development, production, utilization, support and retirement stages [183]. This all-
inclusive approach is composed of twenty-two processes. The first eleven process 
areas focus on security and the last eleven focus on “project and organizational 
activities” [183]. The process areas that focus on security provide a high level 
initiative telling organizations what to address. For example, under Coordinate 
Security, they indicate that 
 “all members of the project team are aware of and involved with security 
engineering activities to the extent necessary to perform their functions” [183].  
This statement focuses on the team, not the methodology being used. While there is 
minimal concept commonality, in general, the scope of SSE-CMM is much broader 
than the dissertation scope. The CC attempts to fuse an assortment of international 
standards into a set of evaluation criteria to be utilized against information 
technology products [163]. 
Siponen defined the third generation as consisting of structural and object-oriented 
security methods, information modelling methods, and stepwise security methods. 
He also indicates that the third generation is focusing on modelling information 
system security requirements. Third generation security models would include 
approaches like the Spiral Approach, the Logical Approach, and Data Flow 
Diagrams (DFD) and Entity Relationship (ER) modelling. According to Siponen, the 
fourth generation builds on the third generation by addressing the social and socio-
technical aspects of the methods. The term socio-technical was originally coined by 
Bostrom and Heinen in a paper where they were examining Management 
Information Systems (MIS) project failures [28]. They described an organization 
work system as being comprised of two components: the social and the technical. 
Bostrom and Heine went on to explain that the technical aspects focused on the task, 
the processes and the technology. While the social side of the system is focused on 
people attributes, relationships, reward systems and authority structures. Basically, 
the social component is concerned with the management aspect of the business. 
Bostrom and Heinen defined the socio-technical perspective as an intermediate 
position between the two extremes [28]. Siponen give the Survivable IS approach as 
an example of a fourth generation methodology. 
The fifth generation, of security methodologies, that Siponen discusses [171] is really 
the next generation of methodologies. This implies that the fifth generation security 
methodologies do not currently exist, a point which he also articulates in a later 
article [173]. Siponen describes four criteria that the fifth generation security 
methodologies should strive to achieve. These criteria are as follows: 
• Use of social ideas and techniques ensuring congruent design and user 
expectations 
• Integration with all types of software development methodologies 
• Painless adaptability of security methods with practitioners 
• Provide empirical evidence of their usefulness [173]. 
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Siponen’s points, regarding the fifth generation, bring us to the heart of the security 
problem. There have been few industrial attempts to comprehensively address user 
focused aspects; methodology integration; practitioner malleability and employment 
of Web engineering security throughout the Web-based application development 
process via the establishment of a comprehensive security methodology.  
Regardless of where one stands on security methodologies, the initial problem with 
tackling security is the terminology. Terminology in various environments has the 
potential to have multiple meanings. As Anderson indicated, reality is a complex 
environment in the real world [6]. Hence, what the terms security and vulnerability 
mean to one organization, such as a large financial institution, may or may not have 
the same relevance to another business, such as a newsagent or a small legal firm. 
Logically, different organizations will require “some combination of user 
authentication, transaction integrity and accountability, fault-tolerance, message 
secrecy and covertness” [6]. So what is the definition of security? 
3.2 Security Definition 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we will define a Web enabled secure system in 
terms of well established security concepts which consist of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability [90]. The system should protect confidentiality by limiting access to 
the appropriate individuals [153]. This would involve user identification, 
authentication and authorization. The integrity of the system should be maintained by 
only allowing modifications to be conducted by the appropriate individuals and 
within established guidelines [153]. The availability of the system is defined by 
providing access to the appropriate parties at designated times [153]. It should be 
noted that there are two additional categories that are commonly included when 
discussing security and they are ‘non-repudiation’ and ‘accountability’. Non-
repudiation is the capability to prevent, in this case, a software user, a system, or an 
application from denying actions they have performed. Accountability is the 
recording of the software user’s actions. Since “accountability includes authenticity 
and non-repudiation” [119] and authenticity is the “property that allows the ability to 
validate the claimed identity of a system entity” [119], i.e., the authentication aspect, 
we will consider these topics to be subtopics of confidentiality that are utilized to 
help ensure integrity. 
Vulnerabilities will be defined using The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) 
definition. It has been said that “security is about preventing adverse consequences 
from the intentional and unwarranted actions of others” [168]. OIS publishes 
Guidelines for Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response. In this document, 
security vulnerability is defined as  
“a flaw within a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its 
documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to violate its 
documented security policy” [142]. 
It should be noted that this statement makes the assumption that a documented 
security policy exist. The reality of the OIS vulnerability definition is that any flaws 
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in the system design or application coding can potentially lead to security 
vulnerabilities. 
The need to improve security in the Web application development is reinforced by 
testimony from Robert F. Decay, Director, Information Security Issues indicating 
that patch management is critical in mitigating cyber vulnerabilities [45]. According 
to the same report, the number of security vulnerabilities reported is increasing and 
attacks are becoming automated [45]. Software security encompasses more than 
encryption and password maintenance. The ability to defend against software attacks, 
in the long run, will need to come from “more rigorous software engineering 
practices, better tools and technologies” [45].   
Using these broad definitions to understand security supports the idea that security 
means more than implementing encryption, Secure Socket Layer (SSL), firewalls 
and creating and maintaining secure networks [58, 64]. It is also more than the use of 
digital certificates, the different technologies used for authentication and 
authorization or intrusion detection systems [58, 64]. In-depth discussions on these 
topics and research into their improvement are occurring on a daily basis. However, a 
system’s security is not determined solely by the technology that is implemented. 
Web security is determined by a number of factors that include legal issues, social 
issues, technical issues, and Web engineering practices. The synergic factor 
highlighted in this research is the necessary integration of a broad security solution 
into Web engineering methodologies. This expansive perspective on the scope of 
security was reinforced by Eugene Spafford, a security expert and professor at 
Purdue University when he stated in an interview that “security is a total-picture 
issue, not a set of spot problems to patch” [126]. 
3.3 Dissertation Scope 
A method may be defined as “a procedure, technique” [59] or “way of doing 
something” [9, 59, 212]. In this specific discussion, it is a way of integrating Web 
engineering security into Web Engineering application development methodologies. 
Accepting this concept limits this dissertation to matters pertaining specifically to 
Web engineering security methodologies. This excludes the technical details of 
security implementations. The scope of this dissertation is further limited to new 
Web-based applications developed for business needs. Web enabled software 
systems defined as human safety critical or national infrastructure critical systems 
are, therefore, out of scope. The focus on Web Engineering application development 
naturally leads to a discussion about what makes it different from traditional software 
engineering application development. 
3.4 Web Engineering 
As discussed in the introduction, Web Engineering is “the application of systematic, 
disciplined and quantifiable approaches to development, operation, and maintenance 
of Web-based applications” [53, 55]. Research indicates that there are several criteria 
that differentiate Web Engineering from traditional software engineering. 
McDonald’s empirical software engineering research identifies seven criteria that 
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Web engineering processes need to address [129]. These characteristics are as 
follows: 
1. Short development life-cycle times (generally less that six months); 
2. Different business models; 
3. Multidisciplinary development teams; 
4. Small development teams working in parallel on similar tasks; 
5. Analysis and Evaluation; 
6. Requirements and Testing; 
7. Maintenance [129]. 
The different business models acknowledge the interactions among the business 
model, the software model, the domain model and the creative design model by 
discussing the impact of the various models on each other. The multidisciplinary 
development team means that there are stakeholders from different areas of the 
business that are a part of the application development team. The Web engineering 
process needs to support small development teams working in parallel on the same 
project. The analysis and evaluation aspect refers to the need of the development 
team to truly understand the overall problem they are attempting to solve. This 
includes a sound understanding of the business problem, the expected end-user usage 
and the expected deliverables in order to optimize system functionality. McDonald 
also stresses the need for requirements engineering and a testing phase during Web 
application development projects. He also acknowledges the need to address 
maintenance. 
A separate survey by Baskerville [14] identifies six common practices for high-speed 
Internet software development as follows: 
1. Parallel Development and Frequent Releases 
2. Tools and Reusable Components 
3. Production Prototyping 
4. Customer Implantation 
5. Multi-tiered Architecture 
6. Tailored Methodology [14]. 
Baskerville’s [14] research arrived at the six common practices by identifying 
common problems faced by the organizations involved in the case study. Parallel 
development and frequent releases are used to address compressing time-to-market 
demands. It is interesting to note that Baskerville did not assign a time frame to 
frequent releases. In contrast, as discussed above, McDonald did assign a general 
indication of the time frame for frequent releases. Tools and reusable components 
came about in response to insufficient programmer productivity. Production 
prototyping tries to address ambiguous requirements, while customer implantation is 
used to address the need for fluid requirements. Baskerville acknowledges the 
security dangers of prototyping when he states that “critical requirements like 
security, scalability, and robustness are hard to appraise through prototyping” [14]. A 
lack of design time and experience is countered by a multi-tiered architecture and an 
emphasis on acquiring the right experience. A tailored methodology attempts to 
handle a changing environment.  
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There are similarities in the findings of the two studies by McDonald and Baskerville 
et al. Both identify short development cycles and parallel development. It could also 
be argued that tools and reusable components realistically play a part in the short 
development cycles, maintenance and testing of Web applications. It should be noted 
that McDonald’s research focused specifically on process while the Baskerville 
survey identified common practices for high-speed Internet development. It is 
interesting to note that Baskerville’s survey noted tailored methodologies as a 
common practice. The willingness of businesses to modify their methodologies is 
perceived as a benefit to methodology research that modifies and / or expands 
existing methodologies. 
While the research objectives for these studies may be slightly different and the 
results provided include deviations in the overall information produced, the research 
recognizes that Web Engineering has different attributes than traditional software 
development. These differences support research into how to address development 
issues in Web Engineering. These divergences also support research into supporting 
the characteristics of Web-based application development projects while effectively 
integrating security into those methodologies. The integrated security methodology 
needs to be compatible with the same Web engineering characteristics.  
3.5 Web Engineering Security 
The need for information security has been noted and attributed to several factors 
ranging from the enormous interconnection of assorted and distributed systems, the 
existence and availability of sensitive information, computer crime anonymity, the 
lack of geographic boundaries and forensic evidence [109]. The lack of security in 
development methods has been noted in the literature [13]. Baskerville noted that 
third generation information systems development methodologies lacked security 
considerations[13]. This problem still exists today. The lack of security 
methodologies that are compatible with existing application development 
methodologies has also been noted. Siponen’s analysis only found three approaches 
that could be smoothly integrated in information systems development 
methodologies [171]. According to Siponen [171] these methodologies are 
Baskervill’s logical approach [15], Booysen and Eloff’s spiral approach [27] and 
McDermott and Fox’s abuse case methodology [128]. These methodologies are 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 8. It has also been noted that Agile 
methodologies “have few features specifically addressing security risk” [170]. 
Security is inherently not a part of ‘Vanilla - Off the Shelf’ Web engineering 
development processes and this inherent lack of security encourages environments 
that are susceptible to exploitation via potential breaches [81]. Web Engineering 
methodologies do not make any direct references to security, consequently today’s 
web applications face major security problems [78]. Therefore, my definition of Web 
Engineering Security modifies Deshpande’s explanation of Web Engineering [53, 
55]  as follows: 
Web Engineering Security is the systematic, disciplined and quantifiable 
amalgamation of security with a Web-based application development process. 
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A specific Web engineering security methodology provides a road map for 
developers and management to follow during a Web-based application development 
project. A methodology attempts to provide guidance for all of the various aspects of 
security during the individual stages of the application development process. In order 
to allow organizations and individuals to preserve and capitalize on existing Web 
application development capabilities, and possible market advantages, a process 
neutral approach was explored. The phrase ‘a process neutral approach’ has been 
chosen to convey the idea that the design of the security methodology endeavours to 
seamlessly integrate with a variety of existing Web application development 
methodologies.  
A process neutral approach to the implementation of security is based on the fact that 
organizations use a variety of methodologies during their Web application 
development projects [79, 82]. This variety ranges from the traditional Waterfall 
approach, or some variant thereof, through to agile approaches in order to support 
Web application development. A process neutral approach provides an organization 
with the opportunity to support its existing Web application development 
methodology regardless of the style of the methodology. It also complies with 
Siponen’s recommendation that new methodologies should strive to integrate with all 
types of software development methodologies 
The process neutral approach provides a roadmap for organizations that are using a 
more traditional methodology for Web application development from a deliverable 
perspective.  The number of deliverables that an organization will require depends on 
the culture of the organization, the methodology that the culture is comfortable with 
implementing and, to a large extent, the regulatory impact on the business. 
Businesses that are more conservative in nature and under a large amount of 
regulation, such as a large financial institution, are going to require deliverables at 
every stage of the development process. On the other hand, smaller businesses are 
more inclined to be agile in nature and require fewer deliverables during each stage 
of the development process. A process neutral approach allows a methodology 
greater flexibility to support agile methodologies. The Agile community’s manifesto 
states that:  
“We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing it and helping 
others do it. We value: 
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools. 
• Working software over comprehensive documentation. 
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation. 
• Responding to change over following a plan. 
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the 
left more” [4, 71]. 
In order to support the agile community’s manifesto, a new security methodology 
needs to be flexible enough to integrate with existing Web application development 
methodologies in order to meet the needs of specific organizations. At the same time 
it needs to encourage interaction among project members. This increased interaction 
among all of the individuals involved in the project, over security issues, raises the 
overall security visibility of the Web application while supporting software 
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deliverables. The security methodology needs to encourage customer input into the 
security aspect of the Web application. The flexibility of the methodology provides 
the implementing organization the freedom to decide on the amount of 
documentation that is appropriate for the Web application being developed and the 
culture of the organization. The overall flexibility of the methodology allows the 
implementing organization the capability to decide the rigidity of the methodology. 
Pursuing a process neutral approach attempts to support the ideals of the agile 
manifesto along with providing the flexibility to integrate into traditional application 
development methodologies.  
The author’s personal experiences indicate that the direct contributions of individuals 
involved in Web development projects provide the fundamental ingredients for a 
project’s ultimate success or failure. This is especially true in the security arena. The 
methodology should support the individuals involved in the development process by 
providing guidance so that the end product is a secure Web application, while 
meeting the needs of the customer / business. This necessity for versatility supports 
research into a process neutral approach in order to allow appropriate customization 
while meeting the needs of the individual stakeholder groups. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter examined the evolution of security methodologies and identified criteria 
that new methodologies, also referred to as fifth generation methodologies, need to 
endeavour to satisfy. These criteria include the use of social ideas and techniques 
ensuring congruent design and user expectations, security methodology integration 
with all types of software development methodologies, painless adaptability of 
security methods with practitioners and empirical evidence of the methodologies 
ineffectiveness or effectiveness. Along with the acknowledgement of the fifth 
generation criteria, a working definition of security is provided for this dissertation 
based on the concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The chapter also 
addressed the concept of a method which limited the scope of the dissertation 
discussion to matters pertaining specifically to Web engineering security 
methodologies excluding the technical details of security implementations. 
After defining the scope of the security methodology discussion, existing research 
into some of the characteristics that make Web Engineering projects different from 
traditional software development projects is acknowledged. The process 
characteristics identified by the research included short development life-cycle times; 
different business models; multidisciplinary development teams; small development 
teams working in parallel on similar tasks; analysis and evaluation; requirements and 
testing; and maintenance.  
A working definition of Web Engineering Security is established that states: Web 
Engineering Security is the systematic, disciplined and quantifiable amalgamation of 
security with a Web-based application development process. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion acknowledging the need for a process neutral approach to the 
security methodology solution. This chapter established the academic area of 
research that is being investigated. The next chapter investigates the incentive for 
industrial research in the area of secure application development. 
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4 Business Case for Researching Web 
Engineering Security 
Some of the most precious commodities in today’s business environment include 
data, information and knowledge. Management of the data asset is becoming 
increasingly challenging as the global community progressively utilizes the World 
Wide Web to conduct business. It has been said that “one man’s data can be another 
man’s knowledge, and vice versa, depending on context” [180]. Once data is 
collected, through a Web enabled application, then the challenge morphs into 
information and knowledge management as businesses take advantage of Internets, 
intranets, and extranets. As Ralph Basham, the Director of the Secret Service put it, 
“Information is the world’s new currency; information has value” [87]. This point 
was reinforced by Thomas A. Stewart when he wrote in The Wealth of Knowledge 
“Knowledge is what we buy, sell, and do” [180].  
“Knowledge management involves capturing, classifying, evaluating, retrieving 
and sharing all of a company’s information assets in a way that provides 
context for effective decisions and actions” [68].  
As strategic alliances and partnerships develop, it will become increasingly necessary 
for a company’s information and knowledge to be available to all parties in the 
appropriate forms, at the appropriate place and time [68]. The main conduit for this 
transfer of knowledge, information and data is the Web. A major management issue 
that has become increasingly visible in today’s Web market place is the security of 
an organization’s data, information, and knowledge assets. Section 4.1 discusses the 
economic incentive. Section 4.2 examines the US Legislative Incentive and section 
4.3, the US Legislation with International impact. Section 4.4 talks about the UK 
Legislative Issues, section 4.5, the International Legal Forum and section 4.6 
summarizes the chapter. 
4.1 Economic Incentive 
Security failures can cost companies staggering amounts of money and have become 
a global epidemic that affects everyone in the world of e-business. There are several 
factors that contribute to an organization’s security cost. The cost associated with 
application development is one of those factors. An article published in Secure 
Business Quarterly titled “Tangible ROI through Secure Software Engineering” 
(Fourth Quarter of 2001) states that 
 “one dollar required to resolve an issue during the design phase grows into 60 
to 100 dollars to resolve the same issue after the application has shipped” [94].  
They also indicate that the return on investment (ROI) can be as high as 21 percent 
when examined during the design phase [94]. Even if the security flaw is not caught 
until the test phase, Gartner estimates that the cost to fix a “security vulnerability 
during testing to be less than 2 percent of the cost of removing it from a production 
system” [151].   
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Even though there has been a decline over the last couple of years in the average loss 
per respondent to the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, it should be 
noted estimated losses from Internet security breaches in the US are still in the 
millions of dollars [83-85]. An interesting point to note in the 2006 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey, that supports the idea that a business’ 
reputation is important, is that the  
“number of respondents willing to report their losses this year was less than 
half the number of the previous year” [85]. 
The PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) indicates that large companies appear to be 
handling the cost of the disruptions better than small companies [158]. However, 
they still estimate that the average cost, for a large United Kingdom company’s most 
serious security breach is still between £65,000 and £130,000 and smaller businesses 
between £8,000 to £17,000 [158]. PWC also stated that: 
“The median number of incidents suffered is roughly eight a year. This has 
increased from two years ago. The cost associated with security incidents has 
also risen” [158].  
PWC goes on to indicate that “the biggest single impact of security breaches 
continues to be business disruptions” [158] via attacks on web-sites and /or internet 
gateways. This corresponds with a previous CSI/FBI survey which indicated that 
there are problems with Web site defacement, misuse of public Web applications, 
unauthorized access, insider net abuse, denial of service attacks and viruses [83]. 
This information clearly demonstrates that there are individuals actively looking for 
software vulnerabilities on the Web. According to Deloitte & Touche’s 2004 Global 
Security Survey, the number of systems being compromised in the financial sector is 
on the rise and attacks are on the increase [47, 48]. The 2006 Global Security Survey 
elaborates on this point by stating that internet threats are on the rise and that the 
attacks are becoming more sophisticated [50]. Now, either more companies are being 
more forthcoming with information, or more systems are being compromised, or 
possibly both. However, given the statement by the CSI/FBI survey that the number 
of respondents willing to report losses is less than half of the previous year, it is 
likely that more systems are being compromised.  
The truth of the matter is that we really do not know the exact number of systems 
that are being compromised. Most companies do not want this information made 
public for a variety of reasons. For example, they do not want to admit, from a 
reputation standpoint, that their systems have been compromised; they do not want to 
endure the expense necessary to rectify the problem; they do not know how to fix the 
problem or, even worse, they are not even aware that their systems have been 
compromised.   
These issues can be summarized in terms of potential economical cost. Since bad 
news sells in today’s press environment, companies do not want to sustain damage to 
their reputations or lose public good-will which could translate into soft cost. Soft 
cost, also referred to in the accounting profession as indirect cost, in this instance, 
refers to costs that are hard to quantify economically [202]. In opposition, hard cost, 
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also referred to in the accounting profession as direct cost, refers to cost that are 
easily quantifiable [202]. There is some research that provides validity to company 
fears in terms of hard cost i.e., stock price. Telang and Wattal’s research indicates 
that a software vendor loses, on average, approximately 0.6% of their stock price per 
vulnerability announcement [184]. Granted, there appears to be a lot of contributing 
factors in their calculation of the estimated stock hit per vulnerability announcement. 
Those factors included whether the vulnerability announcement comes from the 
vendor or the press, if there is a patch currently available, the type of breach, and the 
extent of market competition [184]. The point is not to argue the economic validity 
of their findings but to note that there appears to be a potential connection between 
security announcements and company profitability. It is only when a company’s 
security issues start to seriously interrupt business or application functionality or 
evidence of an attack appears that they may admit to having a problem. Another 
possible reason for not wanting to admit to security breaches on the Internet is to 
minimize the chance of copy cat attacks on their systems until the issue has been 
resolved.   
4.2 US Legislative Incentive  
The purpose of this section along with section 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 is to acknowledge the 
legal pressures that are mounting through the introduction of legislation throughout 
the world in response to computer crimes and acknowledge the importance of a 
stable Internet and World Wide Web. Internet and World Wide Web legislation still 
has many problems to address that include the common definitions on computer 
crimes, international relations, sovereignty and jurisdiction [210]. To win the war on 
Internet and World Wide Web crime, legislation must not only be enacted but 
enforced as well. Enforcement of legislation in computer crimes is very difficult due 
to an array of factors that include anonymity, global reach through multiple 
jurisdictions, and the retention and preservation of evidence [120]. Additional factors 
include resources, technical knowledge, and the speed at which technology develops 
on the Web, coupled with the need to counteract emerging problems [131].  
As the World Wide Web continues to become an integral part of everyday life, the 
demands for secure Web applications in the business world will continue to grow. 
This societal pressure is being felt in the corporate environment through legislation 
that exists in the US on both the Federal and the State levels. Since there are fifty 
states, covering the impact of all individual state legislation is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. However, the existence of the legislation needs to be acknowledged. 
An example of state legislation is the Minnesota Security Breach Disclosure Act. 
This Act requires businesses to contact individuals when their personal data has been 
released to unauthorized parties due to a security breach [186]. Federal level 
executive orders / legislation that have affected the computer industry include the 
following: 
• Electronic Communications Privacy Act - provided some of the foundations 
for investigating computer crimes [138]. 
• Federal Information Security Act (FISA) of 2002 - “requires each agency to 
inventory its major computer systems, to identify and provide appropriate 
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security protections, and to develop, document, and implement an agency-
wide information security program” [138]. 
• Executive order - National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace - makes 
recommendations to network operators [138]. 
• Homeland Security Act of 2002 - provides authority to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to develop Information systems to encourage the storage, 
analysis and exchange of information [138]. 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7) - stresses the 
improvement of protecting US critical infrastructure [138]. 
• Cyber Security Research and Development Act -  authorized the National 
Science Foundation to award funding for computer security related activities 
[138]. 
• Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act - enables banks to process checks 
electronically and provide substitute checks to customers [200]. 
As discussed in the Web Development Evolution: The Business Perspective on 
Security [75], societal pressure has encouraged the development of U.S. legislation. 
This legislation includes the following acts which are explained below: 
• The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) 
• The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
• The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
• The Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was passed into law in July of 2002 [216] 
• The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 (FACTA)  
• The Family Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 
• Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004. 
The EEA was the first law that explicitly makes the theft of commercial trade secrets 
a federal crime [52, 75, 91]. The Act defined information in very broad terms which 
includes storage of information in intangible forms like that of a document on a 
computer [52, 75]. The EEA was liberal in how it defined “the phrase ‘obtaining 
information’ which  includes merely reading it” [52, 75]. Possible penalties for 
violating the EEA range from fines, to imprisonment, to forfeiture of any property 
used to commit or facilitate the crime [34, 75, 91].   
HIPAA is concerned with disclosure and transmission of healthcare information 
[159]. The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act focuses on how financial organizations use and 
distribute a customer’s personal information [39, 75]. The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
Act was designed to help restore confidence in publicly traded financial companies, 
due to accounting debacles like the one experienced at Enron,  by making the chief 
executive officers and chief financial officers personally responsible for validating 
financial information [75, 98]. However, the wording in the law has a broader reach 
than just the financial industry. The law (Sarbanes-Oxley) states that company CEOs 
and CFOs  establish and maintain proper “internal controls” [75, 98, 216]. This 
means that by signing off on the validity of the data within the system they are also 
signing off on its security [75, 98]. It is important to note that this is only applicable 
in situations where the data can have a material impact on the organization’s 
financial results [216]. The impact of the SOX legislation is the application of 
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immense additional pressure for organizations to provide secure applications, in 
those scenarios, increasing the overall visibility of security in these organizations. 
FACTA falls under the broad category of privacy and data protection [176]. FACTA 
specifically targets the accuracy of consumer financial information in an attempt to 
address identity theft and consumer fraud [38, 161, 196]. This could potentially 
impact any business system that captures and manipulates a consumer’s financial 
information during the course of normal business activities.   
FERPA protects the privacy of student records [197] and The Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act introduces stricter penalties for identity theft [141]. The legislative 
story continues to evolve. A ninety-one page bill was introduced in the Senate by 
Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter [127]. The proposal is an 
aggressive “regulation-oriented” bill containing “an avalanche of new rules for 
corporate data security and stiff penalties for information burglars” [127]. The 
motivation for the legislation is the result of a series of high profile security problems 
[127].  
4.3 US Legislation with International Impact 
It should be noted that the SOX Act has an international impact. 
“It is significant to note that – in contrast to the traditional accommodation 
provided under the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and national 
exchange rules for listed non-U.S. companies – the requirements of the Act 
apply to all foreign private issuers:  
that have securities, including American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”), 
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;  
that are required to file reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act (including all European companies filing Form 20-F); or  
that have filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective (under 
the Securities Act of 1933) and that have not been withdrawn”[125].  
This translates into the Act being applicable to a large portion of the non-US 
companies that are registered with the SEC. Other acts that have an international 
impact include: 
• Electronic Signatures Act - grants electronic contracts the same weight as 
paper contracts [198]. 
• The Computer Fraud Act of 1984 - dealt with computer violations to 
government computers [217]. 
• The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996 amended the 
Computer Fraud Act of 1986 [195] - expanded the legal reach to include non-
government computers making unauthorized access to computers, not in the 
same state, a federal crime [217].  
Page 38 of 262 
 
• The USA Patriot Act of 2001 - greatly expands the US government’s 
capabilities to legally intercept a multitude of communications including 
communications relating to computer fraud and abuse [155]. 
• The US Safe Harbor Act - an agreement that allows US companies 
conducting business in the EU to conform to EU data protection laws [179]. 
4.4 UK Legal Issues  
The US is not the only country that is concerned with cyber crime. Several countries 
have created legislation to address issues that have developed through the expansion 
of the net. Some of the legislation for forty-four different countries is listed in a 
report by Stein Schjolberg [167]. The United Kingdom laws that have impacted 
technology include the following: 
• The Theft Act 1968  - applicable to fraud [32] 
• The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 [32]  
• The Criminal Damage Act 1977 - applicable to physical damage of  
computers [32] 
• The Protection of Children Act 1978 - applicable to child pornography [32] 
• The Telecommunications Act 1984 [32, 136] 
• The Public Order Act 1986 - applicable to racist materials [32] 
• The Criminal Justice Act 1988 [32] 
• The Malicious Communications Act 1988 [188]  
• The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 [32] 
• The Computer Misuse Act 1990 [32] 
• The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 [32] 
• The Data Protection Act 1998 [32] 
• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act(RIP) 2000 [192] 
• Electronic Communications Act 2000 [191] 
• The Telecommunications Regulations 2000 [193] 
• The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 [194]. 
All of the Acts listed above have influenced the application legality of Information 
Communication Technology. Four commonly examined laws when discussing 
computer crimes, the World Wide Web and the internet are: 
• The Telecommunications Act 1984 [32, 136] 
• The Computer Misuse Act 1990 [136] 
• The Data Protection Act 1998 [136] 
• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIP) 2000 [136]. 
The Telecommunications Act makes it a criminal act to transmit obscene materials 
via a telecommunications network or to deceive a licensed telecommunications 
service. The Act defines a telecommunication network broadly enough to include 
Internet traffic [136]. In August of 1990, the Computer Misuse Act became law in 
the United Kingdom. The Act is concerned with three specific offences that include:  
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• Unauthorised access to computer material 
• Unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further 
offences 
• Unauthorised modification of computer material [136, 189]. 
As with any Act there are always possibilities for amendments. An amendment has 
been proposed to The Computer Misuse Act of 1990 that would clearly criminalise 
interference with computer systems via denial of service attacks and significantly  
lengthen the maximum imprisonment terms for offences for unauthorized access and 
unauthorized modification [16]. 
The Data Protection Act specifically addresses offences concerned with unauthorised 
procurement or processing of data [136]. An interesting point in the Data Protection 
Act is that where a proven offence has taken place, the wording referencing the 
liability within corporate bodies in section sixty-one states that 
“any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the 
body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and be liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly” [190]. 
Understanding this information in conjunction with the SOX legislation, discussed 
earlier in the chapter, indicates that there may be an increasing trend towards 
personal liability in computer related legislation.   
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIP) 2000 deals with two major points: 
the interception of data and the relinquishing of encryption keys. This means that the 
UK government can compel Internet Service Providers (ISP) to copy its traffic and 
divert this information to a government location for analysis. It also means that 
individuals holding encryption keys can be subject to prosecution for non-disclosure 
and for notifying any one that they have been served with a disclosure notice [88, 
136, 192]. 
4.5 International Legal Forum  
The importance of the Internet and the World Wide Web is voiced in the US report 
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace via the statement that, in regards to the 
nation’s critical infrastructure, “Cyberspace is their nervous system — the control 
system of our country” and that “the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to 
our economy and our national security” [201]. International support for this 
perspective is visible through efforts attempting to address computer crime which 
include agreements by the G8 nations [118], the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MILAT) [199], the European Union border controls (Interpol) and United Nations 
(UN) recommendations [37, 90]. 
A major event on the international level occurred in November of 2001 when twenty-
two European countries along with Japan, Canada, South Africa and the US signed 
the Cyber-crime treaty [153] also referenced as the Convention on Cyber-crime. The 
treaty is unique in that it is “the first international treaty on crimes committed via the 
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Internet and other computer networks” [40]. The Cybercrime treaty was put into 
force in July of 2004 (which required five ratifications including a minimum of three 
member countries). The treaty attempted to address a range of activities that includes 
computer-related fraud, copyright violations, network security breaches and child 
pornography [40]. The overall impact of the treaty is that it endeavours to address: 
“issues of substantive and procedural criminal law, which member states are 
obliged to take measures to implement in national law, as well as issues of 
international co-operation” [209].
4.6 Summary 
The environment can be described through the business foundational concepts of 
supply and demand. As pressure continues to escalate, i.e., demand increases in 
reference to application security through legislation and dissatisfied customers, not 
following a Web application development methodology that specifically addresses 
security is a potentially expensive and dangerous strategy for any business. Previous 
research has indicated that it is cost effective to address security flaws during 
development. In theory, the implementation of a Web engineering security 
methodology should translate into a higher Return on Investment (ROI) for the 
company and help improve application and application feature time-to-market 
through constant and consistent security testing during application development. The 
implementation of security during the development process should positively impact 
application maintenance as well as helping to improve the overall profit for the 
organization, in effect, increasing the supply of more secure applications. 
Security, from a business perspective, has become a critical issue in today’s Web 
enabled society. The question is not whether an attack will happen to an 
organization’s Web site, but when, and how will it be handled? The best approach to 
security, from a Web application development point of view, is to address security 
issues upfront in the design of the Web application, mitigating both soft and hard 
costs. The decision that an organization has to address is how much risk is it willing 
to accept and at what financial cost. The policies, procedures, standards, processes, 
and technical controls that are developed and implemented will define the system via 
the terms that were discussed in chapter three, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. How the policies, procedures, standards, processes, and technical 
controls define security results from an analysis of the organizations’ business 
objectives, business assessment on the necessity of security and financial 
capabilities. This collaborative approach defines the overall security of the system 
within an organization. The next chapter examines how security is realistically 
perceived and implemented in industry during Web application development. 
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5 Web Application Development 
Security Analysis 
Chapter three established the broad deficiency, in current research and practice, 
regarding security during the Web Engineering Development process. The business 
case established the industrial viability for attempting to address organizational 
security needs during the Web application development process. The next logical 
step was to determine practitioner opinions [162] and acquire practical information 
regarding their experience with security and development methodologies. This was 
approached from a general industry perspective and a specific business perspective.  
This chapter focuses on understanding security in the Web engineering development 
process. Section 5.1 examines the results of a Web survey. Section 5.2 presents an 
analysis of the Web survey data. Section 5.3 examines the results of a survey 
conducted in a Global Fortune 500 financial organization. Section 5.4 presents the 
analysis of the financial organization’s survey results and section 5.5 summarises the 
chapter. 
5.1 Web Survey Results  
In order to acquire information, a Web survey was hosted at the University of 
Glasgow during June and July of 2005. The Web survey was validated by two 
different individuals in the financial industry. The first individual is a Technical Lead 
for a major financial institution in the United States and the second individual is a 
Security Specialist for a financial institution in the United Kingdom. 
The survey was designed to encourage participation so that the majority of the 
questions had a specific answer. The sample size was relatively small, (fifty-three 
initial respondents) and a high number of respondents did not complete all of the 
sections (eighteen), reducing the value of any statistical data that could be derived 
from the survey results.  
The majority of the respondents were acquired through e-mail requests. The e-mail 
requests were initiated through the British Computing Society in Glasgow. These 
requests helped to target professionals in the industry. The balance of the respondents 
was acquired via communication with colleagues. The small sample size helped 
support the initial qualitative approach to the implementation of the survey 
instrument. The purpose of the survey was not to argue the validity of the sample 
size, the presentation / design  [42, 89, 152], or the incomplete survey responses [41, 
89]. In academia, there has also been a great deal of debate over the demographic 
groups that have access to the Internet, also know as the “digital divide” [92]. The 
effort behind the survey focused on the questions, not the presentation, demographic 
groups or plausible reasons for respondent abandonment.  
This survey endeavoured to determine the responder’s opinion [162] and acquire 
practical information regarding his or her experience with security and development 
methodologies. The Web provided the vehicle with the broadest industrial coverage, 
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with the least cost and risk to organizations, while providing information on trends in 
the industry. Other approaches such as gathering log data will not indicate where 
security is in the development process and interviews are very time consuming and 
costly to all parties.  
5.1.1  Demographics 
The initial questions were used to determine the interviewee’s current role in the 
development process and to determine the overall size of the organization. The titles 
indicated that the interviewees were experienced IT professionals. Out of the initial 
fifty-three valid respondents who participated in the Web survey, forty-one of the 
respondents were from the United Kingdom. The balance of the respondents 
consisted of seven from Jordan, one from France, one from Japan, and three from the 
United States. Fifty-three respondents participated in the survey; however, only 
thirty-seven respondents completed the survey. The options for the size of the 
respondent’s organization and their responses are detailed in Table 5 - Organization 
Size.  
Table 5 - Organization Size 
Categories Size Responses 
1 0 – 500 28 
2 500 – 1,000 4 
3 1,000 - 5,000 9 
4 5,000 - 10,000 3 
5 10,000 - 50,000 5 
6 50,000 - 100,000 2 
7 100,000 or More 2 
Although the specific industry was not captured in the survey, the result in the first 
category supports the idea that a lot of Web development companies are small 
companies. Even though the majority of the respondents worked in small businesses, 
there is a reasonable spread of the respondents over the balance of the categories. 
5.1.2 Results 
As expected, the number of respondents decreased as the survey progressed from 
Internet, to intranet to extranet questions. Out of the total number of respondents, 
fifty-one indicated that they had an Internet; thirty-two indicated that they had an 
intranet and twelve indicated that they had an extranet. 
It should be noted that most of the respondents represent small businesses. The 
majority of the respondent’s organizations have Internet sites. The break down of the 
type of application development process implemented by the various organizations is 
shown in Table 6 – Application Development Process.  
Development Processes 
The traditional systems development process appears to remain very prevalent in 
industry Web development. The responses that included some form of the traditional 
development process appeared in five out of the thirteen responses for Internet 
Page 43 of 262 
 
development and eight out of the thirteen for intranet development and four out of 
six responses for extranet development. Oddly enough, none of the respondents 
indicated that they use both agile and traditional processes depending on the nature 
of the project. This suggests that the organizations involved in the survey implement 
a single development methodology to address all their needs during application 
development. This result supports previous application development research 
findings where specific organizations have taken a “one size fits all approach” [129].  
Table 6 - Application Development Process 
 1 2 3 4 5 Total Number of Respondents 
Internet 2 3 2 0 6 13 
Intranet 1 6 2 0 4 13 
Extranet 0 2 2 0 2 6 
Table 6 - Key 
1– Agile Development Process (Extreme Programming, DSDM)  
2– Traditional Systems Development Processes (Water Fall Approach, Spiral 
Model)  
3– A process that is a combination of Traditional and Agile Development Processes 
4– Use both Agile and Traditional process depending on the nature of the project.  
5– In-House 
 
An interesting point is that the data did not totally reflect expectations where the 
methodology and the size of the company were considered in the Internet 
development process. The expectation was that the small companies would be using 
agile approaches and large companies would be using some form of a traditional 
approach. There was a ‘category-six’ company using an agile approach, two 
companies in category one using a traditional approach and one using an in-house 
approach. As the survey progressed to the intranet development questions, the 
number of companies using a traditional systems approach doubles to six companies. 
Two of these companies were in ‘category one’, three were in ‘category five’ and 
one was in ‘category seven’. There were no agile answers to the extranet 
development question. As expected, there were no companies in ‘category one’ that 
responded to having an extranet. The category classification is available in Table 5 
and the overall application development process information is available in Table 6. 
It is encouraging that seventeen of the respondents indicated that they had a defined 
application Internet development process; however, nineteen out of thirty-six 
respondents indicated that they did not. At this point in the survey, the idea was to 
determine the existence of a defined process within an organization and not the 
specifics of the process. One issue that did surface through analysis is the question of 
a defined vs. implicit development process. An alternative set of questions would 
have been to ask if participants had an implicit development process and to have 
expanded on exactly what that entailed.    
It is worth noting that there were more positive answers to the question asking about 
the existence of a defined application development process for intranet and extranet 
applications. The same question, posed about the Internet, yielded more negative 
responses. It should be noted that out of the six respondents who have a defined 
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extranet application development process, five of the respondents have all three 
forms of application development processes defined. The trend indicates that 
organizations with a defined extranet process are more likely to have defined 
processes for Internets and intranets. The high-level application development process 
results are summarized in Table 7 – Defined Application Development Process.  
Table 7 - Defined Application Development Process 
Question YES NO DNK* Respondents
Internet 14 19 3 36 
Intranet 13 11 3 27 
Extranet 6 4 1 11 
*DNK: Do Not Know 
Security Processes 
There were thirty-five responses to a question about the organization having a 
defined application development Internet security process. Out of the thirty-five 
responses, seventeen indicated that they have an Internet application development 
security process, while fourteen indicated that they did not and four indicated that 
they “Do Not Know”. 
The expectation was that there would have been more responses that had a defined 
Internet application development process than a defined Internet security process. 
Another expectation would have been for the respondents who answered positively 
to the defined application development process question to be the same as the 
respondents in the defined application development security process question.  
In other words, the organizations that have an application development process 
would have been expected to have a security development process. A detailed 
examination reveals that there were seven responders who confirmed having a 
defined security development process but who also did not indicate positively that 
they had a defined application development process. This result, however, was 
neither logical nor expected from the survey. 
The organizational demographics for the seven respondents who had a security 
process and did not have a defined development process indicates that these 
respondents are from relatively small organizations. The data are summarized in 
Table 8 – Security Process & No Defined Application Development Process.  
Table 8  - Security Process & No Defined Application Development Process 
Size Count 
0-500 5 
1,000 – 5,000 1 
5,000 – 10,000 1 
The results of the organizational demographics of the ten respondents that had both a 
defined application development process and an Internet security process were as 
expected. The results were spread out across the respondent categories. This 
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information is summarized in Table 9 – Security Process & a Defined Application 
Development Process. 
Table 9 - Security Process & a Defined Application Development Process 
Size Count 
0-500 3 
500 – 1,000 2 
1,000 – 5,000 2 
5,000 – 10,000 0 
10,000 – 50,000 1 
50,000 – 100,000 2 
100,000 or More 0 
The survey did indicate that security is being substantially recognized ‘During the 
initial design phase’ for Internet, intranet, and extranet development. This is an 
excellent indicator that security is starting to be included at the beginning of the 
development process.  To what depth security is being addressed in the design phase 
is still open to debate. 
The survey then attempted to determine the phases that were included in the security 
process, whether there is an individual responsible for ensuring that the security 
process is followed and if there is any job related impact for not following the 
security process. The specifics that the survey revealed, in reference to the 
organizations that claimed to have defined application development security 
processes, are summarized in Table 10 – Security Process Information.  
Table 10 - Security Process Information 
Phases Internet Intranet Extranet 
Total Respondents 17 13 5 
Risk Analysis 12 6 3 
Security Requirements 14 9 5 
Security Design  13 9 5 
Controlled Implementation  14 7 5 
Testing  12 5 4 
Feedback 9 6 5 
Employees Follow Security Process  14 9 5 
Individual Responsible for Insuring 
Security Process is followed 15 9 5 
Job Impact for not following the 
Security Process 4 5 3 
The table reveals that the weakest phase is the feedback phase. Most of the 
organizations that responded indicated there was an individual on the team who is 
responsible for ensuring that the intranet security process is followed, but there was a 
drop in positive responses to the question inquiring about a job related impact for not 
following the intranet security process. It is also worth noting that twenty-three of the 
respondents felt that their organizations considered security to be “Very Important” 
in its Internet, intranet, and extranet applications. However, the number of “Very 
Important” responses fell to sixteen when asked how important security was within 
the development process.  
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Organizations appear to be contributing to the security education of their employees. 
Thirty seven respondents indicated that they take some actions to educate employees 
about computer security. The survey did not attempt to define this information to 
determine the type of security education that was being distributed in organizations. 
The education numbers compared with the perception of importance indicates that 
there still appears to be a gap between understanding security and integrating 
security into the development process. This observation is also supported by the fact 
that out of a potential thirty-five respondents that completed the survey only 
seventeen had an Internet security process. 
Only nineteen (one more than half of the respondents) gave a positive answer to the 
question of the organization having a disaster recovery plan that includes the 
applications in the security design requirements. Only ten of the nineteen responses 
indicated that the organization had tested the disaster recovery plan through 
execution.  
5.2 Web Engineering Security Missing Elements 
Viega stated the issues well in the statement “the problem is, building secure 
software is not easy” [205]. The survey captured relevant data regarding how 
security is realistically perceived and implemented in industry during Web 
application development. In doing so, the survey attempted to gain an understanding 
of the current role security plays in the Web application development process in 
industry. Since the survey specifically targeted Web Application development the 
information derived from the results is targeted in the same area. That is not to say 
that the information may or may not be relevant in other areas of application 
development, but that the research conducted specifically inquired about Web 
application development processes.  
The analysis of the survey data reveals several elements that organizations appear to 
be failing to address. These identified elements need to be stressed when considering 
a Security Improvement Approach (SIA) for Web development projects. An SIA for 
the purposes of this dissertation is defined as the high level theoretical approach to 
making security improvements. The detailed analysis of the information presented in 
this dissertation is reported in the Web Survey Technical Report [82]. The five 
Essential Elements identified in this survey and discussed in the following 
subsections of this chapter are as follows: 
1. Web Application Development Methodology 
2. Web Security Development Process Definition 
3. End-Users Feed Back   
4. Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
5. Job Related Impact 
5.2.1 Web Application Development Methodology 
Before security can be addressed in an organization’s Web application development 
process, there needs to be an application development methodology in use within the 
organization. This methodology can be either implicit or explicit, though it is 
recommended that the development process be explicit. An explicit development 
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methodology helps encourage understanding among existing employees and can be 
used to help foster new employee training. The point supported by the survey is that 
there needs to be a Web application development methodology within the 
organization, regardless of approach. A Web development methodology also helps to 
provide structure to the complex, agile, time sensitive development environment. The 
survey responses indicated that there is the possibility that environments exist that 
claim to have a security process and no application development process.   
This result initiates several queries. The natural questions include: was the survey too 
strict in asking for a defined documented process; are there organizations that do not 
have an implicit or explicit development environment; and are there potential 
discrepancies on the definition of security among the participating parties? These 
concerns are valid observations to note and warrant a discussion in their own right. 
Regardless of the outcome of those discussions, security cannot be implemented into 
a development environment that does not exist. Hence, the identification of the Web 
application development process (even if it is implicit) is a critical starting point 
when trying to integrate security into a development environment. 
5.2.2 Web Security Development Process Definition 
The discrepancy in the responses around the questions concerning a defined 
application development process and a defined application development Internet 
security process indicates that there is possibly some confusion over the definition of 
an Internet security process in the industry. In general, most of the respondents 
indicated that the phases of the security development process were present. This 
indication naturally leads one to suspect that the respondents could have simply 
added a security checklist to a small piece of a traditional process and called it a 
security development process. 
In order to cut down on possible confusion and to ensure that everyone is 
communicating properly, organizations should define: 
• What security means to the business 
• What it means to a Web application 
• What it means in the development process 
• What a Web Engineering Security development process entails. 
Defining this information naturally supports the Web engineering criteria for a 
usability focused design. For the purposes of this discussion, security should be 
defined in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability also know as the CIA 
[153]. Security, in terms of a Web application, means that the information resources 
are suitably protected in terms of the CIA and, it should also consider, the level of 
protection desired based on acceptable risk and appropriate end-user requirements. 
Security in the development process means integrating appropriate security measures 
into the existing development process in order to produce a more secure end-product. 
A Web Engineering Security process should clearly define all aspects of security in 
the development process. It should specifically capture security requirements, 
integrate these requirements into code development, and test to ensure that they were 
successfully addressed. Clearly defining the Web security development process will 
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encourage clearer communication among employees and help with future employee 
training. 
5.2.3 End-User Feedback 
The survey noted that there was a lack of end-user feedback in the Internet, intranet 
and extranet development processes. If a development process does not attempt to 
acquire feedback from the end-users, this could signal potentially large problems 
with the development process alignment with the needs of the business. Strong 
support for end-user participation in Web Application development has been 
previously indicated in a journal article by McDonald and Welland [130]. 
This lack of feedback potentially has a direct impact on the potential effectiveness of 
a security solution. Actual end-users, not surrogate end-users, need to be used in the 
testing of the application. End-users will perform operations, submit data, and 
interpret instructions in ways that the development team, the business team or the 
technical staff within an organization could easily overlook. This is also true from a 
security perspective. 
End-users should be observed and consulted for information on the effectiveness of 
the implemented security solution. Observing employees has the potential to reveal 
security issues and application problems that could be manipulated into contributing 
to a security breach.  
It could be argued that employees are not always forthcoming with information, 
especially if the lack of security or the potential security vulnerability either does not 
directly affect their duties or actually helps them to accomplish their assigned task. 
This indicates that “users often deliberately disable or ignore security to get their 
work done” [12]. The opposite could also be argued in that employees may not be 
aware that they are creating security problems through a lack of knowledge, general 
education and training. Therefore, a multiple stream approach consisting of end-user 
involvement in testing, end-user observation, and end-user consultation is 
recommended when working with end-users. 
The concept of involving end-users in the security aspect of the application 
development process is not a new concept. Saltzer and Schroeder categorized 
“Psychological Acceptability” as one of eight  
“useful principles that can guide the design and contribute to an 
implementation without security flaws” [166].  
Saltzer’s and Schroeder’s viewpoint was from the perspective of minimizing 
mistakes through the human interface design which is a valid point, but it does not 
specifically address end-user involvement in testing or observation of the end-user 
during testing. Existing research [12, 166] coupled with the results of the survey 
discussed in this paper strengthens the case for an organization to seek end-user 
feedback from a security perspective.  
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5.2.4 Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
Nineteen of the thirty-seven respondents indicated that they have a disaster recovery 
plan that includes the individual applications. When asked if the organization had 
tested the disaster recovery plan by execution within the past twelve months the 
number fell to ten. Testing the disaster recovery plan implies that the plan is 
relatively up-to-date and is functional as of the last execution. The survey was really 
saying that there were ten out of a potential thirty-seven organizations that have an 
up-to-date, tested and functional disaster recovery plan. This information concurs 
with an AT&T “survey of more than 1,200 businesses conducted from January to 
August, 2005; (where) nearly 40 percent stated that business continuity planning was 
not a priority” [11]. A Business Continuity Plan (BCP) addresses an organization’s 
capability to respond to events that disrupt critical business systems [90]. This 
comprehensive approach to disruptions would include a disaster recovery plan.   
Security is really a risk management game in today’s society [205]. In today’s Web 
enabled environment disruptions are measured in minutes, not hours [103]. When it 
comes to risk, organizations have to make hard decisions on exactly how much risk 
they are willing to accept and exactly how much money they are willing to spend to 
achieve the agreed upon level of security [75]. This would comprise the inclusion of 
a Web Security process that interfaces with a disaster recovery plan in the application 
development life cycle.  
The logical progression, once the risk and cost decisions have been made, is to 
address the need for a disaster recovery plan. There are a multitude of reasons for 
developing and implementing a disaster recovery plan. These reasons not only 
include the obvious technical attacks on an organization’s Web site, as reported by 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [185], but also natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks. These possibilities have been blatantly exhibited over 
the past year or so and include: The Asian Tsunami; Hurricane Katrina; Madrid 
Bombings [33]; Terrorist bombing in London; and The Hemel Hempstead Oil Depot 
Fire [108].  
These events stress the need for organizations to have and test a disaster recovery 
plan. If the organization does not have a disaster recovery plan, then it is difficult to 
develop a cost effective secure design solution for a Web application.  
5.2.5 Job Related Impact 
The survey revealed that the majority of the organizations did not have a job related 
impact for not following the security development process. There needs to be a job 
related impact associated with security process compliancy. Employees need to 
understand that there are consequences for not following organizational processes. 
This becomes even more important when considering security. 
One solution would be to provide positive and negative reinforcement. The idea is to 
reward individuals that adhere to the security process. An example would be to 
provide monetary rewards to programmers based on the amount of secure code they 
produce, not the total amount of code that they generate. On the other side of this 
issue, there needs to be repercussions for individuals who do not follow the 
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organization’s security development process. Another idea that has surfaced is to tie 
security to the employees yearly evaluation [214]. 
Web Application development takes place in a fast paced environment where 
business reputations, market shares, financial opportunities and losses are at risk 
daily. This increased performance pressure supports the business need for increased 
job related impact measures in secure Web application development. It also supports 
the need to conduct more in-depth industry surveys in order to gain a better 
understanding of security practices and the role of security in large organizations. 
5.3 Fortune 500 Industry Survey Results 
In addition to the Web survey discussed in the previous sections, a more in-depth 
survey was conducted during July and August of 2005, at a Global Fortune 500 
financial organization, which focussed on security. The survey involved a variety of 
individuals engaged in the overall systems development process. The goals behind 
the survey were to determine the areas where security practices were being 
successfully applied and to gain an accurate understanding of the role that security 
plays in a large organization’s application development process.  
The survey examines security from the overall application development perspective 
and from the perspective of security within the process. This survey was conducted 
in the same organization as the research for the Agile Web Engineering (AWE) 
process and the new results from the application development component of the 
survey support previous findings [129]. In-depth survey details are available in a 
technical report [79] and in Appendices III and IV.  
5.3.1 Interviewee Demographics 
Within the organization, sixteen interviews were conducted. This survey sample 
consisted of various employees representing a variety of roles with a diversity of 
work experiences within the technical side of the organization.  The initial questions 
were used to establish the interviewee’s current role in the organization; his/her 
number of years of experience and a brief idea of the individual’s history. These 
questions revealed that the interviewees are experienced IT professionals who have a 
variety of technology backgrounds; and, in general, several years of experience. The 
average number of years of experience among the sixteen respondents was just under 
fourteen years. To comprehend the security challenges, the application development 
process was examined first in order to understand the environment. Then the security 
implications of the environment were scrutinized. 
5.3.2 Application Development Process 
The Web application development findings that are of particular interest to Web 
engineering security research are as follows: 
• At a high level the organization used a customized plan driven document 
centric waterfall approach for all application development including Web 
applications.  
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• After going through a formal design approval process there was no 
verification that the design implemented in production is the design that was 
originally approved.   
• It is questionable as to whether the development process was always 
followed. 
• Realistically, the organization was operating two different approaches to 
application development at different levels within the organization. The high 
level approach was a customized version of the plan driven waterfall 
approach. The low level approach consisted of a number of ad-hoc processes 
contrived by the individual coding teams. 
• Interviewee answers indicated that the current application development 
process is not effective when considering time-to-market issues, rapid 
application development needs and the introduction of new technology, 
resulting in a lack of efficiency. 
• The general indication from the interviewee answers was that projects exceed 
estimated budgets and time frames on a fairly regular basis.   
5.3.3 Security within the Process 
Interviewees were asked about where security is involved in the development 
process. The results of that inquiry are summarized in Table 11. This revealed a lack 
of consideration for security in the business analysis stage of the development life 
cycle. It also indicates that there were deficiencies in the Evaluation, Deployment, 
and Maintenance and Evolution stages. The variety of answers that were received 
when asking employees where security was involved in the development life cycle 
demonstrates the lack of consistent security application throughout the development 
process. It also suggests a lack of employee understanding of the role security plays 
in the application development process. When asked specifically about a security 
process, the majority of the respondents indicated that there was no documented 
process. However, when asked if someone was responsible for security within the 
organization, six out of the eleven positive respondents named a variation of the risk 
team. This is an indicator that security is viewed as someone else’s problem within 
the organization.   
Table 11 - Security Involvement 
STAGE YES NO OTHER 
Business Analysis 4 9 3 
Requirements 10 1 5 
Design 13 0 3 
Implementation 9 4 3 
Testing 9 3 4 
Evaluation 5 5 6 
Deployment 9 4 3 
Maintenance and Evolution 6 5 5 
*Other is any answer that was not a YES or a NO 
The company does have a documented security process in the Project Risk team. The 
interviewee responses reveal that the knowledge of the document is restricted to 
specific groups. Of the five ‘yes’ answers to the existence of a security development 
process, it was unanimous among those five respondents that the security 
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development process applies to all types of application development, including Web 
development projects. 
The problems that were discussed concerning the current security process included a 
lack of emphasis on the employee, a lack of utilization of that process, a lack of 
security involvement after the design has been signed off, and a lack of security 
awareness and stakeholder buy-in to security. The point of break down appears to be 
the length of time around the entire development process. The business has the 
power to circumvent the process to keep projects on track from a time line and 
budget perspective. 
One of the thoughts behind the lack of a known security process within the 
organization seems to be around the fact that the individuals involved in security do 
not record the process. They just do what needs to be done. These people are viewed 
as a resource and are accessed as needed during the development process. However, 
there is some confusion over when and where the Project Risk team actually gets 
involved in the process. This is taken to the point that security is viewed as the 
architect’s problem.  
5.3.4 Security Determination 
When asked how applications are deemed secure within the organization, the 
answers ranged from requirements, to policies, to security standards, to processes, to 
testing, audits and reviews. Requirements refer to the business and the application 
requirements. The policies and standards are set by the Project Risk team and 
industry standards are used to help ensure security within the organization. The 
process refers to the creation of the Design Architecture Document (DAD) and 
submitting it to the Design Architecture Committee (DAC). The testing from the 
organizational perspective refers to internal penetration testing and third party 
testing. Testing from the development perspective is subjective and tailored around 
the needs of the application based on the functional and non-functional requirements. 
The general rule is that high risk applications require more testing and, potentially, 
third party testing.   
The answers indicate that the test used on specific applications depends on the needs 
of the individual application. Outwardly facing applications (i.e. Web Applications) 
are more rigorously tested than inwardly facing applications. Some issues related to 
in-house testing did surface through conversation generated via the survey. Some of 
the respondents indicated that time losses occurred between testing windows. If the 
start time for a specific test is missed, the respondents indicated that it could be as 
long as two weeks before another testing opportunity could be seized. When it comes 
to testing, audits and reviews, as far as the criteria applying to all applications, the 
general consensus was that it depends on the environment, the amount of risk 
presented and the application ‘facing’ that determines the security criteria that would 
be applied.   
The survey confirmed that conflicts arise between the stakeholders and the 
individuals responsible for security. Fourteen of the respondents indicated that 
conflicts arise between the two groups. The types of conflicts range from financial 
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and time constraints, to conflicts over security solutions. The disagreement over the 
security solution appears to have its roots in the perception of the level of risk that an 
application presents to the organization. A higher level of risk would necessitate a 
stronger security solution. This disagreement about perceived risk could logically 
take place between the business unit and the application developers. An interesting 
point that did surface is that certain business units also have their own individuals 
specifically assigned to evaluate the risk a new application presented. When there are 
conflicts on the analysis of a project’s potential risk, this work environment has the 
potential to exaggerate disagreements between the technology area and the business 
unit. 
The survey revealed that contractors are used heavily in the organization. The 
majority of the respondents indicated that contractors are held to the same 
application development methodology as employees. If they use a different process, 
then the process is examined and approved by the organization. The majority of the 
respondents indicated that contractors are also held to the same security requirements 
as employees. However, reading between the lines in conversations, the organization 
does not consistently test contractor constructed applications. Hence, there is the 
possibility that there are discrepancies in application testing. How effectively this is 
monitored and addressed appears to be up to the discretion of the project manager. 
5.3.5 Practical Security 
When the interviewees were asked their opinions on the emphasis security plays 
within the organization, some individuals thought that the emphasis on security was 
strong, due to outside factors such as legislation, while others felt that the emphasis 
was weak. A couple of individuals felt that the emphasis had improved over recent 
months, while others felt that the security focus was still mis-aligned. Some 
individuals felt that security played a large role in the organization while others felt 
that the emphasis was small and that security was effectively seen as an inhibitor 
rather than an enabler in the development process. 
An attempt was made to determine if the elements of the existing in-house security 
process were always followed. The result was that seven out of the sixteen 
respondents indicated that it was not always followed. There was one ‘sometimes’ 
answer and the rest indicated that it was always followed. The interesting point was 
that there were only five respondents indicating that a process exists but there were 
eight individual solid ‘yes’ answers and one ‘sometimes’ answer that indicated that 
the elements of the in-house security development process were always followed. 
This indicates that there was at least an implicit security development process, or 
interviewees felt that it was politically correct to say that it is always followed even if 
it is perceived not to exist or is not understood! The reasons for not following the 
development process range from time pressures, to bureaucracy, to lack of 
awareness, to a lack of security involvement in certain aspects of the process. Other 
reasons that were mentioned include a complete lack of a process and where the 
application sits, i.e., does the application face the Internet or is it internal. 
Eleven of the individuals who were surveyed felt that security should play a larger 
role in the organization’s development environment. Four of the individuals surveyed 
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felt that the current role security plays in the development environment was accurate 
and one felt that there were cases where it should play a smaller role. The individuals 
who felt that the role should be larger based their opinion on several different 
reasons. The reasons that seem to recur throughout the answers to this question are 
focused around the business. They indicate that the financial world is a relatively 
small world and protection of the reputation is critical. They also indicate that, in the 
current environment, security can be de-scoped due to numerous reasons. Integrating 
security into the development process up front would cut development overhead and 
increase security awareness within the organization potentially helping to alleviate 
some of these issues. Various views on the accuracy of the current security role 
included a good balance between security and the development environment; that the 
current role meets project needs; a need to extend security throughout the 
development life cycle and a need to engage the Risk Team as early as possible.  
Eight out of the sixteen individuals surveyed felt that there is no job related impact 
for not following the development security process. Two of the respondents indicated 
that they did not know if there was an impact and six of the respondents felt that 
there was a job related impact.   
5.3.6 Perceived Threats  
An attempt was made to determine major threats to the organization during 
application development. There were a variety of answers that ranged from 
“ignorance, naivety, and incompetence of the people implementing the technical 
solutions”, to coding issues, to coder issues, to general management issues. One of 
the respondents questioned the skill level of the individuals who were creating and 
implementing the design and the security model of the proposed solution. This was 
echoed via other interviewee responses. The coding issues that were discussed 
seemed to focus on the production of bad code. This could be caused by completing 
code rapidly, bad coding practices, not understanding requirements, or malicious 
activity on behalf of a developer. 
The issues around the coder seemed to focus on the dangers associated with 
contractor reliance. Reliance on an outside contractor creates vulnerability from a 
coding practice perspective and from a skill set perspective. If you do not have the 
skills in-house to support the product and the contractor leaves, then the organization 
has to scramble to replace that individual at the risk of a high cost. This also brings 
up another issue that surfaced in this line of questioning, and that is, single developer 
reliance and high contractor reliance. This indicates that the organization does not do 
a good job of sharing development knowledge.   
The managerial issues seemed to focus on unreasonable time scales and poor project 
management from a time and budget perspective. The unreasonable time scales 
imply a lack of understanding of the project requirements on the part of the manager. 
The poor project management of time scales and budgets is inevitably going to put 
pressure on the coding teams to produce a product within shortened time scales. 
The previously mentioned management, coder and contractor issues support the idea 
that security needs to address the people issue, indicating that there needs to be a way 
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to establish trust with individual employees and maintain trust with those employees. 
The process needs to be examined from an end-to-end-perspective to be sure that it 
delivers the desired results. These results need to be examined from a product, a 
security and both an effectiveness and efficiency perspective. The results of the 
survey support the idea that there are fundamental security problems with the 
methodologies being used in Web application development.   
Education is an important area of the security process. Security education should not 
only include raising awareness of the different types of technical attacks and social 
engineering attacks [78, 135], but it should also include information about the current 
environment. Employees should know with whom they should discuss security, how 
it fits into their everyday work environment (i.e. their development process), and the 
potential impact security has on the Web application solution that they are proposing 
or introducing into the organization. 
When the interviewees were asked about the issues they thought were being met and 
the ones they thought were not being met, a variety of answers were received. The 
answers ranged from the coding issues being addressed within the company, to a 
good implementation of separation of duty, to a lack of completely re-testing 
applications when updates are implemented, to out-of-synch testing and production 
environments, to a lack of specific security skills.  
When asked about areas that require more or less emphasis, some of the recurring 
themes included business requirements, education, and testing. When the 
interviewees were asked about the major security risk that they perceived during 
application development, the range of answers included these common themes; seven 
mentioned code/design/testing /requirements, three mentioned people and behavior, 
two mentioned policy circumvention and enforcement, and two mentioned viruses. 
There were a variety of answers to the question inquiring which of these issues are 
being met by the existing process, which ranged from none to all. A few individuals 
did indicate that separation of duty, code reviews and testing is sufficient within the 
organization. There were several respondents who indicated that issues were not 
being satisfied by the existing process. Other answers ranged from a lack of 
documentation, to internal and external coding issues, to a lack of security in the 
design architecture.  
The survey confirmed that conflicts arise between application developers and the 
individuals who are responsible for security. Thus, security from time-to-time is 
perceived as the culprit when Web application development projects do not hit pre-
determined goals. This supports the thought process behind implementing security 
from the beginning of the project and sustaining it throughout the life of the project. 
Integration of security early in the development process helps move security from a 
perceived application development blocker to that of an application development 
enabler role.   
The survey attempted to capture relevant data regarding security practices and gain 
an accurate understanding of the role that security plays in a specific organization’s 
application development process. The next section examines the captured data from 
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the perspective of identifying security criteria that are applicable to Security 
Improvement Approaches. 
5.4 Security Criteria for Web Application Development 
Industry surveys have established the global problem and the organizational survey 
has established the local problem in developing secure Web applications. Together, 
they support the need to establish a Security Improvement Approach (SIA) that can 
be applied to different Web engineering development processes. In order to 
accomplish this goal, a set of criteria needs to be established that is specific to Web 
engineering processes. 
Exler makes an excellent point in that “the best protection” during application 
development “comes from a bullet-proof, practical, rigorous, and scalable process 
that includes security” [65]. The questions then becomes what does an organization 
use as a guide to achieve the best protection and how does an organization 
effectively critique a Web application development process? The answers to these 
questions are derived from the Fortune 500 financial survey discussed in the previous 
section and relevant literature. The Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development (SCWAD) identifies six security criteria within methodologies: 
1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2. Proper Security Controls in the development environment 
3. Security Visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
and security 
5. Prompt, Rigorous Security Testing and Evaluation 
6. Trust and Accountability 
5.4.1 Active Organizational Support 
Active organizational support for security in the Web development process is critical. 
Without the support of management, there is little hope for effective integration of 
security within the development process. Managerial support for security needs to be 
both proactive and reactive. Management needs to be proactive by supporting 
employees, hence, giving them the necessary tools to be successful in their 
endeavors. Likewise, management needs to be reactive by stating and enforcing job 
repercussions if employees do not follow security practices within the development 
process or the development process in general upon which the security process 
depends. This lack of enforcement is noticeable in the organizational survey through 
the number of respondents who indicated that there was not a job related impact 
associated with not following the development process. This also means that the 
development process and any existing security measures need to apply to all 
employees including contractors and permanent employees. Again, this issue is 
questionable in the organizational survey. 
Active organizational support includes encouragement of security communication 
among employees. The process itself should encourage communication among 
employees. The increased communication should translate into a better working 
understanding of the role security plays in the development process and the 
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organization. This better understanding should increase the overall level of security 
in the development process.  A key component of security is education. Employees 
need to be formally educated on the role security plays in the development process 
and in the organization, i.e., all stakeholders need to understand all of the security 
requirements along with the role security plays in the development process. 
5.4.2 Proper Security Controls 
The organization has to have proper security controls. The term proper security 
controls is a very broad term that encompasses policies, knowledge, technology, and 
processes. These controls help to provide structure to the development environment.   
5.4.2.1 Policies/Standards/Procedures 
Policies, standards and procedures are utilized to assist in providing a cohesive 
organizational infrastructure.  
“The goal of an information security policy is to maintain the integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of information resources” [91]. 
The policy indicates “what” is to be done while the standards and procedures indicate 
“how” it is to be accomplished [90]. The detail to which these controls are developed 
and implemented will depend on cultural and business DNA of an individual 
organization. The organizational survey revealed that development and security 
policies have been created and are maintained in the company. However, if the 
development process is not always adhered to, then it stands to reason that the 
policies are not always enforced. If a project goes through under the wire, there is no 
guarantee that the risk team has been properly briefed on the project details. 
5.4.2.2 Knowledge 
Organizations need to encourage knowledge transfer among employees and provide 
for proper training. Such training is necessary with respect to comments regarding 
incompetence which were covered in section 5.3.6 Perceived Threat, issues with 
coding, issues with the coders themselves, and managerial issues, all of which impact 
security issues in Web Development.  
As discussed in chapter three, section two, the Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) 
publishes Guidelines for Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response in which 
they define a security vulnerability as 
“a flaw within a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its 
documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to violate its 
documented security policy” [78, 142]. 
This translates into the fact that any flaws in the system design or application coding 
can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities [78]. This problem is emphasized due 
to the availability and accessibility of Web applications. Common Web development 
security problems include un-validated parameters, cross-site scripting, buffer 
overflows, command injection flaws, error-handling problems, insecure use of 
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cryptography, and broken access controls [20, 78, 134]. Designers and developers 
should be educated on common development flaws, best coding practices and the 
implementation of practical development solutions. Coupling the OIS definition with 
the results of the survey supports the idea that security can not be left to the 
acquisition of the functional and non-functional security requirements. It also 
supports the idea that security is more than a technical issue; it is a people, a process 
and an educational issue that must be addressed in its entirety.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter security should cover a variety of topics. These 
topics include technical attacks, social engineering attacks and information 
pertaining to the impact of security against the daily operational Web application 
development activities within the organization.  
5.4.2.3 Technology 
Technological controls can be as granular as implementing proper authentication in 
order to preserve confidentiality, integrity and availability through policy 
enforcement. Technological controls can also include the use of source control 
applications, the use of standardized application development software and up-to-
date code libraries. Software can be used to analyze code to reduce the number of 
security vulnerabilities. Technology can also be utilized during application 
development by using project management software and monitoring programs such 
as network intrusion detection and host based intrusion detection systems.     
5.4.2.4 Process 
A Gartner report refers to the process as  
“The newest and least-mature lens added to the resources of the information 
security officer” [72]. 
Gartner goes on to say that 
“focus(ing) on process maturity can improve the quality of work and the 
efficiency with which it is accomplished (and that) the ability to translate 
efficiency into cost savings makes process maturity an easily justified 
investment” [72].  
The process that an organization decides to implement is another form of control. 
This process can be in the form of a development process and a specific security 
process. It should be noted that there needs to be an application development process 
established either explicitly or implicitly within the organization. Without a 
development process there is serious potential for chaos. The results of the project 
then depend on the skill levels of the individuals involved.  
The survey revealed three problems within the organization. The first problem is that 
the process is not used on all projects or is not followed properly for all projects. The 
second issue is that, realistically, the organization is operating two different 
approaches to application development at different levels within the organization. 
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The risk with the issues is that security is implemented at the high level approach and 
ignored at the lower levels. This situation can mask security problems and make 
them more complicated to resolve. The third problem, the split process environment, 
naturally encourages a lack of consistency in the coding, documentation and delivery 
abilities between different development areas within the organization.  
5.4.3 Security Visibility 
The third criterion is that security is visible throughout all areas of the development 
process. The organization’s application development findings indicate that there is a 
problem with visibility due to the fact that, after a design has been formally 
approved, there is no verification that the implemented design matches the approved 
design. It also indicated that there is a much deeper security issue within the 
organization. The fact that the organization is operating two different development 
methodologies at different levels within the organization violates the visibility 
criteria. Security could potentially be implemented at the higher level and never filter 
down to the lower level. The security aspect of the organizational survey revealed 
that there are deficiencies in the areas of Business Analysis, Evaluation, Deployment, 
and Maintenance and Evolution.   
Security should be visible in all steps of the development process if it is to be 
implemented with any success. This implies that the development process needs to 
be security focused. The term security focused translates into the use of effective and 
efficient designs, good coding practices, addressing security issues such as 
authentication and authorization issues, having specific security testing criteria, and 
acquiring feedback from the end-user that is security specific. This means that the 
process encourages secure practices such as: acquiring specific security 
requirements, infrastructure re-use, re-usable components, coding standards, coding 
practices, end-to-end data security, secure designs, and takes into account security 
policies, procedures and standards. 
Security solutions should also be confirmed with the end-user. Does the solution 
meet the needs of the end-user? If not, is the end-user circumventing the security 
measure? The survey indicates that there is a deficiency in the acquisition of end-user 
feedback.  This end-user feedback deficiency is supported by other work in the same 
organization [130]. 
5.4.4 Delivery of a Cohesive System 
The goal of any development process should be to deliver a cohesive system, 
integrating business requirements / needs, software and security. This means that the 
security requirements of the business need to be identified as early as possible in the 
development process so that they can be incorporated into the design and the 
construction in order to produce secure software. The survey indicates that this does 
not happen within the organization. Security is lacking in the business analysis stage. 
The incorporation of security into the development process should be as seamless as 
possible. The security that is implemented should meet the needs of the organization 
so that it adds value to the end product and to the overall business process. The 
application development area of the survey indicates that this criterion is not being 
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met. The development process is not effective when considering time to market, 
rapid application deployment needs, introduction of new technology, and efficiency. 
Since security is not explicitly stated in the analysis phase of the process, the 
organization does not truly know if the business needs are being satisfied. To make 
matters worse, the survey revealed that budgets and time frames are often exceeded. 
A metric system should also be developed that helps the organization determine the 
success of the development process security initiative. This should include issues 
ranging from general security education, to training, to monitoring and tracking all 
development bugs. This will help the organization determine if it is actually 
delivering a cohesive system that integrates the business, the software and the 
security perspectives.  
5.4.5 Prompt, Rigorous Security Testing and Evaluation 
The development process should include rigorous end-user relevance testing and 
evaluation. The idea of collecting information from end-users is not a new idea in the 
testing world. Rakitin advocates primarily a post-implementation solution when he 
indicates that  
“data collected on the types of problems reported by customers (an example of 
a product metric) can be used to change the software validation test suite to be 
more representative of actual customer use of the product” [160]. 
Testing is critical to the success of many applications. This is especially true of 
applications that live on the World Wide Web. The criticality of testing Web 
applications is due to the unlimited exposure provided by the Internet. This extreme 
exposure reinforces the idea that software testing should be conducted from different 
perspectives such as structure-driven, requirements-driven, statistics-driven and risk-
driven testing [74]. Testing should be conducted from a design and programming 
perspective using both automated tools [74, 86] and manual scripts. Testing should 
also consist of activities that include: code reviews [86], and black and white box 
testing [160]. Likewise, testing should also take into consideration as much as is 
realistically achievable and financially viable by the organization. The risk presented 
by the application coupled with financial capabilities could warrant additional testing 
in the areas of penetration testing [153] and end-user evaluation testing. End-user 
testing translates into the process being accountable for the security requirements, the 
environment and the practicality of the solution from the end-user’s perspective. 
Another sound testing practice is to bring in external testers [153] to validate 
application security, when the risk is deemed appropriate for such an action. 
The survey revealed, in the Security Determination section, that the process is not 
efficient in creating a situation where certain types of testing can occur on demand. 
Rigorous testing is a necessity in Web application development; however, the idea of 
possibly losing two weeks based on strict testing windows directly contradicts the 
Web application development need for short development life cycles. In a perfect 
world, testing should take place throughout the development life cycle; hence, 
utilizing short focused development cycles.  However, this issue is dependent on the 
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development life cycle the organization decides to implement as well as the cultural 
environment. 
5.4.6 Trust and Accountability 
The development process should encourage the development and maintainability of 
trust and accountability within the organization. Trust can be defined as “Firm 
reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing” [60]. It is the 
foundation for a good relationship because it realistically adds value to the 
communication that takes place in the relationship [110]. Kaplan’s reference to 
Gerick’s explanation of trust is that  
“trust is not transitive, distributive, associative, or symmetric except in certain 
instances that are very narrowly defined” [110].  
This information is of key importance to understanding the overall concept of trust. 
Establishing trust is the heart of security for without trust you can not rely on the 
information that is presented. A major component in gaining trust is to manage risk 
and then to implement appropriate controls, educate employees and monitor 
effectiveness [110]. A tried and true approach to identifying risk is a risk assessment 
initiative. Trust should be identified in the risk assessment and mitigated in the 
design to establish and maintain trust. Since nothing is truly risk free, the goal is to 
mitigate the risk so that it is at an acceptable level. Therefore, the development 
process has to take risk into consideration. This is typically done via a risk analysis. 
The earlier this is completed in the development process the better. 
Accountability is critical to the enforcement of security. Individuals have to be 
successfully identified and authenticated in order to be held accountable for their 
actions through the use of logs and the effective implementation of access 
methodologies. The effective establishment of trust and realistic implementation of 
accountability controls should be visible within the organization’s security policy, 
the application’s design, coding practices, coding standards, application testing, and 
project feedback, as a project progresses through the application development life 
cycle. 
5.5 Summary 
The results from the Web survey have identified five Essential Elements that can be 
used in a Security Improvement Approach (SIA) and, optimally, should be examined 
prior to conducting a Security Improvement Initiative (SII) within an organization. 
The five Essential Elements identified in this survey are as follows: 
1. Web Application Development Methodology 
2. Web Security Development Process Definition 
3. End-User’s Feed Back   
4. Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
5. Job Related Impact 
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The basic idea is that there appears to be fundamental issues with industrial Web 
application development that need to be addressed. The survey indicates that the 
elements listed above appear to be problem areas and warrant additional research. 
This does not mean that the list is exhaustive or conclusive or that these elements are 
mandatory for an organization to function. However, their presence will potentially 
improve the results of the SII and/or provide a less resistant path to identified areas 
that need improvement. This information can also be utilized to help critique security 
identifying potential problem areas in a SII that is currently being executed. Once the 
foundational issues for conducting a SIA have been established, the next step 
examined where security practices have been effectively applied in a large 
organization. 
The Global Fortune 500 financial organization demonstrates a lack of security 
integration in the application development process. This lack of integration is 
supported through deficient security discussion in the beginning of the development 
process, a lack of encouragement for re-usable components, a lack of follow-up after 
design approval, and a lack of employee understanding of the role security plays in 
the application development process. The results also indicate that there is a gap 
between the application development process and the implementation of security 
from an end-to-end perspective. Therefore, it is vital to develop a security process 
that addresses security issues throughout the entire process.  Empirical evidence from 
the organizational survey coupled with relevant literature supports the identification 
of six Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD): 
1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2. Proper Security Controls in the development environment 
3. Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
and security 
5. Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation 
6. Trust and Accountability 
SCWAD provides an avenue for assessing existing Web Engineering processes and a 
guide to future Security Improvement Approaches and Initiatives. The next chapter 
examines SCWAD in conjunction with Web Engineering processes and security 
processes.  
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6 Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development (SCWAD) Analysis 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate existing application development 
processes and security processes used in Web engineering via the Security Criteria 
for Web Application Development (SCWAD). Therefore, this chapter is based on a 
critical literature review that examines popular Web engineering processes and 
security processes assessing their compatibility with the SCWAD. 
The point of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive evaluation or to argue the 
validity of either Web engineering development processes or security methodologies. 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine popular Web application development 
processes and security processes from the SCWAD perspective. The analysis at this 
stage of the dissertation will also assist with future process discussion throughout the 
remainder of the dissertation. The Web engineering processes that were chosen 
include both agile and traditional software engineering processes. The reason for this 
is twofold. First, it demonstrates that the criteria are applicable to both traditional and 
agile engineering approaches. Secondly, and more importantly, the Web survey 
discussed in chapter five indicates that both approaches to Web engineering are used 
in industry.   
SCWAD identifies six criteria which were discussed in detail in chapter five. The 
rating of the various methodologies is examined from the perspective of: 
• None – no direct reference was determined from the materials 
• Weak – minimal indication of applicability 
• Partial – indicates that there was some evidence of applicability 
• Strong - clear support for the criteria.  
The criteria are summarized in Table 12 - Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development (SCWAD). 
Table 12 - Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
1 Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software & security 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation 
6 Trust and Accountability 
There are several methodologies that can be used in Web application development. 
These include both traditional plan driven approaches and agile approaches. Figure 1 
– Process Positions on the Web Engineering Process Spectrum presents the spectrum 
of Web engineering application development methodologies that are discussed in this 
chapter. The methodologies were chosen for discussion in this chapter for two 
reasons. The first reason is that they provide a good representation of methodologies 
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across the broad spectrum. The second reason is that they are reasonably popular in 
industry.  The chapter briefly describes the individual processes displayed in Figure 1 
- Process Positions on the Web Engineering Process Spectrum along with ranking 
them according to SCWAD. Section 6.1 examines plan driven processes. Section 6.2 
inspects agile process. Section 6.3 looks at security methodologies and section 6.4 
provides a summary of the chapter. 
Figure 1 - Process Positions on the Web Engineering Process Spectrum 
 
6.1 Plan-Driven Processes 
The Waterfall approach and the Unified Software Development (USD) process 
represent traditional approaches, also known as plan-driven approaches, to software 
development. Plan-driven approaches follow a series of fairly rigid steps in order to 
progress through the development life cycle. 
s between stages and the initial introduction of the idea of prototyping 
ut at all, the requirements stage and system specification are traditionally 
where security would have been discussed. Subsequent phases make direct reference 
6.1.1 Waterfall Model  
The waterfall method is the classic traditional software engineering methodology. 
The waterfall model is attributed to Royce [164]; however, it should be noted that 
Royce’s waterfall model was a refinement of Benington’s Stagewise model [19] 
which was discussed in 1956 [24]. The refinements consisted of the addition of feed 
back loop
through the emphasis on “build it twice” [19, 24]. 
The basic waterfall process according to Royce included the following stages: 
systems requirements, software requirements, analysis, program design, coding, 
testing and operations [164]. Since its inception, the waterfall methodology has been 
condensed into five stages. The information regarding the individual stages of the 
waterfall method, which is displayed in Table 13 - Waterfall Method, has been taken 
directly from the Sommerville’s Software Engineering text book eighth edition 
[175].  
Security is not specifically discussed in any of the original documentation. There is, 
however, reference in the original documentation and subsequent discussions of the 
waterfall method about specifications and requirements [164, 207]. If security was 
talked abo
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to verification and validation ons and/or the requirements 
[207]. In a perfect world, if se
requirements, then it should have 
However, since this has not specif hat needs to be 
a r s sta
being addressed. It has also been n
taken place; however, since “ther
are” [174] and they are not a pa ethodology, this topic is not 
p s
bl
1 Requirements Definition 
tion 
 of either the specificati
curity had been specifically documented in the 
trickled-down to the other stages of the life cycle. 
ically been documented as an area t
dd essed in the requirement ge there can be no assumption that this issue is 
oted that the identification of sub-phases may have 
e is no general agreement on what the sub-phases 
rt of the original m
ur ued. 
Ta e 13 - Waterfall Method 
The system’s services, constraints and goals are established 
by consultation with system users. They are then defined in 
detail and serve as a system specifica
2 System and Software Design The system design process portions the requirements to 
either hardware or software systems. It establishes an overall 
system architecture. Software design involves identifying 
and describing the fundamental software system abstractions 
and their relationships. 
3 Implementation a  is realised as a set of 
programs or program units. Unit testing involves verifying 
nd Unit Testing During this stage the software design
that each unit meets its specifications 
4 Integration and System Testing  The individual program units or programs are integrated and 
tested as a complete system to ensure that the software 
requirements have been met. After testing, the software 
system is delivered to the customer. 
5 Operation and Maintenance The system is installed and put into practical use. 
Maintenance involves correcting errors which were not 
discovered in earlier stages of the life cycle, improving the 
implementation of system units and enhancing the systems 
services as new requirements are discovered. 
*Source: Sommerville’s Software Engineering, Seventh edition [175] 
The waterfall method does not support the first criteria ‘active organizational support 
ce’s original article is heavily concentrated on 
documentation. Royce does talk about controlling the testing phase and specifically 
being 
captured in the requirements stage. Progression of the requirements through the 
for security in the Web development process’. The methodology does not make any 
reference to the policies, standards and procedures to which the application needs to 
comply. Nor does it discuss employee knowledge or technological controls. The very 
nature of the discussion acknowledges the process as a control on the subconscious 
level. The control discussed in Roy
controlling input values while acknowledging the need to control certain aspects of 
the development process. However, there is no discussion of the process as an overall 
control of the development process. 
While the methodology does attempt to identify specific requirements and 
specifications along with compliance, the methodology does not make direct 
reference to security. At best, security is presumed to be a part of the requirements 
and the specifications. This translates into security, at best, being a superficial issue 
in the waterfall methodology. 
It could be argued that it is presumed that the security requirements are 
Page 66 of 262 
 
proces rfall 
metho  the 
develo  the 
waterf rification with specifications. The Integration and 
System Testing stage makes direct reference to meeting the requirements. However, 
ot seen as a 
atrix of phases and workflows. The phases of 
cess nd transition. The 
f the phases. The workflows 
en 
explicitly compared with SCWAD, both of these processes demonstrate the inherent 
lack of security within basic plan-driven application development processes. 
s is supported by the fact that the System and Software Design, of the wate
dology, allocates requirements to the software design to be used in
pment of the architecture. The Implementation and Unit Testing stage, of
all methodology, involves ve
since security is not specifically called out in the development process the rating is 
‘None’ for the third criteria.  
Couple this information with the original comments by Royce stating that it is 
“important to involve the customer in a formal way so that he has committed 
himself at earlier points before final delivery (and that) to give the contractor 
free rein between requirement definition and operation is inviting trouble” 
[164]. 
This information warrants acknowledgement; however, security is n
specific issue that needs to be addressed. A ‘None’ rating is assigned to the ‘prompt 
and rigorous testing and evaluation’ criteria. The waterfall methodology does not 
presents specific evidence to support the idea of proper controls in the development 
environment, or the delivery of a cohesive system that supports integrating business 
requirements, software and specifically security; nor does the methodology discuss 
trust and accountability. Therefore, the Waterfall method does not explicitly support 
any of the criteria listed in Table 12 – Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development. 
6.1.2 The Unified Software Development Process (USD) 
The inception of the USD process can be traced as far back as 1967 in the Ericsson 
Corporation [105]. It has undergone many modifications since that time. The current 
USD process actually consists of a m
the pro  include inception, elaboration, construction, a
workflows take place, to varying degrees, within each o
consist of requirements, analysis, design, implementation and test. The USD process 
is use-case driven, architecture-centric, iterative and incremental [105]. It should be 
noted that risk is mentioned as the driver for the iterative approach that the USD 
process promotes. However, when discussing the iterative and incremental process, it 
is from a project risk perspective, not a security risk perspective. All of these points 
are good points for a development process. However, the process does not 
specifically address security. Hence, the USD process does not explicitly support the 
SCWAD listed in Table 12.  
6.1.3 Plan-Driven Development Summary  
There are other plan-driven development processes in existence that contain similar 
basic elements such as a requirements gathering stage, a development stage, a testing 
phase and an implementation phase. The two that were discussed above are arguably 
two of the more popular traditional development processes used in industry. Wh
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6.2 Agile Methodologies 
Agile approaches have been broadly characterized as incremental, straight forward, 
cooperative and adaptive [2]. A review and analysis of agile software methodologies 
by VTT Technical Research Center of Finland examined several different agile 
methodologies through five different lenses [1]. It is interesting to note that security 
was not a separate lens or considered as an aspect of one of the examined lenses.  
6.2
The first version of DSDM was published in the mid nineties. DSDM has been 
describ
According to Stapleton, DSDM is based on the following nine principles: 
4. ness purpose is the essential criterion for acceptance of 
deliverables 
ring development are reversible 
7. Requirements are base lined at a high level 
ed throughout the lifecycle 
and cooperative approach between all stakeholders is 
None of the nine principles discussed above explicitly state the need to address 
security from the perspective of SCWAD. Stapleton goes on to define the five stages 
2. Business study 
3. 
4. 
5. Implementation [177]. 
 “speeding up the development process through shortening the communication 
However, there is nothing to indicate that the communications are about security 
rela M supports active involvement of the end-user throughout the 
dev ain, this is great. However, users are not explicitly being 
ask  the security of the system, the effectiveness, or to test the 
implem lution?   
.1 Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) 
ed as a frame work of controls for Rapid Application Development (RAD). 
1. Active user involvement 
2. DSDM teams must be empowered to make decisions 
3. The focus is on frequent delivery of products 
Fitness for busi
5. Iterative and incremental development is necessary to converge on an 
accurate business solution 
6. All changes du
8. Testing is integrat
 9. A collaboration
essential [177]. 
of DSDM as follows: 
1. Feasibility study 
Functional model iteration 
Systems design and build iteration 
Even though the five original stages support individual ideas that are prominent in 
the SCWAD, they are not discussed from a security perspective. DSDM supports 
improved communication in organizations. In this case, DSDM describes it as 
lines between all parties involved” [177].  
ted matters. DSD
elopment process. Ag
ned to provide input o
ented security so
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A DSDM.org white paper [63] does describe the implementation of the DSDM 
process in an organization slightly differently. They describe it as follows: 
2. Feasibility Study 
ject risk 
and details the working environment. The ‘Post Project’ phase reviews the project, 
ons learned phase. 
This phase looks at everything from the solution’s business fit, to measurable 
to management expectations.  
ctions to first release, 
productionising, maintenance and death. The Extreme programming Web site 
l release stage. The iteration 
stage is refined to include iteration planning, development and the latest version 
stages
Several individual XP tasks were analysed via SCWAD criteria. It should be noted 
1. Pre-Project  
3. Business Study 
4. Identify Suitable Projects 
5. Deliver DSDM Project 
6. Post Project DSDM Promotion 
7. Critical Success Factors [63]. 
The difference between the implementation approach and the actual methodology is 
really the level of execution. The implementation points discussed above are from a 
higher level of functioning than the actual methodology. The phases that exist, in 
some form, in the previous discussion of DSDM, include phases two, three and five. 
The new phases include phases one, four, six and seven. It should be noted at this 
point that a later release of the DSDM methodology does add in the pre-project and 
post project phases [178]. The general idea behind the points mentioned above could 
be argued to take place in any development process. According to the white paper, 
the ‘Pre-Project’ phase identifies a specific problem that DSDM can address. The 
‘Identify Suitable Projects’ phase selects a project, highlights the main pro
examines any applicable matrix, promotes the project’s successes, communicates this 
information out to the public, and starts looking for another project. The ‘Critical 
Success Factors’ phase is what is commonly referred to as a less
benefits of the solutions, to team satisfaction, 
DSDM is very pro-business; however, it does not explicitly recognize security 
integration with the business needs in either approach discussed above. Thus, DSDM 
shows no explicit support for SCWAD criteria listed in Table 12.  
6.2.2 eXtreme Programming (XP) 
The XP life-cycle has six phases as described in Beck’s first book [17]. The 
individual cycles include: exploration, planning intera
presents a slightly different picture of the extreme programming project which is 
displayed in Figure 2 - eXtreme Programming Project. They have a release planning 
stage, an iteration stage, an acceptance stage and a smal
 which are shown in Figure 3 - Iteration Refinement.  
that at no point does Beck make direct reference to a security solution while 
discussing the individual tasks. In fact, Beck states that  
“A system isn’t certifiably secure unless it has been built with a set of security 
principles in mind and has been audited by a security expert”[18].  
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Beck goes on to state that XP is compatible with security but that the security 
practices would have to be incorporated into the team’s daily activities. The inherent 
security compatibility of XP could be suggested to support the first criteria ‘Active 
organizational support for security in the Web development process’ through the 
implementation of pair programming. Two people coding amounts to on-the-spot 
code reviews. However, security was not explicitly stated. Another XP activity that 
om a security perspective. One could argue that if you trust the software 
and security was a requirement of the system, then trust from a security perspective 
has been established on a ity to be truly integrated 
into a development life cycle, security needs to be explicitly stated. The results of the 
analysis indicate that XP does not show explicit support for the criteria listed in 
Table 12. 
Figure 2 - eXtreme Programming Project 
shows inherent support for one of the criteria is testing. The fifth criteria states that 
there are ‘Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation’; testing is a major activity in XP. 
XP promotes short development cycles along with early, frequent and automated 
testing of code.  
It should be noted that Beck does mention trust but from a social perspective. He 
explains that the customers need to trust the software; developers need to trust 
progress reports and developers need to trust each other. He does not explicitly call 
out trust fr
n implicit level. However, for secur
 
 
Figure 3 - Iteration Refinement 
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6.2.3 Agile Development Summary 
Again, there are many other agile development processes in existence that share 
common attributes such as short development cycles, parallel development, heavy 
o four categories which 
consisted of functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist. 
sed of the business, social and computer environments and that 
licting interest. Discordance among these 
promise and negotiation.  
nerational approaches 
focus on specific activities such as check list, standards, and structured step wise 
me  on the social and the 
soc es’s soft 
app rmation System (VIS) approach in 
this
6.3
A t approach, also know as the Orion 
Stra  adept at providing information security 
user involvement and development stages. The two that were discussed above are 
arguably two of the more popular agile development processes used in industry. 
When explicitly compared with SCWAD both of these agile processes demonstrate 
an inherent lack of security within basic agile application development processes. 
6.3 Security Methodologies 
Security methodology research has been reasonably well covered by Dhillon and 
Backhouse [57], Siponen [171] and Baskerville[13]. Dhillon and Backhouse 
categorized Information System security research int
Baskerville analyses early security solutions and Siponen developed a generational 
classification scheme. Industrial attempts have also been conducted in this area along 
with specific academic initiatives into agile development. 
According to Dhillon and Backhouse, they use a framework derived by Burrell and 
Morgan to categorise information systems security research. They state that the 
functionalist paradigm is based on the natural sciences. The interpretive is based on 
social situations and the actions of the individuals within those situations. The radical 
humanist focuses on “harnessing the competence of people” [57] rather than 
technology and rational models. The radical structuralist believes that the 
organization is compo
these environments are driven by conf
groups is resolved through com
Siponen indicates that the contributors to this field of security research consist of 
four communities which include: computer security, MIS/IS security, database 
security and cryptology [171]. The two categories that contributed to the areas where 
WES is focused include MIS/IS security and computer security. As discussed in 
Chapter three, Siponen expanded on Baskerville’s security methodology analysis 
creating a generational classification system. The first three ge
thods. According to Siponen, the fourth generation focuses
ns. Siponen mentions the Jamio-technical facets of the third generatio
roach [106] and Karyda’s, et. al., Viable Info
 category [111].  
.1 Orion Strategy 
more detailed examination of James’s 
tegy [106], reveals that it is really more
sof
than security during application development. This point is demonstrated in a paper 
published by Armstrong [8]. The phases associated with the Orion strategy focus on 
information security and associated activities. These activities, really, should be 
conducted before a specific application goes through the development process. The 
eight phases associated with the Orion strategy are as follows: 
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1. Acknowledgement of Possible Security Vulnerabilities 
2. Analyse Current Security Situations 
3. Analyse Systems of Information Security 
4. Model Ideal Information and Security Situations 
5. Compare Ideal security with Current Security 
6. Identify and Analyse Measures to Fill Gaps 
7. Establish and Implement Security Plan 
8. Monitor and control Activity [106]. 
The first stage of the strategy calls for vulnerability recognition by an empowered 
senior manager who can take actions to resolve matters. The second stage 
investigates the organization’s current security situation. This analysis involves staff 
briefings, security reviews, security awareness seminars and a big picture 
compilation.  The third stage examines the systems of information and the security of 
the information through system identification, a high level systems analysis, the 
creation of security profiles for core systems and a detail risk analysis. The fourth 
stage creates a model of the ideal information security situation based on the 
information from the previous stage. The fifth stage compares the ideal security 
model with reality. The idea is to use the comparison of the system to identify 
This would entail the establishment of system goals and measurable 
performance criteria.  All of the stages of the Orion strategy are more attuned with 
e issue is also revisited in the final stage through training and 
education. 
ess is not discussed in 
security gaps in the organization, not an individual application that is under 
construction. The sixth stage identifies and analyses possible solutions to the gaps 
identified in the fifth stage. The seventh stage calls for a decision from senior 
management on the preferred solutions along with preferred solution 
implementation. The last stage calls for monitoring and controlling actions when 
necessary. 
solving security problems post system construction not prior system construction. 
Thus, these activities are better suited for a high-level information security initiative. 
Even though the applicability of this strategy to the development process is 
considered possible, but not probable, it can still be examined, from a high-level 
perspective, under the light of SCWAD.  
When the Orion strategy is compared with SCWAD, there is ‘Strong’ support for the 
first criteria. SCWAD’s first criterion focuses on encouragement for security 
communication among employees. The Orion strategy encourages this in the analysis 
of the current security situation stage through the staff briefings and security 
awareness seminars. Th
The second criteria can be subdivided into four important points which include: 
Policies/Standards/Procedures, Knowledge, Technology and Process. The strategy 
does not discuss the policies, standards or procedures within the organization or the 
impact of these items on information security. The strategy does encourage 
knowledge transfer through training and education but not at the design or coding 
levels of the construction of an application. Technology is examined as part of the 
solution to identified problems but not from an application development perspective. 
Simply following the Orion strategy which is a process for improving information 
security helps with the criteria but again the development proc
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conjun  the 
secon
The Orion strategy does not discuss the actual development process or the integration 
pt to do this but it is vague about 
the capturing of the business security requirements. There appears to be an 
The second observation is that the business requirements are not explicitly stated 
when discussing the phases of the strategy.  Nor does the strategy discuss software 
elopm lead to k’ 
comp
T e aluatio the 
impl  
i a ablished to determine effectiveness but 
t s as been implemented. Therefore, the rating for the fifth 
criteria is ‘Weak’. The strategy does indicate that a risk analysis is conducted in the 
al system. However, the strategy 
AD) Results 
ction with the Orion strategy. The strategy shows ‘Weak’ support for
d criteria at best. 
of the strategy into a development process; however, the phases of the Orion strategy 
could be loosely associated with application development stages. Thus, the rating for 
the third element is ‘Weak’. The fourth criterion focuses on the delivery of a 
cohesive system. The Orion strategy claims to attem
assumption that the compatibility of the security recommendation offered in stage 
seven will be evaluated by senior management and they will make the appropriate 
decision.  This inference is supported by a couple of observations. The first is a 
statement made when discussing user participation indicating  
“technical experts may be knowledgeable in their own field of speciality, 
however, they cannot be expected to know the business operations of the 
organisation to the same depth or as widely as a body of employees will” [106]. 
dev ent during any of the phases. These observations a ‘Wea
liance with the fourth SCWAD criteria.  
h Orion strategy does not specifically discuss testing and ev
emented security solution. In the monitor and control stage they do put forth the
n of 
de that measurement criteria needs to be est
hi is after the solution h
stages that examine the current system and the ide
does not indicate that the risk analysis is used to determine or establish trust and 
accountability of the security system. The rating for the sixth criteria is ‘None’.  The 
results are summarized in Table 14. 
Table 14 - Orion Strategy / SCWAD Analysis 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCW
1 Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  Strong 
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment Weak 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Weak 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
& security Weak 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation Weak 
6 Trust and Accountability None 
6.3.2 Survivable / Viable IS Approach  
Karyda, et. al., propose a Viable Information System (VIS) process that takes its 
roo
broa
system ion system consists of 
ts from Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model (VSM) [111]. The thought is to 
den the idea of survivability of the individual system to the survivability of the 
 in relation to the organization. The viable informat
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three m
VIS is to “maintain its existence, by managing risk” [111].   
The diagnosis phase is where VSM is implemented. The risk analysis is conducted in 
and mechanisms to mitigate risk for the processes with a high 
risk factor 
The ficient 
fun de the 
intr The third 
specifically identifies high risk processes and tries to address these issues. The last 
At 
researc  of research, but he was probably most famous for his 
con
followi
5. Deciding on and keeping track of values and ensuring identity [44]. 
ain phases: diagnosis, re-design, and transformation. The main idea behind a 
conjunction with the VSM. They do expand the idea of the diagnosis stage by putting 
forth the idea that the parameters for this stage should include performance, risk and 
cost. They also propose a process modelling technique in the paper which they claim 
is based on a popular business process re-engineering technique.  
According to the paper, the re-design phase may include the following steps: 
1. Design processes that implement the missing, underdeveloped or flawed 
VSM functions. 
2. Add processes that serve as attenuators or amplifiers. 
3. Add controls 
4. Re-evaluate [111]. 
 first step in the re-design is trying to address any issues that are de
ctions identified in the VSM and the risk analysis. This could inclu
oduction of a process that is designed to amplify potential problems. 
step evaluates the changes to see if they actually achieved their goals. Once this has 
been completed, then the changes are implemented in the transformation stage.     
this point it is appropriate to elaborate on Beer’s VSM. Beer was a well published 
her in the various areas
tributions to cybernetics. The core architecture behind VSM is composed of the 
ng five tasks: 
1. n organization) 
2. Coordinating (within the organization) 
Optimizing (operative corporate manageme
Doing things (within a
3. nt) 
4. Observing and drawing conclusions (strategic corporate management) 
The viable system model identifies five sets of rules that were developed by Beer 
that coincide with the core architectural components listed above. These include: 
1. The operational elements that produce the system and interact with the 
external environment 
2. The co-ordination functions that ensure that the operational elements work 
harmoniously 
3. The control activities, which maintain and allocate recourses to the 
operational elements 
4. The intelligence functions that consider the system as a whole its strategic 
opportunities, threats and future direction. 
5. The identity function, which identifies self-awareness in the system [44] 
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The Viable Information System (VIS) process does not perform well when it is 
compared with the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD). 
VIS process acknowledges the importance of security incorporation into the 
organization’s management. However, it does not elaborate on what this means to 
the development process. This means that the result for the first criteria is ‘Weak’.  
VIS utilizes a risk  the risk analysis 
f a sec ontrols k’. 
I o  ter st 
an ac ility, ing 
fo he m a specific security 
te ng ia is ‘None’. 
The other criteria that it could be argued that the process faintly addresses is the 
fo th , integrating business requ nts, 
software & security’. This criterion is faintly addressed through the use of the VSM 
 the 
oup urity 
 analysis in its process. It does not elaborate on
rom 
t s
urity perspective. For this reason, the rating for proper c is ‘Wea
m rual  does not specifically state how the risk analysis will be used in
and accountab
s of t
d countability. Since there is no discussion of trust the rat
r t  last criteria is ‘None’. Also, there is no discussion fro
sti  perspective which indicates that the rating for the testing criter
ur  criteria ‘Delivery of a cohesive system ireme
model which originally had a business orientation. The original orientation of
VSM c led with the fact that the VIS process is designed to address sec
warrants at least a ‘Weak’ result. The results are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15- Viable Information System / SCWAD Analysis 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) Results 
1 Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  Weak 
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment Weak 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Weak 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
& security Weak 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation None 
6 Trust and Accountability None 
6.3.3 Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process  
The commercial organization, Secure Software, recognizes the importance of 
implementing security in the software development life cycle [169]. Secure Software 
has attempted to address this problem with the introduction of the Comprehensive 
Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) as a stand alone process and a 
available in Appendix X. The result is that the core CLASP activities do not show 
plug-in to the Rational Unified Process (RUP) [203]. CLASP provides a list of thirty 
possible activities that can be included in the development process [203]. However, 
an application security development methodology needs to encompass not only 
specific design and development activities but also needs to address overall project 
risk, cultural, environmental, testing, implementation and end-user feed back issues.    
Viega has published an article [204] titled “Building Security Requirements with 
CLASP” that examines a critical area in establishing appropriate security. However, 
the article focuses on requirements and does not go into the aspects of these 
requirements and their cohesiveness with organizational compatibility or foundation 
issues that need to be acknowledge and addressed before the security requirements 
are captured.  
CLASP, realistically, utilizes the integration of several types of lists, activities and 
supporting technology such as security analysis software and databases and even an 
application development process. The core CLASP activities and analysis of them is 
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specific support for the active organizational support criteria. The core activities 
show ‘Partial’ support for the second criteria ‘Proper Controls in the development 
environment’. Security visibility is a ‘Partial’ rating as well. This is due to the fact 
that the core activities la alysis aspect of software 
ecifically e 
e  well re 
activ ut they lack 
r er pt rigorous testing and 
e lu e core ies 
indicate that detailed misuse cases should be constructed. However, there is no 
i ic used in the establishment o or 
accountability. It certainly would not hurt to have them, but it could be argued that 
or the 
ck references to the business an
developm
s bj
ent projects and to following up with the end-user sp  on th
. cou ct of security. The rating for the fourth criteria is ‘Partial’ as
 and security b
The 
ities place a lot of emphasis on the software
ef ences to the business requirements. In the area of ‘Prom
va ation’ the CLASP methodology receives a ‘Strong’ rating. Th  activit
nd ation that these misuse cases will be f trust 
this exercise is being conducted for testing purposes. Therefore, the rating f
final criteria is ‘None’. The results are summarized in Table 16. 
Table 16 - CLASP / SCWAD Analysis 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) Results 
1 Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  None 
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment Partial 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Partial 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software Partial & security 
5 us security testing and evaluation Strong Prompt, rigoro
6 ountability None Trust and Acc
6.3 uting Security Development Lifecycle 
puting initiative is broader than simply 
analysing the software development process. The document acknowledges that 
ent than application designed to function on the 
.4 Trustworthy Comp
Microsoft has attempted to address the security shortcomings presented by the 
waterfall approach and the spiral approach through their Security Development 
Lifecycle (SDL) solution. Microsoft’s SDL is based on the concept of trustworthy 
computing. Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing program was originally introduced 
in a white paper in 2002 [132]. The latest version of the white paper defines the 
overall goals from the user’s point of view as: 
1. Security  
2. Privacy  
3. Reliability 
4. Business Integrity [133]. 
The overall scope of the trustworthy com
security challenges are prevalent throughout the hardware, the software and the 
service components of the computing industry. The Trustworthy Computing concept 
was expanded in a conference paper to extend specifically to the development 
lifecycle which was published in the Computer Security Applications Conference in 
2004 titled “The Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle” [123]. As 
of March 2005, an updated version of the document is available via Microsoft’s Web 
site [124]. It is important to note that the SDL proposed by Microsoft makes no 
claims to be applicable to Web application development. In fact, it is more applicable 
to general application developm
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World Wide Web. However, the SDL does put forth some interesting points that 
warrant acknowledgement and discussion. 
The SDL process appears to be a waterfall approach, based on the stages that are 
discussed in the methodology. However, they go on to state that it is actually a spiral 
proces ring 
imple ges: 
requir and 
servic spects of security are inserted into the various stages of the 
development process. The SDL stages are shown in Figure 4 – Microsoft’s Security 
Development Lifec
However, an examination of the original spiral model and Microsoft’s SDL reveals 
that Microsoft takes a broad interpretation of the term spiral methodology. The spiral 
model was originally demonstrated using the waterfall model [24]. The spiral model 
presents a situation where  
“each cycle involves a progression through the same sequence of steps, for 
each portion of the product and for each of its levels of elaboration, from an 
overall concept-of-operation document down to the coding of each individual 
s due to the fact that “requirements and design are often revisited du
mentation” [123]. The SDL methodology maps into the following sta
ements, design, implementation, verification, release, and support 
ing. Specific a
ycle.  
program” [24]. 
Figure 4 - Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle 
 
 
Closer examination of the spiral model indicates that this means going through an 
iterative process that consists of four distinct phases that includes: 
• Evaluate alternatives, identify resolve risk 
last iteration of the ‘development objectives, alternative, 
constraints’ phase that the waterfall method is clearly used in Boehm’s example of 
• Determine objectives, alternatives, constraints 
• Develop, verify next-level product 
• Plan next phase 
It is not until the 
the spiral model. Based on this information, any methodology could be implemented 
into the last iteration of the ‘development objectives, alternative, constraints’ phase 
in the spiral methodology. The use of any methodology would need to conform to the 
iterative process of the four phases and include the prototyping and the identification 
of project risk as identified in Figure 5. 
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For the purpose of this discussion, I will assume that the waterfall methodology is 
used in the last iteration of the ‘develop, verify next-level product’ phase. The spiral 
model does place a greater emphasis on risk analysis, software analysis and 
requirements validation than th gy through the iterative nature 
of the methodology.  
Figure 4 indicates that Microsoft has modified a waterfall process to include security 
e waterfall methodolo
in the various stages. Microsoft’s SDL is then applicable to the final iteration of the 
‘develop, verify next-level product’ phase in the spiral methodology. While the 
original version started off with a risk analysis, a prototype, a concept of operation 
and a requirements plan, the stages are expanded in later iterations of the spiral 
methodology. Microsoft’s spiral makes no mention of the other three phases or the 
prototyping which is noted in the original methodology. It also does not discuss the 
individual iterations and exactly what they entail.  
Figure 5 - Spiral Method 
 
*Source: Barry W. Boehm  - Spiral Model[25] 
SCWAD’s evaluation of Microsoft’s SDL is summarized in Table 17. SDL shows 
‘Strong’ support for the first criteria. Microsoft believes that executive support for 
the security initiative is critical along with education and awareness. They also 
nominate point people to be responsible for security. The four parts of the second 
criteria include: Policies/Standards/Procedures, Knowledge, Technology and 
Process. As stated previously, Microsoft is a firm believer in security education and 
awareness which contributes to the knowledge portion of the second criteria. The 
SDL only discusses policy from the perspective of implementing the SDL in 
Microsoft. In the formalization of the SDL process Microsoft established a “Policy 
for implementing mandatory application of the SDL” [124].  This is the only aspect 
of policy that is discu  policies that have a 
ntial nization. oft 
d s  and ing 
p sp sted on Microsoft’s ite 
ssed. There is no discussion of other
pote  impact on applications that are developed in the orga  Micros
oe  support the use of standards from a requirement, a coding a test
er ective. Lipner, et. al. March 2005 document po  Web s
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l ks icrosoft doe uss 
e c nology hey 
have added to their developm  
SDL is a process which they recommend and contributes to the second criteria. 
Therefore, the rating for the second criteria is ‘Partial’.  
 requirements and the 
security requirements. The SDL does support on-going testing by the development 
ilding secure software but 
does not provide any elaboration on the idea. Therefore, the rating for the last criteria 
ac  specific discussion on the use of procedures [124]. M s disc
du ating developers in terms of special technologies [124] and tech  that t
ent environment, i.e., Visual Studio 2005 [96]. The
In addressing the third criteria, the only stage that the SDL does not show support for 
is the business analysis stage. This is the point at which the business unit surfaces the 
initial project idea. The rating for the third criteria is ‘Partial’. The methodology does 
not discuss interactions with the business units or the production of a cohesive 
system that meets the business requirements, the software
team, a focused security push that includes user beta testing and code reviews, and a 
final security review. The final security review is an independent review of the 
software from within the organization. The rating for the fifth criteria is ‘Strong’. 
The last criterion addresses trust and accountability. Microsoft’s SDL does a good 
job of discussing trust. They examine trust from the levels in a computer and from a 
threat modelling perspective. The threat modelling provides an avenue for addressing 
the risk that an application presents to the organization. Lipner, et. al. [124] mentions 
accountability along with metric as a major facet of bu
is ‘Partial’. 
Table 17 - Microsoft SDL / SCWAD Analysis 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) Results 
1 Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  Strong 
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment Partial 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Partial 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
& security None 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation Strong 
6 Trust and Accountability Partial 
6.3.5 Agile Method Security 
It should be noted that there have been specific attempts to add security to the agile 
application development processes by Ge [73] and Beznosov [23]. These endeavours 
acknowledge and validate the inherent lack of security within the ‘vanilla-off the 
shelf’ methodologies used for Web application development. 
An analysis of Ge’s et curity within the agile 
developme policy dd 
a  a sio tive 
org iz es two direct ref  to 
sec ity ty risk anal oth 
of es e de ent 
process. Since the proposed solution is trying to add security into a development 
pro ss f the proper controls crite ese 
contributions warrant a ‘Partial’ rating for this criterion.  
 al. [73] attempts to address se
nt process is to primarily review and update the security  and to a
nrisk ssessment into an agile development process. There is no discus  of ac
an ational support for security. The solution mak erences
ur  and they include a security policy decision and a securi ysis. B
th e address two aspects of the criteria for proper controls in th velopm
ce , this contributes to the process aspect o ria. Th
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The paper touches on requirements analysis, use case analysis, content design and 
implementation but from a Feature-Driven Development (FDD) methodology 
perspective not specifically a security perspective. They indicate that there is a link 
between the development requirements and keeping the security policy up to date.  
They do indicate that security risk analysis is “an iterative, incremental, ongoing 
process” [73] and that the results of the risk analysis “may modify the content 
No. Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) Results 
design” [73]. This implies that there is at least a weak level of intent for security 
visibility throughout all areas of the development process. 
The business model is addressed through use cases and functional design content 
modelling in the FDD. They do allude to the fact that security needs to be built into 
the development process early in the life cycle. However, there is no discussion of 
whether this meets the needs of the business or any metric to see if the goal has been 
achieved. This warrants a ‘Weak’ rating for the criteria of ‘Delivery of a cohesive 
system, integrating business requirements, software & Security’. There is no specific 
discussion of security testing or accountability. The results are summarized in Table 
18 – Ge et al. /SCWAD Analysis. 
Table 18 - Ge et al. / SCWAD Analysis 
1 Active orga None nizational support for security in the Web development process  
2 Proper Security Controls in the development environment Partial 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Weak 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
& security Weak 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation None 
6 Trust and Accountability None 
Beznosov discusses Extrem
d
e Security Engineering [23] which delves into a 
iscussion about XP practices and how to achieve good enough security. The paper 
lid methodology that can be easily identified and transferred to 
 In doing so, there is no discussion about active organizational 
the fourth criteria. The paper does discuss 
trong’ support for testing from a security perspective. There was no discussion of 
trust and accountability riteria. The results are 
s ariz able 1 xtrem ity En / SCWA nalysi
does not put forth a so
other agile processes.
support in the paper. The rating for the first criteria is ‘None’. 
The discussion around small releases does mention the need for a well organized 
development environment that includes testing, scripts and duplicate resources but 
does not make a direct reference to security specific uses for these points. The rating 
for the second criteria is ‘None’. This indicates that XP is compatible with controls 
from a security perspective but this point is not elaborated on in the paper. The very 
nature of tailoring the security approach to the individual stages of a development 
methodology leads to a ‘Strong’ rating for the security visibility criteria. The paper 
does discuss user involvement in the XP process, the business stories from a security 
point of view and mentioned continuous integration from a security perspective. This 
warrants at least a ‘Partial’ rating for 
‘S
, leading to a ‘None’ rating for the last c
umm ed in T 9 – E e Secur gineering D A s. 
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Table treme Security Engineeri AD An
. ty Cri r Web tion Deve t (SCWA R
 19 - Ex ng / SCW alysis 
No Securi teria fo  Applica lopmen D) esults 
1 Act nizati pport fo ty in the W lopment ive orga onal su r securi eb deve process  None 
2 Pro urity C  in the d ment envirper Sec ontrols evelop onment None 
3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  Strong 
4 Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
& security Partial 
5 Prompt, rigorous security testing and evaluation Strong 
6 Trust and Accountability None 
 
6.4 Summary 
As the US Department of Homeland Security has stated “there is nothing inherently 
‘security-enhancing’ about most development methodologies”[51]. The Waterfall 
methodology, the Unified Software Development Process (USD), Dynamic Systems 
Development Method (DSDM), and eXtreme Programming (XP) are all used to 
illustrate the fact that ‘Vanilla - Off the Shelf’ application development processes 
that can be used for Web engineering do not inherently include security from the 
SCWAD perspective. An examination of existing security methodologies 
demonstrates the deficiencies in the areas highlighted by SCWAD. A Summary of 
the security methodologies SCWAD analysis is available in Table 20 – Overall 
Security SCWAD Analysis. This analysis also provides a baseline for further work in 
Web engineering methodologies. The next chapter examines the Web Engineering 
Security (WES) methodology in detail. 
 
Table 20 - Overall Security SCWAD Analysis 
No. Orion VIS CLASP Microsoft GE ESE 
1 Strong Weak None Strong None None 
2 Weak Weak Partial Partial Partial None 
3 Weak Weak Partial Partial Weak Strong 
4 Weak Weak Partial None Weak Partial 
5 Weak None Strong Strong None Strong 
6 None None None Partial None None 
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7 Web Engineering Security (WES) 
Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the Web Engineering Security (WES) 
methodology. WES is a proactive, process neutral, security specific methodology 
that is based on the empirical evidence used to identify the Essential Elements and 
the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) as discussed in 
chapter five. Section 7.1 presents the WES principles. Section 7.2 describes the WES 
process in detail. Section 7.3 briefly discusses the stakeholders involved in the WES 
process. Section 7.4 covers WES process deliverables. Section 7.5 presents the goals 
of the WES methodology. Section 7.6 presents the advantages and disadvantages of 
the WES methodology and section 7.7 provides a chapter summary.  
7.1 WES Foundation Principles 
The Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology was designed to complement 
Web software development through customer communications, short development 
cycles, and practical security solutions to business problems [4]. WES attempts to 
achieve this by stressing core principles while providing a general outline with 
customizable sub-components.    
The core principles behind the development of WES include good communication, 
security education, and cultural support. These principles are interdependent and 
need to work in concert in order to achieve and maximise the desired effect from a 
security perspective.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 6 - Principles. 
Figure 6 - Principles 
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7.1.1 Security Education 
As discussed in 3.2 and in 5.4.2, the Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) publishes 
Guidelines for Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response [78, 142]. These 
guidelines highlight the fact that any flaws in the system design or application coding 
can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities [78]. Meaning that security education 
should cover an array of issues including knowledge transfer, coding practices, 
technical attacks, social engineering attacks, security processes, every day activities 
and potential impact analysis methods.  
This problem is emphasized due to the availability and accessibility of Web 
applications. As mentioned in chapter 5.4.2, common Web development security 
problems include un-validated parameters, cross-site scripting, buffer overflows, 
command injection flaws, error-handling problems, insecure use of cryptography, 
and broken access controls [20, 78, 134]. Hence, designers and developers should be 
educated on common development flaws, best coding practices and the 
implementation of practical development solutions. Security should not be left to the 
acquisition of the functional and non-functional security requirements. Security is 
more than a technical issue; it is a people, a process and an educational issue that 
must be addressed in its entirety. Organizations need to encourage knowledge 
transfer among employees and provide for proper training. 
Education is an important area of the security process. Security education should not 
only include raising awareness of the different types of technical attacks and social 
engineering attacks [78, 135], but it should also include information about the current 
environment. Employees should know with whom they should discuss security, how 
it fits into their everyday work environment (i.e. their development process), and the 
potential impact security has on the Web application solution that they are 
implementing.  
7.1.2 Good Communication 
Good communication is a critical component of the methodology, as it is needed to 
assure solution cohesiveness within the development team and with the organization. 
Good communication helps to provide the foundation for security visibility 
throughout the entire application development methodology. Hence, good 
communication should encourage security visibility through the development 
process, an auditable process, a clear understanding of the defined metrics, the 
delivery of a cohesive system, and the dissemination of the importance of the 
integration of development and security methodologies.  
In order to achieve these goals, there needs to be good stakeholder communication. 
This includes good communication between management and the development team, 
among members of the development team and between the development team 
members and the end-users. The communication between management and the 
development team is needed due to the fact that management is responsible for 
setting the policies, standards and procedures to which the development team must 
adhere.  
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7.1.2.1 Development Team Communication 
Communication has to be encouraged and fostered in the technical side of the 
organization. The organization’s management, in concert with the architects, need to 
provide a security vision for the future. This can be communicated, in the present, 
through the creation of current and future standards. An excellent example of this is 
the development of software standards to be used for the design process. If an 
organization is currently on Windows XP, that standard should be published along 
with the expected standard for the future, such as the next version of Windows and 
when that standard is to become effective. Communication of this information 
through standards has a direct effect on the organization’s coding teams. They now 
know the appropriate time frames, based on the published standard, so that they can 
code from a compatibility perspective. This idea can be expanded to include testing 
environments, compatibility with specific security software such as host intrusion 
detections systems (HIDS) and network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). The 
point is that this directional support needs to be driven by upper management and 
provided for by the relevant parties. This support and integration with 
communication is a critical component for the purpose of driving future security 
initiatives in an organization. The marketing and dissemination of this information is 
necessary to effectively implement this initiative. If your employees do not know 
about the tools that are available, they will not use them. It is also true that if the 
tools and/or methods are not effective in completing the job, are too complicated to 
use effectively, or are just not user friendly, then employees are likely to avoid using 
them. 
If the tools or the methods are not productive for various reasons then the individual 
members of the development team should suggest alternative tools or methods to be 
evaluated. A channel for communicating feedback to management for both positive 
and negative communication needs to be established in the organization. If this 
channel is not established, then developers will inevitably use their own tools to 
complete the job. Their decisions realistically could range from using off-the-shelf 
solutions to open source software. Off-the-shelf software could put the organization 
in jeopardy from a legal perspective. If the software in question has been sold for 
personal use and is being used in a commercial environment then there are legal 
implications. Open source software could introduce potential security breaches into 
the organization. The interaction between management and the developers helps to 
introduce and sustain flexibility in the Web application process. More importantly, it 
gives the development team a sense of ownership in reference to the methods and the 
tools that are used in the development process. Along with this interaction, all of the 
tools and the methodologies that are used in the development process need to be 
reviewed frequently. This review helps to ensure that the tools and the methodologies 
are achieving the desired goals.  
Developers should also be encouraged to share technical knowledge with each other. 
This distribution of information encourages debate on technical solutions and 
distributes application knowledge through the group.  This distribution of knowledge 
helps keep a balance in the group, thereby reducing dependency on individual 
employees. 
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7.1.2.2 End-User Communication 
Communication with the end-user is needed to acquire the appropriate application 
requirements. Security solutions also should be confirmed with the end-user. Does 
the solution meet the needs of the end-user? If not, is the end-user circumventing the 
security measure? The security that is implemented should meet the needs of the 
organization so that it adds value to the end product and to the overall business 
process. Essential Elements that contribute to good communication include a clearly 
defined application development methodology and a clearly defined Web security 
development process. The security process should explicitly include the end-user. 
This communication has a direct impact on the potential effectiveness of a security 
solution. Actual end-users, not surrogate end-users, need to be used in the testing of 
the application [81]. End-users will perform operations, submit data, and interpret 
instructions in ways that the development team, the business team or the technical 
staff within an organization could reasonably not consider! This is also true from a 
security perspective. 
End-users should be observed and consulted for information on the effectiveness of 
the implemented security solution. Observing employees has the potential for 
revealing security issues and application problems that could be manipulated into 
contributing to a security breach [81].  
It could be argued that employees are not always forthcoming with information, 
especially if the lack of security or the potential security vulnerability either does not 
directly affect their duties or actually helps them to accomplish their assigned tasks. 
Therefore, a multiple stream approach consisting of end-user involvement in testing, 
end-user observation and end-user consultation is recommended when working with 
end-users [81]. 
7.1.3 Cultural Support 
Cultural support should drive the efforts in security and education along with the 
efforts in good communication. Cultural support for security should embrace 
confidentiality, integrity and availability throughout the management structure. 
Active organizational support for security in the Web development process is critical. 
Without the support of management, there is no hope for effective integration of 
security within the development process. Managerial support for security needs to be 
both proactive and reactive. Management needs to be proactive by supporting 
employees, hence, giving them the necessary tools and developing the necessary 
policies so that employees can be successful in their endeavours. This would include 
proper controls for the development environment such as software versioning 
controls, providing up-to-date code libraries, setting the policies for testing code and 
for establishing trust and accountability within and outwith the organization. 
Likewise, management needs to be reactive by stating and enforcing job 
repercussions if employees do not follow security practices within the development 
process or the development process in general upon which the security process 
depends.  
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7.1.4 Security Synergy  
The environment that is most conducive for fostering security in the Web application 
development environment is the intersection of all three principles. The intersection 
of security education and practising good communication should help build 
confidence in the overall security of the organization, the general security knowledge 
of the employees and encourage compliance with organizational policies. The 
distribution of security information and how that impacts the daily activities of 
employees helps to provide practical solutions to security issues. This approach helps 
to propagate the concept that security needs to be viewed in the application 
development process as “everybody’s problem” [86]. Integrating security 
responsibilities and security education into the development process increases 
employee confidence in addressing security issues and sends the signal to the 
development group that security is an important issue that has to be addressed.   
A key component of security is education. Employees need to be formally educated 
on the role security plays in the development process and in the organization, i.e., all 
stakeholders need to understand all of the security requirements along with the role 
security plays in the development process. The support for this education should 
originate from management!  
Cultural support for good communication helps to provide the necessary tools to get 
the job done and demonstrates that the organization supports the security movement 
within the company. Active organizational support includes encouragement of 
security communication among employees. Increased communication should 
translate into a better working understanding of the role security plays in the 
development process and the organization. This better understanding should increase 
the overall level of security in the development process.   
The incorporation of security into the development process should be as seamless as 
possible. As discussed in greater detail in 5.4, this seamless integration of security 
into the development process should support the goals of meeting the Security 
Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD): 
1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2. Proper Controls in the development environment 
3. Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software 
and security 
5. Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation 
6. Trust and Accountability 
7.2 WES Process Life Cycle 
The Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology, as shown in Figure 7 - WES 
Methodology, starts with a Project Development Risk Assessment. 
This Project Development Risk Assessment is the initial phase and it examines the 
security risk associated with the implementation of a project. The Application 
Page 86 of 262 
 
Security Requirements phase examines the requirements from the customer 
perspective within the frame work of organizational compatibility. Security Design / 
Coding examine the architecture, the solution design and the coding practices that are 
implemented to solve the issue. A Controlled Environment Implementation 
scrutinizes the application’s interactions with the entire environment before specific 
aspects of the application are examined.  
Testing is critical to the success of many applications. This hypothesis holds true in 
the area of security as well. Testing not only includes the examination of code but 
incident management and disaster recovery. Implementation of the application in a 
production environment should only take place after it has successfully completed 
testing. End-user evaluation is used to establish the success of the application’s 
security features and for security maintenance. 
The WES methodology implicitly supports the concept of separation of duty between 
everything that happens before testing and everything that happens after testing. This 
is demonstrated through the colour of the line, the line style and the directional 
arrows displayed in Figure 7 - Wes Methodology. The ideal situation is that the 
developers and the testers who work on the project are not the same individuals who 
implement the project into production. Depending on the size of the organization, 
this may not be possible. Regardless, once code has been moved from the test 
environment to the production environment it should not be allowed to return to 
testing without going through another iteration of the process. 
After the application has been implemented into the production environment, end-
users should be consulted in an attempt to determine the usability of the security 
solution, suitability of the security solution and to help identify any security issues 
that need to be resolved. Once this information has been attained then the process 
should start the next iteration of the WES development process. Ideally, the iterations 
in the process should be concise. Succinct iterations encourage smaller frequent code 
releases which, by nature, mean that less code is introduced into a system at a single 
point in time. Injecting a smaller quantity of code into an existing system, in theory, 
denotes that smaller chunks of code are being tested at a single point in time. This 
potentially allows testers to focus in detail on smaller amounts of code and hopefully 
improve security test results.  
7.2.1 Project Development Risk Assessment 
The purpose of the risk assessment is to identify any risk associated with the 
development of the proposed application functionality. An excellent definition of risk 
is 
“…risk is a measure of the loss of what you consider valuable, the impact of 
losing it, the threats to those assets, and how often those threats could be 
successful” [187]. 
This would include examining appropriate data protection legislation that might 
apply to your organization’s application. There are several tools and suggested 
practices available in the market for conducting risk analysis. These tools include 
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Cobra [31], the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) [146] and the 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) [5]. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recommendations 
for conducting company wide risk analysis on their Web site [147]. OCTAVE is an 
in-depth organization wide risk analysis approach developed at Carnegie Mellon [5].  
If an organization wide risk analysis is conducted periodically, then the information 
in the analysis can be used as a starting point for the application risk analysis. The 
reverse is also true. Information from the individual application analysis can be used 
as an initial guide to organizational analysis. The risk assessment piece of the 
methodology can be customized to work in conjunction with an organization’s 
existing risk analysis processes.  The basic idea is to: 
• Detail critical functions,  
• Determine the necessary service levels in doing so, identify possible threats 
and outline their motivating factors, 
• Estimate the probability of an attack, 
• Estimate the probability of a successful attack, 
• Outline the cost of providing protection [64, 153, 154].  
The answers generated from researching the statements above should help answer the 
following questions proposed by Ozier: 
1. “What could happen? (What is the threat?) 
2. How bad could it be? (What is the impact or consequence?) 
3. How often might it happen? (What is the frequency?) 
4. How certain are the answers to the first three questions? (What is the degree 
of confidence?) The key element among these is the issue of uncertainty 
captured in the fourth question. If there is no uncertainty, there is no ‘risk’, 
per se” [144]. 
Application threats can cover a wide range of possibilities including: human errors in 
coding, user errors, external attack, fraudulent individuals, technical sabotage, acts of 
God, and disgruntled employees; all of which should be accounted for in the risk 
assessment [64]. Once the risk assessment has taken place, the specific application 
security requirements need to be determined through in-depth conversations with the 
end-users and evaluation of organizational compatibility. Organizational 
compatibility determines how well security requirements fit into the frame work of 
an organization. The general areas that make up this category include security policy 
compatibility, corporate culture compatibility and technical compatibility.   
By conducting a Project Development Risk Assessment, the business and the 
information technology group can analyze each stage of the development by 
identifying the associated risks. This would include determining the states of the 
application and how they can be used or misused as the case may be. This step 
provides an opportunity for the organization’s development team to understand the 
application from a risk point of view and helps to generate appropriate questions to 
address the application security requirements phase. Depending on the size of the 
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organization and the market requirements, both the governmental and commercial 
perspectives, the risk analysis can be used to help identify known risks, point out 
new risks and ensure that these risks are acceptable. Depending on the needs of the 
organization, this can be either a very formal process or a very informal process. If it 
is a formal process, then the advantage for management is that it presents a clear 
understanding of the risks before a substantial investment is made in the 
development of the Web application. The disadvantage of a highly formalized 
process is that it can slow down the development process.  In reality, there will be a 
lot of cross-over communication between the Project Development Risk Assessment 
stage and the Application Security Requirements stage. Informal processes tend to be 
faster but introduce more risk through a potential lack of environmental and risk 
understanding. The deliverables that could possibly be generated at this stage include 
a formal project risk analysis document and a risk analysis document used to gather 
end-user requirements, and a document detailing high-level issues for design and 
testing. 
7.2.2 Application Security Requirements 
Specific application security requirements have to be acquired from the end-users. 
The project risk analysis should be used to help gather the security requirements by 
generating a series of questions and responses that filter the desires of the end-users 
into a list of detailed needs. The Application Security Requirements phase allows 
the development team to make a specific effort to acquire the security requirements 
through effective communication with the end-users. Hence, the stakeholders 
involved in this stage would probably include the business unit and the technical 
staff. They should coordinate these requirements with the organization’s security 
compatibility constraints. The security compatibility constraints encompass several 
important issues that include security policies, standards, baselines, procedures, 
guidelines, the corporate culture and existing technology. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the terms listed in Table 21 -Terms have been taken directly from The 
Security Policy life Cycle: Functions and Responsibilities by Patrick D. Howard [97]. 
Once these requirements have been captured, they should be examined against the 
organization’s security policy, the corporate culture, and technical compatibility. 
Table 21 - Terms 
Policy: A broad statement of principle that presents management’s 
position for a defined control area. 
Standards: Rules that specify a particular course of action or response to a 
given situation. 
Baseline: A platform-specific security rule that is accepted across the 
industry as providing the most effective approach to a specific 
security implementation. 
Procedures: Define specifically how policies, standards, baselines and 
guidelines will be implemented in a given situation.  Procedures 
support policies, standards and baselines. 
Guidelines: A general statement used to recommend or suggest an approach 
to implementation of policies, standards, and baselines. 
Howard, P.D., The Security Policy life Cycle: Functions and Responsibilities[97] 
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7.2.2.1 Security Policy 
Policies, standards, baselines, procedures, and guidelines can assist in large 
organizations to provide cohesiveness within the organization.  
“The goal of an information security policy is to maintain the integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of information resources” [91]. 
In smaller organizations, where it is not mandatory through regulation, they can be 
implicit to the organization. The policy provides the “what” and the standards, baselines, 
procedures and guidelines provide the “how” [90].  They can work in concert to support 
the organization from a security perspective. The security policy encompasses all 
business interactions providing overall guidance to protecting resources [156]. This 
includes acceptable computing practices, all interactions with the network, Internet, 
messaging, and business specific applications or services [64]. Companies may need to 
meet security policy standards requirements like the ones put out by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) [104]. In the context of Web development, the main area 
of concentration, with regards to the security policy, would be application compatibility 
within the corporation. However, all areas would need to be addressed to ensure overall 
compatibility. The security policy should be a living document and updated as new 
architectures and applications are developed [182]. If a security policy does not exist at 
project inception, then the organization may need to investigate the validity of creating 
the appropriate document. 
7.2.2.2 Legal Compliancy 
It is important to recognize that a company’s policies, standards, baselines, procedures 
and guidelines should be compliant with relevant legal obligations. Cyber-crime is a 
reality that cannot be ignored in today’s global business environment. The ramifications 
from a financial perspective and a legal perspective are potentially enormous. Web 
application security needs to be incorporated into the entire development methodology. 
This includes upfront acknowledgement of the potential legal implications involved with 
the development and deployment of the Web applications. Effective security resolutions 
need to acknowledge the legal ramifications that the application introduces to the 
company and the attendant risks need to be mitigated to the organization’s satisfaction. 
For this reason, a check list of relevant legislation has been compiled from the legislative 
information discussed in chapter four. The current list of legislation is available in 
Appendix V. The purpose behind the check list is not to introduce a debate over the 
legislative or the legal enforcement challenges that computer crime presents. Nor is it to 
discuss the effectiveness of the current legislation or potential conflicts between 
legislation enacted in different countries.  
The point is to acknowledge the increasing global legislation that is developing due to 
the growing impact of the World Wide Web on everyday life, on business economical 
environments and national importance. The legislative list provides a snap shot in time 
of current relevant legislation. Due to the dynamic nature of legislation, it is understood 
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that the list will continue to change over time as the Web integrates into global 
environment. Economies continue to integrate with the Web to produce and/or provide 
goods and services. Societies continue to increase dependence on the Web to help 
provide basic operational economical components. This increasing dependency 
introduces potential national security risks. Therefore, societies are demanding a more 
secure World Wide Web which leads to the continued creation of new and refinement of 
existing security legislation. This security legislative growth potentially has world wide 
ripple effects on the global economy.  
7.2.2.3 Corporate Culture  
Corporate culture needs to take everything into account, ranging from employee security 
awareness programs, to employee education on social engineering attacks (discussed 
below), to recognition of organizational norms. Corporations need to educate the 
application end-user employees and their development staff in terms of security. They 
also need to remind employees periodically about security policies, standards, baselines, 
procedures, and guidelines. One approach to this is to make the issue important to the 
employee by integrating it into their annual evaluation [214]. This will not solve all of 
an organization’s security problems; however, it does provide an avenue for encouraging 
good security practices [214].  
Corporate culture needs to be examined from several different perspectives that include 
managerial acceptance of the importance of security, the threat of social engineering, 
employee perception of security and security habits, and technological acceptance of 
cultural norms. Managerial acceptance and habits, from a cultural stand point, are 
critical to the success of security within an organization. Large organizations, looking to 
strengthen security in their corporate cultures, need to have the highest possible ranking 
champion promoting the change. In small organizations, the change should be 
introduced by the owner. If management takes security seriously and encourages a 
secure environment through their actions, then the odds of this having a positive trickle 
down effect to employees within the organization are good.     
7.2.2.4 Technology Compatibility 
Existing technology needs to be examined from two view points; a compatibility point 
of view and a value added point of view. When an application is being proposed, the 
solution needs to be compatible with the existing infrastructure in the organization.  
Does the technical expertise exist in the organization to write the application in the 
proposed language? Does the hardware infrastructure support the new applications? Is 
the existing code repository compatible with the development of the new application? 
There are both hard and soft costs associated with these types of questions that need to 
be taken into consideration when considering any new application development.   
Technology needs to be examined from a value added point of view.  Whether or not 
you subscribe to the individual aspects of the “value configuration(s)” [3] which include 
the value chain, the value shop and the value network, one of the goals of the 
organization is to provide added value regardless of the product or service that is being 
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offered [3]. Technology is a major contributor to this goal in today’s market place.  
Hence, when examining the validity in developing a new application, the organization 
should be asking how this will help them add value to their organization.  
In general, the area of technological compatibility has to do with an organization’s 
existing applications, software compatibility, legacy systems and the acquisition of new 
software and technology [26]. When considering the technical compatibility of a system, 
it is necessary to consider the existing employee skill set within the company. To 
implement a technical solution, does the necessary skill set exist within the company, 
can it be acquired easily through employee training or will it require the company to 
acquire the necessary skills though outsourcing? To answer these questions, an in-depth 
analysis will need to be conducted and compared with the solutions requirements. 
Technological compatibility, from a security standpoint, needs to examine the 
application to see if it is compatible with existing security solutions already in 
production. An example would be a new application that is not compatible with the 
company’s existing single sign-on solution. If a solution requires new technologies, the 
organization should rate the security capabilities of the new technologies and determine 
if they meet the company’s security standards out of the box. If they do not, can they be 
brought up to speed and at what cost? 
This does not mean that these are the only areas that can contribute to this category or 
that they all have to be present within this section to ensure compatibility. There are 
environments that may choose not to implement a security policy or to investigate 
corporate culture due to the size of the company. For instance, a large financial 
institution will probably have all three categories (security policy compatibility, 
corporate culture compatibility and technical compatibility) documented to some extent. 
However, a small family run business, like a local restaurant, probably will not have a 
security policy and the culture in that business will be implicit. However, more than 
likely, they will have technical compatibility issues that they will need to address. 
7.2.2.5 Security and the Human Element 
Technical solutions alone will not provide protection against the human element. They 
will not provide protection against an end-user who reveals his/her passwords, users who 
circumvent security to complete a specific task, or insider attacks [64]. When it comes to 
information security “the human factor is truly security’s weakest link” [135]. This fact 
has spawned an area of warfare in the business world known as social engineering.  
Social engineering attacks take place when an outsider or insider observes an 
organization, gathers information and makes necessary business contacts under the 
premise of a legitimate purpose in order to gather information [135]. This information is 
then used to acquire more information until the intruder has acquired something of value 
[135]. The same tactics can be used by a current employee to gain unauthorized 
privileges. Company employees need to be educated on the existence of social 
engineering attacks and how to identify and prevent these attacks from occurring [135].   
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The perception of security, and its importance to the business, needs to be effectively 
communicated at an employee level.  If the employees do not place a great deal of 
importance on security and they regularly post passwords on screens or in accessible 
areas, trade passwords with colleagues, or grant system access to outside vendors, then 
they are creating a security risk for the company.   
Technological acceptance of corporate norms is when a solution has been implemented 
in the environment, becomes accepted and then becomes expected. If an organization 
has implemented a single sign-on solution for several of the existing applications then it 
would be reasonable for employees to expect new applications to take advantage of this 
technology. The justification for complying with this expectation or going against the 
grain needs to be examined and justified to the employees. Otherwise, employees could 
start to circumvent security when it suits their needs. 
7.2.3 Security Design / Coding 
Once the application security requirements have been determined, the next issue that 
needs to be addressed is security design. The design of the application needs to consider 
the overall architecture, the application design, and good design principles.  
This information then allows the technical architect, in the Security Design / Coding 
phase, to pick the most appropriate technical controls from a design, risk and cost 
perspective. Once the high level design decisions have been made, then the coding takes 
place. The programmers should take into consideration coding standards, good coding 
practices, code reviews and appropriate security measures. Encouraging programmers to 
adhere to coding standards and to pursue good coding practices will increase the code 
readability which will inherently improve software maintenance. This improvement 
should be felt in both enhancement maintenance and patch maintenance. It has been 
estimated that maintenance accounts for an average of 60% of an application’s software 
expense [74]. In reality, “better software engineering development leads to more 
maintenance, not less” [74]. If an application meets the needs of a particular market, 
then the application will be enhanced through the addition of new features and improved 
functionality. It should be noted that this is considered new development in a lot of 
organizations. Patch maintenance is another area that is critical to defending against 
cyber vulnerabilities [45]. Any improvement in an organization’s software maintenance 
capabilities translates into long term savings. 
Code reviews ensure that the code is doing what it is suppose to do, decrease errors in 
the code and ensure that more than one person understands the application. The 
implementation of the type of code review is up to the individual organization. Code 
reviews can encompass everything from pair programming, to design reviews, to manual 
reviews of code after it has been written. It is up to the organization to decide the best 
avenue for implementation so that the organization is not dependent on a single 
employee for modifications and support for a specific application. Applying appropriate 
security measures will help ensure data security and security consistency throughout the 
application. 
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The architecture needs to fit into the existing organizational environment. There are 
several issues that need to be addressed within the realm of architecture. Some of those 
issues are: 
• Application layers [66] 
• Application maintainability [86] 
• Information compatibility from a data transfer standpoint 
• How strongly typed the language needs to be, [123] 
• Approach to privileges i.e. role based or inheritance 
• The approach to default privileges from the application and the user’s standpoint 
[153] 
• Security in-depth - use passwords and another mechanism, such as an encrypted 
key of some sort, for determining object access [153]. 
The design of the application needs to address:   
• The language that will be used [123]  
• Ease of use – the easier security solutions are to use, the less likely that they will 
be circumvented [153] 
• Authorization techniques  
• The use of encryption algorithms 
• The establishment of trust  
• The establishment of accountability. 
It should be noted that the establishment of trust should link back to the project risk 
assessment. The amount of trust that is designed into an application is directly related to 
the amount of risk that an organization is willing to tolerate and the total cost that they 
are willing to absorb. Accountability, through the implementation of appropriate 
mechanisms, is an essential ingredient to security.  
The design needs to examine the code from common attack standpoints and implement 
the appropriate controls to ensure secure data. A professional code management system 
should be used by the development team to ensure accountability, within the team, and 
provide a means of roll back [70].  
Once the design has been chosen, the solution is coded. During coding, the developer 
should be cognizant of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) coding standards and 
pursue secure coding practices [208]. One idea that a designer should keep in mind, 
when designing a secure solution, is to balance the need for a secure application with the 
need for a particular functionality.  
Another idea that a designer should strive to attain is the creation of simple design 
solutions that solve specific problems and fit into the applications global architecture. 
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The design will depend on the level of security the customer is willing to accept from a 
risk and/or cost standpoint.     
7.2.4 Controlled Environment Implementation 
Depending on the needs of the organization, the Controlled Environment 
Implementation can be as complex as implementing it into an environment that mirrors 
the production environment or it can be as simple as running the application on a 
desktop [78]. In this case, both the desktop application installation and the server 
mirroring environment can be used to test the security controls. The point here is to 
release the code in a secure environment that simulates the production environment for 
compatibility testing before the application is made available to the general public. The 
goal of the environment is to minimize surprises. Basically, this phase allows the 
developers to test the application’s compatibility with the operating system and 
interfacing programs before application testing and a production release.   
The controlled environment implementation should also take into consideration 
application compatibility, load testing and regression testing. The new application has to 
be compatible with the native operating system and with the other pre-existing 
applications. Compatibility also needs to be verified with applications on the same 
server and applications that live off site (internal to the organization or external to the 
organization) where data is being exchanged.  
7.2.5 Security Testing 
Testing takes place from both the developer and the end-user perspective. Developers 
should be running their own battery of tests when the code is conceived. Again, it should 
be stressed that the methodology is designed to work in conjunction with existing 
organizational tools and processes. If the organization already has an investment in 
automated testing tools, they should be used in this stage to augment the testing process.  
Actual end-users should be incorporated into the testing campaign whenever possible. 
The end-users should be writing test scripts and actively interfacing with the application 
to ensure that the program is performing accordingly. End-users participation in the 
security testing of the Web application holds the process and the solution accountable 
from a practicality perspective. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimates that “93% of 
reported vulnerabilities are software vulnerabilities” [143]. The Organization for Internet 
Safety (OIS) publishes Guidelines for Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response. 
In this document, they define a security vulnerability as 
“a flaw within a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its 
documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to violate its 
documented security policy” [78, 142]. 
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Hence, any flaws in the system design or application coding can potentially lead to 
security vulnerabilities [78]. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
provides an excellent listing of the top ten vulnerabilities in Web Applications. The top 
ten vulnerabilities, listed below in Table 22, are taken directly from the OWASP report. 
Table 22 - Top Vulnerabilities in Web Applications 
Unvalidated Input 
Information from Web requests is not validated before being used by a 
Web application. Attackers can use these flaws to attack backend 
components through a Web application. 
Broken Access Control 
Restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed to do are not 
properly enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to access other 
users’ accounts, view sensitive files, or use unauthorized functions. 
Broken Authentication 
and Session 
Management 
Account credentials and session tokens are not properly protected. 
Attackers who can compromise passwords, keys, session cookies, or 
other tokens can defeat authentication restrictions and assume other 
users’ identities. 
Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS) Flaws 
The Web application can be used as a mechanism to transport an attack 
to an end-user’s browser. A successful attack can disclose the end-user’s 
session token, attack the local machine, or spoof content to fool the user. 
Buffer Overflows 
Web application components in some languages that do not properly 
validate input can be crashed and, in some cases, used to take control of a 
process. These components can include CGI, libraries, drivers, and Web 
application server components. 
Injection Flaws 
Web applications pass parameters when they access external systems or 
the local operating system. If an attacker can embed malicious commands 
in these parameters, the external system may execute those commands on 
behalf of the Web application. 
Improper Error 
Handling 
Error conditions that occur during normal operation are not handled 
properly. If an attacker can cause errors to occur that the Web application 
does not handle, they can gain detailed system information, deny service, 
cause security mechanisms to fail, or crash the server. 
Insecure Storage 
Web applications frequently use cryptographic functions to protect 
information and credentials. These functions and the code to integrate 
them have proven difficult to code properly, frequently resulting in weak 
protection. 
Denial of Service 
Attackers can consume Web application resources to a point where other 
legitimate users can no longer access or use the application. Attackers 
can also lock users out of their accounts or even cause the entire 
application to fail. 
Insecure Configuration 
Management 
Having a strong server configuration standard is critical to a secure Web 
application. These servers have many configuration options that affect 
security and are not secure out of the box. 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). [185] 
This list complements information discussed in the previous articles the “Top Web 
application security problems identified” and “The Bugs Stop Here” which were 
published in 2003 [20, 134]. Only after testing has been completed and the 
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vulnerabilities removed to the satisfaction of the organization should the application be 
moved into production.   
Developers need to examine their code independently and the program as a complete 
entity in order to determine possible misuse from a functional standpoint. That is, 
programs should do precisely what they are designed to accomplish.  
“Vulnerabilities can stem from the rapidly evolving use of software, in which 
programs meant for a limited purpose are applied in ways not anticipated by their 
developers” [213].   
Thus, can a program be manipulated in a manner that might create problems and can this 
be stopped or mitigated? A primary example is an e-mail server that is used to propagate 
a virus or used in a denial of service attack. 
Testing is critical to the success of many applications. Testing should cover application 
testing, incident management and disaster recovery plans. Application testing includes 
validation errors, program behaviour testing, and code analysis. This will involve 
implementing appropriate programs to test static and runtime code, penetration, and 
application scanning. Automation, where possible, of the testing process will help 
provide stability. Testing should also involve executing scripts from both the developer 
and the end-users to test the application. An important part of the testing phase should be 
to decide appropriate action plans for incidences. When there is an issue, what are the 
procedures that need to be implemented to resolve the situation? This should also 
include amending the disaster recovery plan where appropriate. If the organization does 
not have a disaster recovery plan, then, they should investigate the creation of a plan. 
The disaster recovery plan on the organizational level should be a living document. The 
disaster recovery plan for the application should be flexible enough to allow for the 
addition of a new functionality. Once the plan either has been created or amended then it 
should be tested. Testing is where everything should come together in the development 
process. Hence, testing should: 
• Contain a requirements check against the application to ensure that they have 
been satisfied and that any risks that were identified in the risk analysis have 
been sufficiently mitigated. 
• Be as prompt as is reasonably possible so that an organization is competitive in 
the Web application development market 
• Involve actual end-users, not surrogate end-users 
• Be as comprehensive as possible. This will be determined based on the amount 
of risk the application presents to the organization’s reputation and the 
organization’s core business. 
• Tailored for security. 
• Take advantage of an organization’s existing testing infrastructure. 
• Should include external testing to verify application security where the risk 
warrants the expense. 
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• Implement a matrix to measure the success of the testing and effectively track 
bugs. 
7.2.6 Implementation into Production 
After testing has been completed, then and only then is the application prepared for 
Implementation into Production. The introduction of the application into the 
production environment needs to be completed with the involvement of the appropriate 
security personnel. The appropriate personnel need to be present to ensure that the 
application has been deployed properly into the production environment. If possible, this 
allows for immediate issues resolution at the time of implementation. If issues are 
discovered after the application has been implemented into production, then the 
application must go through the process again and be re-implemented into production.  
7.2.7  End-User Feed Back 
End-User Evaluation is critical from the standpoint of security. Whenever it is 
possible, actual end-users should be used in the security evaluation of a Web application. 
End-users are the ultimate variable in the execution of an application. If end-users are 
circumventing the application’s security in order to make their lives easier or perform 
their jobs in a timely manner, then these issues need to be investigated and resolved [78].   
An efficient and effective response to application security breaches is mandatory to Web 
based business survival. If the application has been compromised due to a flaw in the 
design or the code, then the security issue needs to be addressed, realistically, as rapidly 
as possible. If the application is not secure, businesses run the possibility that the 
application will be abused, corporate credibility lost, and financial consequences 
incurred. 
End-User Evaluation involves both communicating with the user to determine the 
success of the application’s security and security maintenance. This can range from 
informal communication, to surveys, to structured interviews with the end-user. Security 
has to find a balance between usability and providing a secure environment.  
Security maintenance has to do with discovering vulnerabilities after a production 
release. As new technologies emerge from the view point of development and 
maintenance, new vulnerabilities will be created and uncovered and these issues will 
have to be addressed to maintain application security [123, 153]. Patches will need to be 
tested to ensure that they resolve the newly discovered issue and to ensure that they do 
not create new security vulnerabilities in the application.  
7.3 WES Stakeholders 
The stakeholders who are involved in a specific project obviously depend on several 
criteria ranging from resources, to project visibility, to project risk, to funding. A large 
organization is more likely to have the resources available to assign different people 
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from different areas to the project. A small company, on the other hand, may have 
employees conducting multiple job functions.   
Project visibility is a factor when considering the amount of resources that will be 
assigned to a specific project. If an organization has a project that is considered to be a 
high profile project, then the project affects many people within and/or out-with the 
organization and will probably receive more attention than a low profile project. 
The risk associated with the profile is another matter. If the application has a high profile 
and a high risk to the core business function of the organization then it stands to reason 
that most organizations would assign more resources to the project. An example of this 
is a Web site that conducts financial transactions for a banking institution. On the other 
hand, if a project has a high profile and a low risk, such as an intranet phone book 
application, then fewer resources are probably going to be assigned to the project. 
As always, funding is an issue with all projects. If the funding is not available, 
regardless of the size of the organization, then resources will simply not be assigned to 
the project. If funding is available but at a smaller amount than initially requested then 
corners are cut in order to reduce expenditures. Easy targets for reducing expenditures 
include security testing, ongoing end-user input and feedback, and developer security 
education and training but this is potentially a dangerous strategy. 
General stakeholder who would be expected to be involved in the development process 
would include the project sponsor, project manager, business analysts, architect, 
programmer, tester, risk and security personnel, release personnel, and the end-user. 
7.4 WES Deliverables 
After the process has been customized to satisfy the needs of a specific business, it can 
then be documented so that it can be replicated for future projects. Depending on the 
needs of the organization, this can also serve as an audit trail. The amount of 
documentation implemented will depend on the needs of the particular organization. A 
financial institution, due to regulations, will probably have to provide detailed 
documentation of their processes. In contrast, a small local business will probably 
document only the bare necessities in order to conduct business. 
The deliverables that are required during each stage of the Web Engineering Security 
development process depends on two issues. The first issue that has to be recognized is 
the culture of the organizations, which is directly related to the industry to which the 
organization belongs. If the organization is in a highly regulated industry, such as 
banking or insurance, then there will be a greater emphasis on the individual 
deliverables that are required at each stage of the process. However, the converse is also 
true; if the organization is not in a highly regulated business then there will be fewer 
deliverables that are required during the various stages of the process. 
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The second issue that has to be acknowledged is the application development 
methodology that the organization is implementing to create Web software. This usually 
will be linked, as well, to the culture and the industry to which the business belongs. An 
organization that uses a waterfall approach will be more inclined to generate 
documentation and specific deliverables between the various stages. However, an 
organization that is implementing an agile approach to application development will, by 
nature, produce fewer deliverables between the various stages. Understanding the 
previously mentioned issues, the decision as to whether to create deliverables and to 
what extent the deliverables are created is left to the organization to determine. 
7.5 WES Goals 
WES tries to achieve several goals. These goals include upfront integration of security, 
security comprehensiveness, structured security implementation and industrial 
practicality. 
7.5.1 Upfront Integration of Security 
The WES methodology strives to integrate security from the beginning of the 
application development process. This is why security discussions are initiated during 
the business analysis stage of the development process. This up-front integration should 
help the organization reap benefits ranging from faster application development, to 
positive effects on budgets and time frames by proposing realistic security solutions at 
the onset of the project. The idea is to move security from the typical view point of an 
inhibitor to that of an enabler in the eyes of the end-user. 
Granted, this move is, to some extent, dependent on the security team that is involved in 
assisting in the implementation of the WES methodology. They need to not only be 
defining what is possible in the current organization but be providing an architectural 
strategy for the future and providing realistic alternatives to business needs rather than 
stating that something is not possible, full stop. 
7.5.2 Security Comprehensiveness 
The WES methodology hopes to address the questions of “How do I build application 
security into the fabric of my company?” [46].  The solution is to approach the problem 
from the idea of presenting a proactive comprehensive approach to the security 
development process. The security methodology should be compatible with the existing 
application deployment process capitalizing on current core competencies while 
providing a road map for improving security during the application development 
process. 
7.5.3 Structured Security Implementation  
The WES methodology provides an overall structure that allows organizations to 
customize the level of security to its individual needs and implement security into their 
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application development process. This structure can then be hardened to provide an 
organization with the desired level of continuity, reusability and audit-ability for future 
development projects. 
7.5.4 Industrial Practicality 
The general categories in the WES methodology are not set in stone but are strongly 
recommended. The items within the categories will need to be tailored and, where 
necessary, expanded to meet the specific needs of the individual organization and their 
current policies and procedures. The methodology is designed to complement an 
organization’s current methodology, while providing guidance to the development 
process from a security perspective.   
The idea behind the WES methodology is to provide a roadmap for Web application 
development that will help guide organizations to a more secure system. The goal is to 
proactively help developers create applications that are secure by design. Following the 
WES methodology means that the development process has taken into account risk 
analysis, application security requirements, various organizational policies, organization 
architecture, code design and coding practices, proper testing procedures and end-user 
feedback. 
WES provides the individuals involved in the Web development process with a practical 
method by which to address security. There are several solutions in existence that tell 
you “what” to do to improve general security within an organization and some within 
the organization’s development process. There are currently a multitude of technical 
solutions that offer possible solutions to very specific questions which basically answer 
“how” to solve specific security problems. The technical contribution is growing rapidly 
daily.  
Previous to the WES methodology, nobody has designed a security process based on 
criteria that are specifically tailored to address the needs of a Web Engineering 
development process. The general solutions that have been proposed in the past tend to 
lack accurate details that address the practical issue of “where” actions should be 
performed in the software development process. WES provides the Web Engineering 
community with a practical methodology to solve the inherent security deficiencies 
present within generic Web development life cycles.   
7.6 WES Analysis 
A real world understanding of application security indicates that it is a multifaceted issue 
in an increasingly complex environment. This becomes especially apparent when 
examining Web facing applications. The need to address security in application 
development has increased over the past several years. However, one of the major 
challenges facing organizations in today’s Web enabled environment is balancing 
technological needs with the business needs of the organization. Another potential 
challenge for organizations is structuring the overall development process so that there is 
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not a general frustration within the organization in terms of overall process efficiency. A 
lack of process efficiency potentially hinders aggressive Web development from a 
business perspective. A lack of security integration and understanding of the application 
development process creates an environment that is conducive to fostering security 
deficiencies. 
WES is a proactive approach that is designed to operate at a high level of abstraction. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to a high level abstract solution. The advantage 
that a high-level of abstraction provides is inclusiveness to the overall process. A high-
level process is naturally conducive to security issues, business issues, software 
development issues, and organizational issues being more inclusive. If these issues are 
narrowed through too much detail then there is the possibility that the details will be 
biased in some way or that they will simply have missed an important issue. The 
disadvantage of an abstract approach to a security methodology is that the 
implementation of the process is demanding from an individual knowledge perspective. 
WES is constructed from empirical research that consisted of two surveys and relevant 
literature. Meaning that the WES methodology is based in reality, in that, the goal of the 
WES methodology is to strengthen security in Web development applications.  
7.7 Summary 
This chapter describes the Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology covering both 
the principles behind the methodology and specific process details. The security 
education, good communication and cultural support principles provide the foundation 
for the WES methodology. Creating an environment that is conducive to initially 
fostering and continually encouraging security in an organization’s application 
development environment.  
Security is an ever elusive target in today’s application development environment. No 
application is ever going to be one hundred percent secure due to things like human 
error, advances in technology and hardware associated vulnerabilities. The idea behind 
the WES process is to strengthen security in a Web application development 
environment by implementing a security process that integrates seamlessly into an 
organization’s development process capitalizing on existing synergies. This seamless 
integration places the responsibility for defining the process stakeholders and the process 
deliverables with individual organizations implementing the WES process. The chapter 
covered the goals of the WES methodology along with an analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the methodology.  
WES was engineered to address security specifically for Web Application development 
processes. This does not mean that WES is not applicable to application development in 
other fields. It only means that WES has been designed to address specific 
characteristics associated with Web engineering. 
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8 Security Methodology Evaluation  
The objective of chapter eight is to review existing security methodologies that have 
been proposed by both industry and academia comparing their solutions with WES. The 
idea is to identify the differences between the existing solutions and the WES 
methodology. As discussed in chapter two, this is accomplished via a critical review of 
the literature.  
Section 8.1 examines a generational security methodology classification along with 
specific methodologies that have been deemed as compatible with application 
development processes. Section 8.2 examines the Comprehensive Lightweight 
Application Security Process also known as CLASP. Section 8.3 inspects Microsoft’s 
Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle. Section 8.4 covers a range of 
additional attempts to solve application development security problems and section 8.5 
provides a summary of the chapter. 
8.1 Generational Security Methodology Analysis 
As discussed in chapter four, industry surveys recognize the importance of security in 
reference to the World Wide Web [21, 49, 84]. This recognition has prompted several 
organizations and some academicians to recognize and investigate the importance of 
security in the development life cycle. As discussed in chapter three, this has resulted in 
work being produced in a variety of fields that includes Software Engineering, 
Management Information Systems (MIS), Computing Science, and mathematics. In 
academia, Siponen and Baskerville have attempted to analyze information security 
development methodologies, thereby, producing a generational security methodology 
analysis.  
The latest analysis produced by Siponen builds off of work originally conducted by 
Baskerville. The end result, as discussed in chapter three, is the development of a 
generational framework consisting of five generations for the security methodology 
evolution. The WES methodology attempts to satisfy the criteria for the fifth generation 
of information systems methods. Siponen broadly defines the fifth generation criteria as 
social ideas and techniques that are in agreement with designer and user expectations, 
integration with a variety of development methodologies, practitioner adaptability and 
empirically examined evidence of usefulness.  
Siponen and Baskerville classified the first two generations basically as containing 
checklist, management criteria and maturity criteria. While these items have their place 
in helping to examine and rectify potential security issues, they do not provide 
methodical, holistic solutions specifically applicable to secure Web application 
development.   
Out of the other generations, it should be noted that Siponen identified, in his analysis, 
only three methodologies that could be “smoothly integrated into Information Systems 
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(IS) development methods” [171]. Since this is a major criterion for WES these articles 
are the focus of the discussion. The three methodologies classified as third generation 
solutions include: 
• Baskerville’s logical control approach  
• Booysen and Eloff’s spiral approach 
• McDermott and Fox’s abuse case solution.  
Siponen did go on to hypothesize that it might be possible to integrate four other 
approaches with varying degrees of modification to various parts of the methods. These 
methods were identified as: 
• Pernul’s security constraint modelling 
• Pernul and Quirchmayr’s data and security semantics 
• Pernul’s, et. al., DFD and ER modelling  
• Karya, et. al., survivable IS.  
Baskerville’s logical control approach [15] focuses specifically on the design aspect of 
the methodology. Baskerville identifies five areas in which controls need to be examined 
when designing a system, whether the system is computerized or not. These areas 
include the system user, system designer, human entity, the client and the owner.  All of 
which are valid points to consider. However, Baskerville does not go into detail on how 
these controlled approaches specifically fit into a development methodology, much less 
the integration of these controls into a Web application development methodology. The 
WES methodology considers controls when acquiring the application’s security 
requirements and the analysis that takes place when examining organizational 
compatibility. This is done prior to the security design stage so that the requirements 
help the designer in the construction of the application. Baskerville’s approach does not 
specifically identify the same controls as WES and he specifically puts them in the 
design stage.  
Baskerville does make two very important points in the summary of the paper that 
concurs with the WES methodology. He states that “management cannot be expected to 
blindly finance controls, nor can the knowledge worker be expected to completely 
accept controls” [15]. This statement alludes to the fact that the final decision to the 
implementation of controls in an application is ultimately a business decision and that 
the knowledge worker (which also could be referred to as an end-user) input is 
important.  
A couple of key points on which Booysen and Eloff’s [27] Automated Secure Systems 
Development Methodology (ASSDM) and WES concur are the integration of security 
with application development together with the involvement of end-user in the 
development process. Booysen and Eloff mention that the end-user should be involved 
during the development process. WES takes this further and indicates that they should 
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be involved in the requirements stage, the testing stage and at the end to provide feed 
back. Granted, Booysen and Eloff do not take end-user involvement to this degree, but 
they do at least acknowledge involvement during the development process. ASSDM also 
concurs with the a major idea behind the WES methodology that  
“a key notion underlying the creation of a security development methodology is to 
include security activities as part of system development” [27]. 
This indicates that both the security activities and the development activities should take 
place concurrently. Booysen and Eloff’s [27] approach adds security into Boehm’s spiral 
approach [24] that was discussed in chapter six. The ASSDM is achieved by integrating 
the following tasks into Boehm’s spiral approach: 
• Determine the sensitivity level of the application  
• Define the goal state of the application system 
• Conduct a security risk analysis 
• Create a security model and object classification 
• Conduct an Information flow analysis 
Determining the sensitivity level of the application involves examining the data from the 
perspective of the source and the value of the data. This exercise would involve the 
application of security models like the Bell-Lapadula model [91]. Booysen and Eloff’s 
define the goal state of the application system as “a breach between the current state and 
the expected state of the application” [27]. The goal state is defined in the same terms in 
which WES defines security which is integrity, availability and confidentiality.   
Conducting a security risk analysis is pursued from the view point of reaching the goal 
state of the application based on the organization’s available resources. At this point, the 
authors acknowledge access control lists and security policies. WES concurs with the 
acknowledgement of the security policies and access control, which is supported in its 
organizational compatibility discussion examined in chapter seven. However, Booysen 
and Eloff do not acknowledge cultural compatibility, making it a point on which the 
solutions differ. 
Security models are created through the use of entity relationship diagrams and data 
flow diagrams. Object classifications are based on sensitivity levels, the objects are then 
modelled on a dataflow diagram to determine data flows. This information is then put 
into a matrix and examined from a source and destination perspective to determine if the 
data flows are valid.  
There are several differences between Booysen and Eloff’s solution and the WES 
methodology that should be acknowledged. Their approach concentrates on the user 
requirements and the design stages of the application development process. On the other 
hand, the WES process examines security throughout the development process. Their 
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approach focuses specifically on the spiral approach. The paper does not discuss the 
applicability of the solution to other application development processes nor does it make 
specific reference to Web application development. It should also be noted that ASSDM 
relies on prototyping to validate security requirements. Prototyping plays a major part in 
Boehm’s iterative process. WES relies on the testing of the actual product rather than a 
prototype. The WES process strives to present a process neutral approach that is 
specifically designed for Web application development. The paper presents a 
hypothetical scenario to which the security approach is applied. They do not present any 
evidence that the approach has actually been implemented in industry or any industrial 
indication as to the success of the solution. 
McDermott and Fox [128] present abuse cases as a solution to analyzing security 
requirements. McDermott and Fox define an abuse case to be a specification that 
completely describes the interaction between an actor and the systems resulting in harm 
to the actors, the system or a system stakeholder. They indicate that abuse cases can be 
helpful during the requirements, design, and testing phases of a security engineering 
process” [128]. While abuse cases can be helpful during these stages, it is not 
recommended that they be used to provide the sole source for requirements analysis, 
design specs or testing specs. They even admit that they “intentionally make abuse case 
models ambiguous and incomplete and do not worry about their soundness. Abuse case 
models do not replace any other part of a sound security engineering process” [128]. It 
should also be noted that abuse cases do not provide assistance with organizational 
compatibility, environment compatibility or user feedback. 
All of the models proposed by Pernul are classified as third generation security 
solutions. Pernul’s [148] paper on security constraint modelling along with Pernul and 
Quirchmayr’s [149] paper on data and security semantics focuses on aspects of security 
that are directly relevant to databases. The first paper focuses on conceptual modelling 
and design of multilevel secure databases [148]. The later paper acknowledges that its 
main contribution is to the logical design of MLS database [149]. Pernul, et. al., present 
a DFD and ER modelling technique that is based on security semantics (security 
classifications) to be used in “a design environment for multilevel secure database 
applications” [150]. All of these articles focus on database security, an important issue in 
security, but only one aspect of security that needs to be addressed in Web application 
development methodologies.  
Solutions are still being explored and developed today that are based on modelling 
techniques. Byers and Shahmehri [30] recently published an idea that they are calling a 
Software Process Improvement (SPI). They claim that the process can be conducted at 
all stages of the development process; however, the practicality of this is debatable for 
Web application development projects. This debate is due to the Web engineering 
characteristics and common Internet development practices discussed in chapter three. 
The process contains three stages which include vulnerability modelling, vulnerability 
cause mitigation and process components definition.  
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The end goal of the SPI process appears to be the same as the WES process. The goal is 
to reduce vulnerabilities. WES does not specifically put a number to this goal for a 
couple of reasons. First, the security challenges are going to be unique to individual 
companies. These companies will have strengths and weaknesses in different areas 
affecting the influence of WES. Secondly, it is realistically very difficult in industry to 
determine the overall affect a security process has on an organization. Security is 
invisible when it is working correctly. The only time it is noticed is when it fails and/or 
there is a breach of some sort to the system. WES takes the stand that it wants to 
strengthen security in an organization. If WES increases the overall Web application 
security in an organization by decreasing the number of security breaches that an 
organization experiences in its Web applications or simply increases security awareness 
through acknowledging and addressing security issues, in the Web application 
development process, then it has been a success.  
There are several differences in the two approaches to solving the security problems in 
application development. The first difference is the fact that SPI is not specifically 
designed for Web application development. The second difference is that SPI is a model 
based solution. The idea behind the process is that vulnerabilities should be modelled 
using what Byers calls a vulnerability-cause graph. As discussed in this paper and 
another paper by Ardi, et. al., [7], this is simply a model of the vulnerabilities and their 
causes. The next step is to attempt to mitigate the risk through the construction of what 
they are calling a security activity graph. They claim that this is used to fully document 
activities in the software life cycle. According to the article, this includes complete 
information on implementation and success verification. The article also talks about the 
future creation of a vulnerability analysis database and the collecting of information into 
this database. The article also claimed to be working with three organizations in industry 
but, to date, has not implemented anything in industry. They also claimed that one of the 
three organizations uses an agile application development approach. The compatibility 
of their solutions with agile methodologies is debatable, based on the amount of 
documentation that they desire with the vulnerability-cause graph, the security activity-
cause graph and the vulnerability database. Heavy documentation goes against the agile 
manifesto’s idea of ‘Working software over comprehensive documentation’ [4]. 
Building upon Siponen’s classification scheme where he defined “the third generation 
approaches (as) focus(ing) on different means of modelling organizations ISS 
requirements” [171], the view was taken that model driven approaches embraced a  
narrowly defined security application scope. Modelling security problems is only one 
way to identify and solve problems. It does not present a comprehensive solution to 
security in the Web application development process, nor does it attempt to build upon 
existing synergies within an organization.  
The survivable IS approach is classified by Siponen as a fourth generation approach 
which he defined as  
“add(ing) the social and socio-technical design aspects to the third generation 
approaches” [171].  
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Karyda, et. al.’s, [111] survivable IS approach, which Siponen classifies as a fourth 
generation approach, does not provide information on exactly how the three main 
phases, which consist of diagnosis, re-design, and transformation, fit into an application 
development methodology. These phases also do not address all of the issues addressed 
by the WES methodology like organizational compatibility, environment compatibility, 
testing, and end-user feedback. The fourth generation suffers from the same issues as the 
third generation. Fourth generation solutions have a slightly broader scope than the third 
generation security solutions but they still embrace a narrowly defined security 
application scope. 
The previously proposed solutions enforce the idea that application development 
security is a broad area of study in which there is an abundant number of research 
solutions that have been proposed. However, none of the previously discussed solutions 
specifically targeted Web application development. All of the previously discussed 
solutions, except for one (Byers and Shahmehri [30]), specifically targeted individual 
aspects of security improvement vs. trying to provide a comprehensive methodology.  
8.2 Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security 
Process (CLASP) 
The Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) provides a list 
of thirty possible activities that can be included in the development process [203]. 
However, an application security development methodology needs to encompass not 
only specific design and development activities but also needs to address overall project 
risk, cultural, environmental, testing, implementation and end-user feed back issues.  
In the areas of design, coding and testing, companies can, where appropriate, use 
additional tools at their disposal like CLASP, automated testing tools, and in-house 
application testing procedures to enhance the security process. The purpose of the WES 
security methodology is to provide cohesion and flexibility to an organization’s security 
process. WES stresses that once the designing, coding, testing and the process of 
implementation have been completed, then end-user feedback is mandatory. CLASP 
does not stress end-user feed back. 
CLASP presents a lot of really good practices that can be implemented into the 
development environment. However, there are several differences between WES and 
CLASP. WES was designed around two sets of criteria that were discussed in chapter 
five. The Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) is used to 
analyse CLASP in chapter six. The result is the identification of several areas where 
CLASP and WES differ to varying degrees.  
Two significant differences include the promotion of security throughout the 
development life cycle and the establishment of trust and accountability. There are also 
two founding principles that WES established that are not mentioned in the thirty core 
activities of CLASP. These include good communication and cultural support as 
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discussed in 7.1.2 and 7.1.3. Without either one of these principles, adding security into 
a development process will be very difficult or is unlikely to be effective. 
CLASP is a set of process pieces that appear to be designed around best industry 
practices. CLASP claims to be process agnostic but there is a tight association with the 
Rational Unified Process (RUP). RUP is basically IBM’s commercial version of the 
Unified Software Development (USD) process. WES is a process neutral methodology 
that is specifically designed to be used for applications that are being created for use on 
the World Wide Web. 
8.3 Trustworthy Computing Security Development 
Lifecycle 
Microsoft has also attempted to address security issues through their Security 
Development Lifecycle (SDL) which is discussed in “Trustworthy Computing Security 
Development Lifecycle” [123].  Microsoft states that the “SDL is process-agnostic as far 
as how you go about developing software” [96]; however, there are several issues with 
this statement. As Figure 4 in chapter 6 displays, the SDL is clearly laid out to follow a 
traditional waterfall / spiral approach. Fundamental components of the Web engineering 
development environment have been outlined to include multidisciplinary involvement 
[54]; a complex, agile, time sensitive development environment [129]; a diverse end-
user population[139] and a usability focused design [139]. Which brings up an important 
issue, Microsoft’s SDL methodology was designed for traditional software development. 
The SDL was not designed for use on Web applications. Another issue to note is the fact 
that it has only been used in the Microsoft environment.  
The documentation makes reference to acknowledging security requirements through the 
need “to comply with industry standards and by certification processes such as the 
Common Criteria” [124]. This directly goes against the concept of a complex, agile, 
time sensitive development environment. The Common Criteria is a document and a 
labour intensive certification process that is not conducive to short development cycles. 
The SDL process does not address multidisciplinary involvement, a diverse end-user 
population or a usability focused design in its documentation. 
The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) solution concurs with WES in 
that it stresses the importance of designing security into the application from the 
beginning and places value on following guidelines and coding standards. However, 
there are differences in the methodologies. Their approach lumps coding and testing into 
an implementation phase. WES places more of an emphasis on these activities and 
places them in separate categories. Microsoft’s solution has a security advisor assigned 
within the requirements stage. Its solution references specific documentation in the 
design stage; a built-in verification stage which encompasses a specific security push 
and, within the release, they have a final security review. Clearly, these stages and 
requirements are more suited toward large corporations that have separate security 
individuals who can be assigned to projects and support a large security push during 
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application development. Large corporations are usually much more inclined to support 
documentation as referenced in the design and release stages. These same security 
professionals are required to sign off on the project in the release phase [124]. Another 
major difference in the Microsoft solution is the support and servicing phase. The 
support and servicing phase is viewed as a fix-it stage where vulnerabilities are analyzed 
and where warranted patches are released [123]. Granted, this is an important area to 
address but they make no reference to determining the effectiveness of the security from 
the customer’s point of view. The customer’s perception and acceptance of an 
application’s security is an equally important security issue. Microsoft’s SDL paper 
[123] introduces four principles which are ‘secure by design’, ‘secure by default’, 
‘secure in deployment’, and ‘communications’.  
Secure by design states that “the software should be architected, designed and 
implemented so as to protect itself and the information it processes, and to resist 
attacks”[123].  
This is a narrow view of security within the development process. WES supports the 
idea that security is visible through-out the development process. This goal is supported 
via the principles of WES which includes good communication, security education and 
cultural support.  
Secure by default states that the “software’s default state should promote 
security”[123]. In the WES methodology, this is stated by applying appropriate security 
principles and good coding practices to the architecture design, coding and testing 
phases of the application development methodology.  
Secure in deployment talks about the “tools and guidance that help end users and/or 
administrators use it securely” [123]. WES agrees that providing the right tools to 
developers and administrators is necessary to provide a secure environment, but WES 
takes the idea further, as discussed in section 7.1.3, by viewing the issue as a cultural 
support topic.  
Communication states that “software developers should be prepared for the discovery 
of product vulnerabilities and should communicate openly and responsibly with end 
users and/or administrators to help them take protective action (such as patching or 
deploying workarounds)” [123]. 
WES concurs that communication is an extremely important issue in the development 
process. However, WES breaks communication into two very important categories. 
There needs to be effective communication among the development team members. This 
includes communication on issues like software standards, testing environments, 
security software compatibility, etc. There also needs to be effective communication 
between the development team and the end-users. This is not only to establish the need 
for patches but simply to determine if the security solution that was implemented meets 
the needs of the end-user and is technically effective. 
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Another point worth acknowledging when examining the differences between the two 
methodologies is the topic of compatibility. Microsoft’s SDL does not discuss 
organizational compatibility from a security policy, cultural or a technical perspective. 
The WES methodology does address these issues and even goes a step further by 
acknowledging legislation that potentially impacts Web application development. 
8.4 Additional Attempts to Address Application 
Development Security  
Relevant security articles, white papers and books exist on an array of topics that focus 
on improving specific aspects of security. The security information in this area ranges 
from general security advice, to security requirements [204], to security risk [211], to the 
use of patterns, to books published on security. However, these attempts do not 
comprehensively address Web engineering security during the application development 
process through the establishment of a security methodology.  
Viega and McGraw’s book on “Building Secure Software” [205] provides a good 
introduction to security. The book takes a general approach to tackling the topic of 
secure software in a networked world. The book makes two important statements. The 
first is that “there is no such thing as 100% security” [205] but they do support writing 
“secure-enough” [205] programs. The second is that “malicious hackers don’t create 
security holes; they simply exploit them” [205]. They go on to say that  
“Security holes and vulnerabilities – the real root cause of the problem – are the 
result of bad software design and implementation” [205].  
The book discusses managing software security. It examines various security 
technologies that are important to understand and it provides advice on security’s best 
practices and principals. In the software security section, Viega and McGraw do discuss 
software engineering. In that section they make very valid points in that the development 
time for Internet applications is compressed compared to traditional development. This 
has an adverse effect on gathering requirements, design and testing in the development 
life cycle. They talk about security goals that include prevention of attacks, traceability 
and auditing, monitoring, privacy and confidentiality, multilevel security, anonymity, 
authentication, and integrity. 
They look at prevention from the eyes of repeat attacks. Once information on 
vulnerabilities has been discovered on the Internet, it can be propagated through scripts 
so that anyone can execute the attack. Traceability and auditing are considered from the 
viewpoint of forensics and monitoring is viewed along the same line of thought through 
applications, like intrusion detection systems. Privacy and confidentiality can be viewed 
from both the users and the businesses perspectives. As they note, by nature, software is 
not really designed to protect these topics. Software is designed to complete a function 
by running on a machine. Hence, the machine is a natural vulnerability to the software. 
Multilevel security is analysed through the concept of classifications and anonymity is 
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discussed from the view point of design and the capturing of data within programs. 
Authentication of application is stressed from both the system side and the end-user side. 
Systems should know with whom they are dealing and end-users should not blindly trust 
universal resource locators (URLs). Integrity is stressed in that data should not be 
modified during transport.   
The authors do touch on the topic of security integration into the development life cycle. 
They stress the integration of risk analysis and security requirements into the life cycle. 
For discussion purposes, they used a spiral software development model but they clearly 
state that they “don’t care which processes you apply” [205]. They continue with the 
statement that “the main thing is to work explicitly to manage software risk, especially 
from a security perspective” [205]. They also consider “sound software engineering a 
prerequisite to sound software security” [205]. 
Viega and McGraw provide a lot of their information in the context of a networked 
world. A lot of their advice is good general advice for Intranets or Internets. They do 
stress risk management in the software development life cycles, but they do not address 
the idea of a security methodology, much less a security methodology that is applicable 
specifically to Web Engineering. 
Wang’s article discusses software quality and inspects risk at various levels in the 
application along with the effects on quality factors [211]. The article makes the point 
that  
“software security needs to be considered from the very beginning of the 
development cycle” [211].  
It goes on to say that  
“the majority of the security compromises can be attributed to one or more 
weaknesses within integral components that make up the software” [211].  
The article discusses specific software quality factors, presented by McCall, which 
consisted of correctness, reliability, efficiency, integrity, and usability [211]. The article 
then proceeds to break down software risk into three categories which included the 
application layer, the platform layer and the network layer. Along with this information 
they present a study that examines the specific technology approaches like secure 
tokens, packet filters, and the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and their 
effectiveness against security threats and risk. 
This article provides interesting and relevant information on specific aspects of security. 
However, the paper does not tackle organizational foundation issues that need to be 
addressed before security can be implemented successfully, effectively and continually. 
The article makes reference to the need for security throughout the development cycle 
but does not address all of the aspects of the development life cycle. 
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Another proposed solution has been to apply security patterns through the use of a 
secure software lifecycle as discussed in “A methodology for secure software design” 
[67]. The proposed pattern solution agrees with the WES methodology in that security 
needs to be ingrained in the application from the beginning and throughout the entire 
application life cycle [67]. The idea behind the pattern is to capitalize on proven design 
solutions. There are a couple of assumptions with this philosophy. First, there is the 
assumption that the individual applying the security pattern understands the pattern 
solution and, secondly, that they will apply the solution in the correct manner. The 
logical postulation gains complexity when the security pattern requires customization in 
order to be applicable to the current environment. Patterns do not address all of the areas 
engaged by WES such as the risk analysis and the organizational compatibility. Patterns 
could be used in conjunction with WES in the design and coding area of the 
methodology. However, patterns alone do not provide a comprehensive solution to Web 
application security. 
There are several differences between Fernandez’s [67] methodology and WES. The 
paper proposes that security verification and testing take place between the four 
proposed stages. It ties itself directly to the use of the Unified Modelling Language 
(UML) and object oriented languages. It also makes no direct reference to the critical 
need for communication with the end-user / customer for requirements and end-user 
feed back. 
Ellis and Speed propose a process for developing a security project in their book [64]. 
While they do support risk analysis and feedback in the security project, there are 
several differences between their approach and the WES methodology. Their solution 
treats the security aspect of a project as a project in itself. Security needs to be viewed as 
a critical component of the development process, not a stand alone project. Their process 
contains a stage for reviewing the business where extensive knowledge of the business is 
required. This would include an in-depth understanding of the business’ markets. The 
process also contains an “Understanding the Technology” [64] stage where a 
comprehensive knowledge of technical solutions and technology that is currently in use 
by the business is expected. Their solution also calls for an implementation and feed 
back stage that is executed with a pilot of the application. After possibly several 
iterations of the pilot, then the application progresses to final roll-out. Their feedback 
appears to be in reference to training and end-user support, not necessarily determining 
the effectiveness of the security from the end-user perspective. The scope of the process 
proposed by Ellis and Speed is larger than the scope of the WES methodology. 
A recent attempt by Cross recognizes the importance of considering security from the 
start and throughout the development process [43]. Instead of providing a methodology 
for the implementation of security into the development process, Cross provides good 
high level advice for developers. The initial advice starts off with the statement “as soon 
as you get the initial requirements” [43]. WES advocates involving security during the 
business analysis discussion prior to the requirements gathering stage. The advice given 
at this point focuses on developer meetings, establishment of project goals, brain 
storming on security, an estimation of the project work effort and a go / no-go decision 
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based on the output form the previous points. The balance of Cross’s advice deals with 
code reviews; setting publishing standards for developers; the use of version control 
systems; establishing testing schedules and the institution of a release process.  
8.5 Summary 
Literature is replete with articles and books that describe implementing general security 
improvements; however, they have the same issues. They make excellent points about 
the need to improve code from specific perspectives. They provide generic information 
that is not specific to Web Engineering and they fail to address underlying 
organizational issues that affect the ability of an organization to efficiently and 
effectively implement security into the development process. 
There have also been attempts in industry to solve security issues in application 
development processes. Industry solutions range from process plug-ins, to modified 
system development life cycles, to the application of security patterns. However, they do 
not attempt to solve the broad security problem during Web Application development. 
Some of these attempts include efforts by Secure Software and Microsoft. While these 
industrial attempts present good information, they fail to address all of the issues that 
have been recognized by WES. These areas include addressing security during all of the 
stages described in the WES methodology, SCWAD and the EE. The next chapter 
focuses on the integration of WES into various Web application development life cycles. 
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9 Life Cycle Compatibility 
This chapter examines the compatibility of the Web Engineering Security (WES) 
methodology with traditional and agile Web engineering application development 
methodologies. Each of the methodologies discussed in this chapter was introduced and 
discussed briefly in chapter six. A critical assessment of traditional and agile life cycle 
compatibility with the WES methodology is presented using descriptions from available 
literature.    
The point of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive evaluation or to argue the 
validity of the plan-driven or agile approaches to Web development. The chapter 
examines the approaches based on the information that both are currently used in 
industry to develop Web applications. Section 9.1 examines the waterfall methodology, 
section 9.2 covers the Unified Software Development (USD) Process, section 9.3 
examines the Dynamic Systems Development (DSDM) Methodology, section 9.4 takes 
a look at extreme programming, section 9.5 inspects agile methodologies in general and 
section 9.6 summarizes the chapter. 
9.1 Waterfall Model  
The waterfall model is arguably the best known of the traditional methodologies. The 
WES model can be moulded so that it complements both the original and the revised 
versions of the waterfall methodology. Table 23 illustrates how the WES methodology 
could be integrated into the original version of the waterfall methodology. The project 
development risk assessment could be conducted while the systems requirements are 
being gathered. Then, while the software requirements are being gathered, acquire the 
security requirements at the same time. There are aspects of the security design / coding 
stage that are applicable to the analysis, program design and coding stages of the original 
waterfall model. The organization would need to choose the specific aspects from the 
security design / coding stage and apply them to the appropriate stages of the original 
waterfall model. An example would be the architect reviewing the project development 
risk analysis and the security requirements during the analysis. 
Table 24, on the other hand, shows how WES can be integrated into the Sommerville 
version [175] of the waterfall model. Note, two stages of the WES methodology are 
being addressed during a single stage of the waterfall process where the need warrants. 
Regardless of how these are integrated into the methodology or to what depth an 
organization decides to take the WES stages, they can be integrated. 
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Table 23 - Basic Waterfall Method and WES Compatibility 
Original Waterfall Model* WES Process 
Systems Requirements Project Development Risk Assessment 
Software Requirements Application Security Requirements 
Analysis Security Design / Coding  
Program Design Security Design / Coding  
Coding Security Design / Coding  
Controlled Environment Implementation 
Testing and Operations Testing 
Implementation in Production 
End-User Evaluation 
* Royce [164] 
Table 24 - Sommerville Waterfall Method and WES Compatibility 
Sommerville Waterfall Model * WES Process 
Requirements Definition Project Development Risk Assessment 
Application Security Requirements 
System and Software Design Security Design / Coding  
Implementation and Unit Testing Security Design / Coding  
Controlled Environment Implementation 
Integration and System Testing  Testing 
Operation and Maintenance Implementation in Production 
End-User Evaluation 
* Sommerville [175] 
9.2 The Unified Software Development Process (USD) 
The phases of the process include inception, elaboration, construction, and transition and 
the workflows consist of requirements, analysis, design, implementation and testing 
[105]. The compatibility of WES with the individual phases of the USD process is 
displayed in Table 25.  
Table 25 - USD Phase and WES Compatibility 
USD Process Phases * WES Process 
Inception Project Development Risk Assessment 
Elaboration Application Security Requirements 
Construction Security Design / Coding  
Controlled Environment Implementation 
Testing 
Transition Implementation in Production 
End-User Evaluation 
* USD Process [105] 
However, Table 25 only displays half of the picture. WES can be integrated into both the 
workflows and the phases of the Unified System Development (USD) process. The work 
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flows in the USD process are really the main activities in the development process. The 
five USD workflows are as follows: requirements, analysis, design, implementation and 
test. There is, realistically, going to be some cross over between the phases of the USD 
methodology. Pragmatically, there could be cross over between the individual work 
flows due to the fact that activities in the business environment do not always stop and 
start on a specific schedule. During the requirements workflow and the inception phase, 
a project development risk analysis should to take place, prior to acquiring the security 
requirements, which will probably start in the inception phase as well and migrate into 
the elaboration phase. The analysis workflow then needs to go back and pick up the risk 
analysis and compare the results against the security requirements to ensure that all of 
the issues are being identified and acknowledged.  
Once this has been achieved, the process moves into the design workflow which has 
activities in the elaboration phase and the construction phase where security design and 
coding issues are resolved. The security design and the coding issues will need to be 
compliant with the security requirements. Once this particular piece of the application 
has been developed, it will need to be implemented into a controlled environment. Once 
the application is compatible with the environment, the next workflow is security 
testing. The testers will probably identify errors in the application and request 
modifications from the coders. The testers should, according to WES, go back and 
compare the application with the security requirements and the risk analysis to ensure 
that the design is correct and the risks have been appropriately mitigated. After testing 
has been completed, then the application should progress into production and feedback 
from the end-user should be acquired. As Jacobson, et. al. stated  
“you integrate, test, and run each iteration a little (and) between each step, you 
take, you get feedback that permits you to adjust your focus for the next step” 
[105]. 
WES complements this approach nicely. Table 26 provides a more realistic perspective 
on the integration of the WES methodology with the USD process. The cross sections 
that are in bold and have a large font indicate the main activities for that phase / 
workflow. The cross sections that are not in bold and contain a smaller font represent 
work that has already been completed. The idea is that the main activities should be able 
to access previously generated data if desired. The Project development risk analysis fits 
well into the USD iterative process. As noted in chapter six, the iterative concept in the 
USD process is risk driven. Hence, adding risk from the security perspective should 
integrate well with the existing risk emphasis from a project point of view. 
The people perspective of the WES process is also compatible with the USD process. 
Both processes believe that people are crucial to the development process life cycle. The 
difference is that WES not only believes the process should work well for the 
individuals implementing it but it should also strive to minimize breaches through 
guidance. 
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Table 26 - USD Process and WES Compatibility 
Phases 
Core Workflows Inception Elaboration Construction Transition 
Requirements Project 
Development 
Risk Assessment 
Application 
Security 
Requirements 
  
Analysis Project Development 
Risk Assessment 
Application 
Security 
Requirements 
  
Design Project Development 
Risk Assessment 
Application 
Security 
Requirements 
Security 
Design / 
Coding 
 
Implementation Project Development 
Risk Assessment 
Application 
Security 
Requirements 
Security 
Design / 
Coding 
Controlled Environment 
Implementation 
Test Project Development 
Risk Assessment 
Application 
Security 
Requirements 
Security Design 
/ Coding 
Testing 
Testing 
Implementation in Production 
End-User Evaluation 
 
9.3 Dynamic Systems Development Method (DSDM) 
As outlined in chapter six, Stapleton [177] defines the five main phases of DSDM along 
with “two non-development phases” [178]  which are as follows: 
0. Pre-Project 
5. Feasibility Study 
6. Business Study 
7. Functional Model Iteration 
8. Systems Design and Build Iteration 
9. Implementation 
10. Post-Project [177, 178] 
The pre-project stage is the first non-development phase and is described as a phase that 
“ensures that only the right projects are started and that they are set up correctly” [178]. 
Realistically, this translates into a focus on funding and general business continuity. At 
this point, it would not hurt to have a security officer with whom to discuss ideas. 
However, it is not mandatory from a WES implementation perspective. WES maps very 
well into the five main phases of the DSDM process. The first main stage is the 
feasibility study. Some of the considerations that the business needs to address include 
the definition of the problem that the business is trying to solve; can the business 
problem be solved with technical solutions and, if so, “is the impact on the current 
business process acceptable?” [177]. Organizations should also be asking the question, 
what is the security risk that the proposed application introduces to the organization? 
The specific security question compliments the business impact question very well. 
The business study’s primary activity “is to get a good understanding of the business 
perspective to be automated and (its) information needs” [177]. This is where detailed 
security requirements should be captured by the development team. WES does not 
mandate how this task is to be resolved. It can be accomplished through one-on-one 
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interviews, group discussions, or as Stapleton recommends for a DSDM project, through 
a series of facilitated workshops. The end goal is to capture the application’s security 
requirements. How this is accomplished is up to the cultural comfort of the executing 
organizations. As described by Stapleton, the functional model iteration activities are: 
1. Identify what you are doing in the cycle 
2. Agree how you are going to go about it 
3. Do it 
4. Check that you did it right [177]. 
Including security in each of these activities does not create any conflicts.  Stapleton 
goes on to state that testing takes place as components are produced.  
“As developers produce a software component, it is tested by them-selves (for 
technical aspects) and the users in the team (for functional suitability). In this way, 
all forms of testing, including acceptance testing, are carried out incrementally 
throughout a project” [177].  
All forms of testing should include security testing as described by WES in chapter 
seven. One of the products of the functional model is a risk analysis of future 
development. Conducting a risk analysis on future development would probably help to 
identify areas that may need additional research and investigation from a security 
requirements perspective and help to propel future conversation in the area of security. 
The design and build iteration stage is where the major construction, testing and general 
tuning of the application takes place. It should be noted that DSDM does not consider 
testing a separate activity. The method states that testing “is thinly spread throughout the 
development process” [177]. This being the case, hopefully, there should be a controlled 
environment, for testing purposes, available to the development staff and any testers. 
The implementation stage is where the transition from the development environment to 
the operational environment takes place. This activity includes end-user education and 
training. DSDM also believes that “Active user involvement is imperative”[62]; a point 
on which WES concurs.  
The last stage is the post-project stage which is the second non-development phase 
mentioned at the start of this section. The goal of this section is to “assess the success of 
the solution in achieving the intended benefits” [178] which Stapleton notes generally 
does not consider the lessons learned throughout the  life of the project since these 
should have been covered incrementally as the project progressed. It is reasonable to 
presume that there could be input / influence from the end-user evaluation stage in the 
WES methodology at this point in the DSDM. Pragmatically, it is recommended that 
end-user evaluation information be gathered incrementally at the end of the 
implementation stage in the DSDM.  
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The consortium does mention an e-DSDM lifecycle which “follows the same process as 
a DSDM project with the exception of a Vision Phase. The Vision phase precedes a set 
of e-DSDM projects. Its aim is to set the e-business strategy for an e-business 
programme” [62]. Again there is no mention of security in this vision phase.  
Table 27 provides an overview of the integration of the WES methodology with the five 
main stages of DSDM. There is a small bit of repetition between the functional model 
iteration systems design and build iteration due to the nature of the methodology. The 
extent of the replication that is experienced is dependent upon the organization 
executing the methodology. If the organization simply chooses to model the system 
without construction of the prototype then there will obviously be less repetition. 
Table 27 - DSDM / WES Compatibility 
DSDM WES 
Feasibility study Project Development Risk Assessment 
Business Study Application Security Requirements 
Functional Model Iteration Security Design / Coding  
Controlled Environment Implementation 
Testing 
Systems Design and Build Iteration Security Design / Coding  
Controlled Environment Implementation 
Testing 
Implementation Implementation in Production 
End-User Evaluation 
9.4 eXtreme Programming (XP) 
The WES methodology could be implemented among the various stages and levels of 
the XP development process so that it looks something like Table 28. The exploration 
and the planning stages are portrayed as more high-level stages whereas development, 
acceptance testing and small releases are a bit more granular.  WES is very suitable to 
the XP process in that it supports the idea that the company should determine the amount 
of documentation that is relevant for the environment. It is very compatible with 
multiple short development life cycles as it increases the number of conversations that 
are relevant to the security of the application. 
The exploration stage is where the project development risk assessment should take 
place. This is where the customer / business unit pulls together enough information to 
construct the story cards and developers explore possible architectures. This is a great 
time to bring up possible risk introduced by the proposed system. These risks can then 
be used to flush out application security requirements in order to mitigate the risk raised 
in the previous stage. The development stage is where the secure coding should take 
place in pairs. Utilize good coding practices; establish trust and accountability while 
implementing standards from a design and a coding perspective. Acceptance testing 
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should include a controlled environment implementation, security testing and end-user 
feedback. A small release coincides with implementation in production. 
Table 28 - XP and WES Compatibility 
Exploration Project Development Risk 
Assessment 
Planning  Application Security Requirements 
Development Security Design / Coding 
Acceptance Testing Controlled Environment 
Implementation 
Testing 
End-User Evaluation 
Small Releases Implementation in Production 
 
9.5 Agile Manifesto Core Principles Compatibility 
 
The Department of Home Land Security (DHLS) provides a break-down of the Agile 
Manifesto core principles and their perceived effect on agile application development. 
The information provided by the DHLS is directly available in the first three columns of 
Table 29 [51]. The fourth column provides information on how WES addresses these 
issues. 
Table 29 - Core Principles of the Agile Manifesto & Relevant WES Impact 
The Department of Home Land Security * WES Dissertation 
No. Principle Implication for Security Relevant WES Impact 
1 The highest priority of 
agile developers is to 
satisfy the customer. 
This is to be achieved 
through early and 
continuous delivery of 
valuable software. 
Negative, unless customer is 
highly security-aware. 
There is a particular risk 
that security testing will be 
inadequate or excluded 
because of “early delivery” 
imperatives. 
All three principles impact this issue 
Security Education, Good communication 
and Cultural Support. WES attempts to 
mitigate this issue by bringing security 
into the development life cycle at an early 
stage.  Early identification of the security 
risk should filter through quick iterations 
of the development life cycle improving 
design, coding and testing.  
2 Agile developers 
welcome changing 
requirements, even late 
in the development 
process. Indeed, agile 
processes are designed 
to leverage change to the 
customer’s competitive 
advantage. 
Negative, unless customer is 
careful to assess the security 
impact of all new/changing 
requirements, and include 
related requirements for 
new risk mitigations when 
necessary. 
 
The principle of good communication is 
critical in this circumstance. Due to the 
fact that it explicitly supports end-user 
involvement; the WES methodology is 
also conducive to short development 
cycles. The WES methodology also 
provides support by having a risk 
assessment early in the development life 
cycle, helping to mitigate risk through the 
development iteration. 
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3 Agile projects produce 
frequent working 
software deliveries. 
Ideally, there will be a 
new delivery every few 
weeks or, at most, every 
few months. Preference 
is given to the shortest 
delivery timescale 
possible. 
Negative, unless customer 
refuses to allow schedule 
imperatives to take 
precedence over security. 
 
The principles (good communication, 
security education and cultural support) 
help provide the organization with the 
foundation to support frequent software 
releases. As demonstrated earlier in 
chapter nine, the WES process integrates 
into agile development processes (DSDM, 
XP) augmenting the security aspect of the 
development process while continuing to 
support frequent code releases.  
4 The project will be built 
around the commitment 
and participation of 
motivated individual 
contributors. 
Neutral. Could be Negative 
when the individual 
contributors are either 
unaware of or resistant to 
security priorities. 
The principles (good communication, 
security education and cultural support) 
help provide the organization with the 
foundation to support individual 
development and participation in secure 
code development. The WES process 
provides guidance during development.  
5 Customers, managers, 
and developers must 
collaborate daily, 
throughout the 
development project. 
Neutral. Could be Positive 
when all participants 
include security 
stakeholders (e.g., risk 
managers) and have security 
as a key objective. 
 
The WES methodology provides the 
framework to encourage daily 
collaboration. This is accomplished 
through the principals (good 
communication, security education and 
cultural support) in conjunction with the 
WES process. The WES approach 
augments the ideals and process 
advocated in the agile manifesto. 
6 Agile developers must 
have the development 
environment and support 
they need. 
Neutral. Could be Positive 
when that environment is 
expressly intended to 
enhance security. 
WES encourages active organizational 
support for security in the Web 
development process through the 
principle of cultural support. 
7 Developers will be 
trusted by both 
management and 
customers to get the job 
done. 
Negative, unless developers 
are strongly committed and 
prepared to ensure security 
is incorporated into their 
process and products. 
The WES methodology provides the 
framework to encourage daily 
collaboration. This is supported through 
the principles of good communication, 
security education and cultural support. 
Enabling the WES process to help 
mitigate these types of problems in this 
environment. 
8 The most efficient and 
effective method of 
conveying information 
to and within a 
development team is 
through face-to-face 
communication. 
Negative, as the assurance 
process for software is 
predicated on documented 
evidence that can be 
independently assessed by 
experts outside of the 
software project team. 
The WES methodology encourages good 
communication and cultural support for 
that communication. The amount of 
documentation required by an 
organization is dependant upon their 
specific business, industry and regulatory 
needs. 
9 The production of 
working software is the 
primary measure of 
success. 
Negative, unless “working 
software” is defined to mean 
“software that always 
functions correctly and 
securely.” 
The WES methodology provides the basic 
framework to help establish the definition 
of working software as functionally 
correct and secure software. 
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10 Agile processes promote 
sustainable 
development. 
Neutral The WES methodology fits into existing 
application development methodologies 
promoting sustainable development. 
Allowing the development team to decide 
how much of the WES methodology is 
suitable to their organization. 
11 The developers, as well 
as the project’s sponsors 
and the intended users 
(either of whom could 
be the “customer”), 
should be able to 
maintain a constant pace 
of progress indefinitely. 
Neutral 
 
As demonstrated previously in chapter 
nine, the WES methodology fits into 
existing application development 
methodologies promoting constant 
development. 
12 Agility is enhanced by 
continuous attention to 
technical excellence and 
good design. 
Positive, especially when 
“technical excellence and 
good design” reflect strong 
expertise in and 
commitment to software 
security. 
 
WES promotes technical excellence 
through the use of standards and code 
review. WES also promotes extensive 
testing along with an environment that 
supports technical excellence through the 
use of technology. WES supports 
technical excellence through security 
education as well. 
13 Simplicity, which is 
defined as the art of 
maximizing the amount 
of work not done, is 
essential to successful 
projects and good 
software. 
Positive, if simplicity is 
extended to the design and 
code of the software as this 
will make them easier to 
analyze and their security 
implications and issues 
easier to recognize. 
WES supports this concept starting with 
the project development risk assessment, 
the capturing of the security requirements 
and the use of this information in the 
security design and coding stage along 
with the testing stage. 
14 The best architectures, 
requirements, and 
designs emerge from 
self-organizing teams. 
At regular intervals, the 
team must reflect on 
how to become more 
effective, then tune and 
adjust its behaviour 
accordingly. 
Neutral 
 
WES is a process neutral approach to 
security enabling the security approach to 
support the organization’s culture and 
existing development synergies. This 
allows WES to be customized on an 
ongoing basis to meet the needs of the 
organization. 
* The Department of Home Land Security [51] 
9.6 Summary 
This chapter evaluated the compatibility of the WES methodology with four 
methodologies that cover both traditional and agile development processes used in Web 
engineering application development. The chapter also examined the compatibility of 
the WES methodology with Agile Manifesto core principles. The results of the analysis, 
based on the available literature, indicate that WES is compatible with both agile and 
traditional Web engineering processes. Chapter ten examines a practical implementation 
of the Essential Elements and the Security Criteria for Web Application Development 
(SCWAD) discussed in chapter five.  
Page 124 of 262 
 
10 Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery 
Case Study 
This chapter focuses on a case study carried out in the Hunterian Museum and Art 
Gallery (Hunterian) at the University of Glasgow, Scotland from February, 2005 to 
January, 2006. The focus of the Hunterian case study involved providing security 
recommendations to the Hunterian development team during the construction of the 
Hunterian Online Photo Library (HOPL) Internet application. The idea behind HOPL 
was to enhance the overall exposure of the Hunterian image collection while providing 
an avenue for increasing business capacity on the sale of the images over the Internet.  
Section 10.1 presents the initial case study information. Section 10.2 discusses the 
methodology and section 10.3 examines the Essential Elements. Section 10.4 covers the 
analysis of the project through the application of the Security Criteria for Web 
Application Development (SCWAD) and section 10.5 summarizes the chapter.  
10.1 Initial Hunterian Discussion Summary 
The Hunterian Museum wanted to increase the visibility of their products by increasing 
its presence on the Internet. The overall marketing approach strives to increase the 
visibility of the museum by increasing the museum’s asset exposure on their primary 
Web site as well as through merchants such as The Research Libraries Group (RLG) 
(http://www.rlg.org/) and The Bridgeman Art Library (http://www.bridgeman.co.uk). 
The imaging business is heavily integrated with the legal side of life due to the fact that 
each sale of an image is associated with a specific release and, hence, a specific 
copyright use. Therefore, the increase in exposure for the museum increases their 
potential points of sale generating the possibility for increased revenue. The aspect of 
the marketing campaign that is of particular interest to this case study involves all 
aspects associated with expanding their Web site so they can display watermarked 
thumbnail images and sell high resolution images on the Internet. An additional benefit 
to making the images available over the Internet is the increased availability to 
departmental personnel.  
The initial design area of the discussion revealed the following information.   
• The initial Web site resided on the University central UNIX servers. Capacity 
should not be an issue from an interactive Web site point of view or an image 
housing perspective. There was some debate as to whether the images will be 
housed on a new Storage Area Network (SAN) that the University is currently 
installing or whether the images will be housed on a server in the Hunterian. 
Several discussions with various departments on campus resulted in the images 
being stored on a server in one of the main server rooms on campus.   
• The initial Web authorizing tool was Adobe Go Live.   
• The database server is a Microsoft SQL server. It should be noted that the current 
database that houses the images was FileMaker Pro. The decision to move to the 
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SQL server is based on increased future development flexibility by the 
Hunterian. This brings up the issue of importing the images from FileMaker Pro 
to Microsoft SQL Server. 
• Reports are desirable, if possible, that can provide insight into marketing 
information and trends. 
• The museum is flexible as to the display of the images on the Web site. They 
may want to do some end-user feed back to the input of design. They may also 
want to implement a voluntary Web survey in an attempt to acquire end-user 
feed back on site usability. 
The security policy aspects of the discussion revealed interesting information about the 
business and copyright side of life in the imaging business. The purchaser of the image 
has to state the way that the image will be used. The copyright that is sold by the 
Hunterian is for a specific use. If the buyer wants to re-use the image for another 
purpose or use the image for the same purpose on a different print run, then these details 
will need to be negotiated with the Hunterian museum. Hence, the form for stating the 
intended use will need to be available on the Internet. 
The Hunterian wants to make the images visible on the Web and to display contact and 
payment information. There is discussion as to whether the digital quality image should 
be downloadable from the net or whether the image should be sent via File Transfer 
Protocol (FTP) to the buyer or whether it should be burned to a CD-Rom and mailed to 
the buyer. This issue prompted an interesting design question.  
If the ability to download an image is used as the transfer medium, should the customer 
be limited to a single download or allowed many downloads within a restricted period of 
time? Are there security implications for either decision? A single download provides 
tighter security from the perspective of controlling access to the images on the server. 
Multiple downloads within a restricted time means that the customer could conceivably 
download the image several times within a short time span. The reality is that once the 
customer has successfully downloaded the image then it can be copied. Hence, the single 
download does not really provide a lot of extra security when considering the individual 
image. Multiple downloads within a restricted period has the added advantage of 
alleviating situations where the customer’s connection drops for whatever reason and the 
download has to be attempted a second time. This reduces the Hunterian’s system 
support effort. Due to the latter reasons, the museum decided to implement the multiple 
downloads in a restricted time period solution. 
The security portion of the initial discussion reveals: 
• The Hunterian’s desire to maintain a high level of customer confidentiality 
through the protection of any data that is collected via the Internet. This level of 
data protection will need to be compatible with the Freedom of Information Act 
(FIA) and the Data Protection Act. Before Web site implementation, a specialist 
at the University of Glasgow should be consulted for compliance with FIA.  
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• The Hunterian also expressed a desire to have a level of system operation 
integrity which translates into a high confidentiality level in the system by the 
museum.   
• The levels of security that the Hunterian indicated interest in protecting included 
defacement, communication and transaction. 
• The Hunterian would like to look into the use of image watermarking 
• The Hunterian would like to look into the use of digital marking high resolution 
images with something to identify the image with the customer. 
• The Hunterian does have implicit procedures in place when examining disaster 
recovery. The University of Glasgow computing services is backing up the Web 
site and the low resolution images that are currently associated with the site. The 
high resolution digital images are backed up on different hard drives within the 
Hunterian. It should be noted that all of the hard drives are located in the same 
building, leading to a physical security issue. It should be noted that there is no 
formal disaster recovery plan in writing.  
10.2 Methodology 
As discussed in chapter two, the research strategy utilized was that of a case study. The 
five stages are listed below. 
1. Case study design: objectives are defined and the case study is planned. 
2. Preparation for data collection: procedures and protocols for data collection are 
defined. 
3. Collecting evidence: execution with data collection on the studied case. 
4. Analysis of collected data 
5. Reporting [95, 215] 
Case study design stage took place when the Hunterian museum decided that it wanted 
to produce a Web application for the purpose of selling images over the Internet and 
then proceeded to inquire about assistance from the Department of Computing Science 
at the University of Glasgow.  
The preparation for data collection stage took the form of several meetings which 
typically happens during the course of software development. Ten project meetings were 
attended during the course of this case study where the project manager deemed security 
to be an issue that might need to be discussed. These meetings specifically discussed 
recommendations on the following topics: the tools and software that the developers 
would use, the conversion of older images to the new system, common security 
problems, the security issues involved with accepting payments over the Web, the 
design of the system around the payment verification, the need to test the application and 
the identification of bugs in the system. Not all of the recommendations that were 
proposed were accepted. 
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Collecting evidence stage took place when some of the recommendations were 
implemented during project development. It should be noted that the security 
recommendations were not implemented by the individual proposing the changes. 
Recommendations were implemented by various members of the Hunterian’s 
development team. 
The Analysis of collected data and the reporting of the effort to include security into the 
Hunterian’s application development process are discussed through the establishment of 
the Essential Elements and the application of the Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development (SCWAD). The specific lessons learned are discussed in the summary 
section of this chapter. 
10.3 The Essential Elements 
The Essential Elements for security in a Web application development process are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter five. The Essential Elements are as follows: 
1. Web Application Development Methodology 
2. Web Security Development Process Definition 
3. End-Users Feed Back   
4. Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
5. Job Related Impact 
10.3.1 Web Application Development Methodology 
The Hunterian implements an implicit traditional life cycle development methodology. 
The developers are assigned to specific projects. They are generally asked to contribute 
to the design of the project and then they are expected to develop the application as 
agreed upon with the project manager. The project manager then keeps track of the 
progress as the developers progress through the agreed upon stages of the project. The 
project manager also attempts to coordinate any additional outside assistance as needed. 
This approach is not ideal. The success of the project is dependent on the skills of the 
project manager. This approach encourages an environment that is generally conducive 
to the generation of minimal code and system documentation. This lack of 
documentation also has a ripple effect on training time for new employees. 
In the real world, the Hunterian, as with many other businesses, has limited funds to 
contribute to application development. The developers for the Hunterian are generally 
Glasgow University computing science students who have been brought in for a specific 
project. The incentive for the students is the experience they gain while working with an 
actual organization on a real problem along with the fact that the project is associated 
with a course mark. Hence, the high turn over and limited availability of a student’s time 
places restrictions on the development team. This means that the Hunterian may have 
multiple students working on specific aspects of a project. The high turnover in students, 
coupled with a high number of potential students working on a project for very short 
periods of time, creates a volatile environment that can be very difficult to ensure that 
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accurate documentation is being accomplished. The Hunterian imaging project had at 
least fifteen different developers who worked on various aspects of the project over the 
duration of the development life cycle. 
10.3.2 Web Security Development Process Definition 
Organizations should attempt to define the following questions when considering 
security in the development process.  
• What security means to the business? 
• What it means to a Web application? 
• What it means in the development process? 
• What a Web Engineering Security development process entails? 
Security to the business, in this context, means that images are not being used in 
publications without the consent of the Hunterian museum. Security to the Web 
application translates into the Web application being able to withstand attacks so that the 
images, which are displaced via the Web site, are not compromised. They also wanted a 
widely available solution where the customer could participate in a secure payment 
transaction for the image over the Internet. The mechanism for this transaction should 
protect both the customer and the Hunterian in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. In addition, the application should not allow intruders to compromise other 
applications operating on the same server.  
The Hunterian’s response to defining security is that they want the application to be as 
secure as possible with the least amount of cost and effort. This translates into the 
securing of outside sources for security advice during the application development 
process. The Web engineering security development process for the Hunterian entails 
addressing security during the process when the project manager deems it to be a 
necessary issue. 
10.3.3 End-Users Feedback 
This is probably the weakest section within the application of the Essential Elements to 
the Hunterian development process. While the Hunterian did provide other museums, 
such as the Smithsonian and Harvard, with a link to view and use the system, it can be 
argued that these individuals are not true end-users. They could be analyzing the system 
from the perspective of a competitor or from a power user’s perspective. While neither is 
bad, it does not provide an accurate overall picture from the end-users’ perspective.  
As discussed in the paper presented to the 2007 ARES conference [81], if a development 
process does not attempt to acquire feedback from the end-users, this could signal 
potentially large problems with the development process alignment with the needs of the 
business. Strong support for end-user participation, in Web Application development, 
has been previously indicated in a journal article by McDonald and Welland [82, 130]. 
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The business needs for small organizations, like the Hunterian, require balancing this 
necessity for end-user feed back with the availability of resources.  
10.3.4 Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
The importance of a disaster recovery plan can not be overstated in today’s Web enabled 
environment. The Hunterian addressed this issue by installing the database and the 
application on servers in the Management Information Service (MIS) department and 
not, as originally planned, in the university server farm. The MIS technical staff has an 
instance of Microsoft SQL, the SQL data and the image data stored on mirrored servers.  
Database and source files on the server are backed up nightly. Both the database and the 
source files are backed up on a weekly basis and a monthly basis. The weekly and the 
monthly backups are stored to tape. The first backup of every month is set aside for a 
year. The weekly backups are held for a month. The tapes are then stored off site in a 
temperature controlled environment. In an event that there is a problem, they can restore 
the information. The backup currently contains five and a half thousand images which 
totals to roughly one hundred and eleven gigabits out of a total drive capability of five 
hundred gigabits. It should be noted that, to the knowledge of the Hunterian staff, the 
backups have never been tested. Meaning that Hunterian staff has never restored any of 
the backups to be sure that they are operating properly. 
10.3.5 Job Related Impact 
The project manager and one technical staff person are the only people on this project 
who were permanent employees of the Hunterian. The majority of the coders were 
students from the Department of Computing Science. The idea of job impact is really 
propagated through the effect the project has on their individual grade and potential 
future references. While this is important and does impact the developer, it is only one 
grade or the loss of a potential reference in the future.  It does not carry the same overall 
impact as a job review. 
10.4 Security Analysis 
The Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) are discussed in 
greater detail in chapter four. Security Criteria for Web Application Development 
(SCWAD) consists of six essential security criteria that need to be met within 
methodologies that are used for application development. These criteria are: 
1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2. Proper Security Controls in the development environment 
3. Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software and 
security 
5. Prompt, rigorous Security testing and evaluation 
6. Trust and Accountability 
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10.4.1 Active organizational support for security 
The project manager instigated the initial contact with the Department of Computing 
Science for both the development and the application security aspects of the project. 
This initial contact demonstrates that the project manager is cognisant of security issues 
in the development process that need to be recognized and addressed. The project 
manger openly encouraged communication and questions from the developers in the 
area of security.  
The project manger also has taken steps to help educate stakeholders on the importance 
of the security aspect of the application. Being a small organization, with limited 
financial resources, the Hunterian has relied on the Department of Computing Science to 
aid in this endeavour.  
10.4.2 Proper Controls in the development environment 
Proper controls provide structure to the development environment. This is accomplished 
by providing information that covers policies, necessary knowledge, technology and the 
process that is to be utilized in the development environment. 
10.4.2.1 Policies/Standards/Procedures 
Since the Hunterian is a small organization with a high turnover, in reference to its 
development staff, there is very little documentation on the policies, standards and 
procedures that are involved in the development process. The project manager is highly 
involved in the development process and handles these issues as they arise. While this 
approach has been very successful for the Hunterian, it does create a general security 
issue that has repercussions in the development environment. The dependency on a 
single individual to achieve project success is a dangerous protocol to pursue. If this 
individual leaves the organization, for whatever reason, then the completion of current 
projects and the practical achievement of future projects are likely to become 
jeopardized.  
10.4.2.2 Knowledge 
The idea is that organizations need to provide proper training in reference to coding and 
project management. Again, since the Hunterian is limited on resources, they depend on 
the Department of Computing Science for this type of training. Currently, the 
Department of Computing Science at the University of Glasgow does not offer a specific 
class on security for computing science students prior to their involvement in this 
project. It should also be noted that students undertaking the projects involve in the 
construction of HOPL did not receive any formal training in security. The lack of 
security in academia is a recognized issue in industry. According to the Department of 
Home Land Security, their draft report on Security in the Software Lifecycle quotes 
several industry leaders on the inadequacy of security education in computing science 
programs [51]. They go on to indicate that  
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“most developers are not being taught how to recognize and understand the 
security implications of how they specify and design software, write code, 
integrate/assemble components, test, package, distribute, and maintain software” 
[51].  
The Hunterian project does not go into the overall education of the developers in any 
detail. The project manager is the primary point of contact for any issue that arises 
during the development project. This places an emphasis on the criticality of the 
individual in this role for the success of projects within the organization.  
10.4.2.3 Technology 
The technology implemented for this project, as with many organizations, was 
determined by existing resources, financial constraints and donations. The Hunterian has 
a limited budget to spend for development and only one technical person. Since 
Microsoft donated the SQL Server application and the Visual Studio software for the 
project, the technical scope was established early in the development process. The use of 
the software did provide the Hunterian with up-to-date code libraries and professional 
quality development tools. Some of the security benefits according to a couple of articles 
[107, 112] include: 
¾ Design analysis tools  
¾ Application Verifier 
¾ Buffer Security Check /GS (Visual C++) 
¾ The Safe CRT Libraries (Visual C++) 
¾ Static code checkers (C and C++ source code) 
¾ Code Access Security/Least Privilege (.NET Framework applications) 
¾ Debug in Zone 
¾ Improved Security Exceptions during Debugging 
¾ IntelliSense in Zone (Visual Basic feature) 
¾ PermCalc (Calculate Permissions for application zones)[112] 
¾ Develop and debug as least privilege  
¾ Issue tracking  
¾ New Testing Tools (Visual C++, Visual C#, or Visual Basic) 
¾ Load testing [107]. 
The point is not to argue the validity or the usefulness of the tools from a security 
capabilities perspective, but to acknowledge that they exist and provide options to the 
developers. It is also useful to note that the Hunterian decided to code the application in 
Visual Basic which limited access to some of the security tools being offered in the 2005 
Visual Studio.  
One suggestion that was not implemented is the use of a source control system. Source 
control systems provide versioning control during code development. This allows for 
code role backs in cases where bugs are intentionally or unintentionally introduced into 
the code and provides developer accountability. 
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10.4.2.4 Process 
The software development process is simply another form of a control. The software 
development process is used to control the development of the application. The process 
that the Hunterian implements to develop projects is an implicit traditional software 
development life cycle. The resource pool that the Hunterian utilizes and the project 
manager dependency creates potential security issues within the development process. 
The heavy dependency on the project manger is dangerous from a process perspective. 
The project manager, in this case, is the only person who sees the entire development 
life cycle. The Hunterian recruits students to work on specific aspects of projects. This 
means that few students actually see a single project completed from inception to 
production. This lack of developer consistency throughout the project introduces 
potential problems with process understanding and process compliance consistency. The 
high developer turn-over has the potential to create problems if code is not commented 
properly and documentation is not kept up-to-date. There is also no specific process for 
security within the Hunterian. 
10.4.3 Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process 
Security visibility was clearly discussed during the business analysis, requirements, 
design phase and the testing phase. Meetings were conducted between the Hunterian 
project manager and the Department of Computing Science (DCS) during the business 
analysis stage and the design stage to determine the security requirements. The basic 
security requirements can be summarized as follows: 
• High level of customer confidentiality and integrity 
o Data Protection  
o Operation Integrity 
o Customer Communication 
• Protection of Images via Water Marking  
• Protection of Images via Customer Number Identification 
• Compliance with existing disaster recovery procedures 
These security requirements led to discussions over the design in terms of integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of the system. These high-level security requirements 
transformed into the following security design recommendations: 
1. Implement logins to establish authorization and authentication 
2. Implement  / Integrate a secure payment system 
a. Encryption of the payment transaction if possible 
b. Confirmation of the transaction prior to end-user download 
c. Page monitoring for post-back information from payment system 
d. Make the discount request manual for the purpose of adding a layer of 
human verification 
3. Web page protection of top ten coding vulnerabilities 
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4. From a security standpoint, code needs to be modularized as much as possible. 
This can be handled in one of two ways. The code can be broken down so that 
there is a separate security class for each type of problem or we can create a 
single security class and have multiple methods for each type of security 
problem. Either will work; the set up is really a design preference issue. The goal 
is to modularize as much as possible from an object re-use perspective. This cuts 
down on the odds of accidentally having two classes that perform the same job. 
5. Install and use a professional source code management system.  
6. Any data that is going to be passed via a URL will need to be encrypted.  
7. Any sensitive data that is being stored on the database will need to be encrypted.  
The recommendations that were implemented include numbers one, two, three, six and 
seven. It should be noted that recommendation numbers three, six and seven were 
limited in their implementations. The elements that were specifically tested for out of the 
top ten vulnerabilities in Web applications included: un-validated input, broken access 
controls, injections flaws, and improper error handling. As far as the sixth 
recommendation goes, the only data that is encrypted is the data going to the payment 
system and the user password. The only stored data that is encrypted in the database is 
the user password. The marking of images to record customer numbers was deemed out 
of scope for this project and tabled for later investigation. Due to the limited resources, 
the developers were trusted to implement the security requirements as requested. 
Although security solutions were discussed during design and testing, an in-depth code 
review was not conducted. 
Additional items that were discussed and not implemented include locking the user out 
after a set number of log-in attempts and keeping a log of the user’s activities within the 
program. Even though the development team had access to a security specialist, there 
was minimal contact during the implementation phase. It should be noted that contact 
between the development team and the security specialist was always initiated by the 
project manager. There was no true end-user testing conducted for this project before the 
Web application went live. 
10.4.4 Delivery of a cohesive system 
This situation is unique in that the unit setting up the system is also defining the business 
requirements. Hence, from that perspective, there is definitely a cohesive integration of 
business requirements and the software. The system provides the amount of security that 
the Hunterian deems necessary for the application. As with most organizations, the 
Hunterian would like to have a system that has had every aspect of the system tested to 
the nth degree; however, security has to be realistically applied to applications during 
the development process. Practical security makes trade-offs with the cost associated 
with developing the solution and testing the successfulness of the solution.  It also makes 
trade-offs with development timelines, human resources, employee skill levels and the 
probability for potential types of attacks. In the end, the level of security integrated with 
an application becomes a managerial decision based on a variety of inputs. In the case of 
the Hunterian, the project manger makes these decisions. 
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10.4.5 Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation 
The idea of outsourcing penetration testing and load testing was discussed with the 
Hunterian project manager. The ideas were turned down when compared with the 
available resources. The testing for the application was handled primarily through the 
developers and outside testers. Three outside testers (including this author) were asked 
to examine the site. This author also discovered two major bugs in the system along with 
a couple of minor link errors and text display errors. The steps taken to identify the 
major bugs along with screen shots (Figure 8 and Figure 9) are as follows: 
10.4.5.1 First Problem - Session State Problem 
The steps are as follows: 
• Select title  
• Select IS from the drop down menu 
• Enter xxxx to fill up the line  
• Hit search twice - this is the root of the problem  
Figure 8 - Hunterian Screen Shots Error Number One 
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The first issue that needs to be addressed is the restriction of the amount of input that the 
end-user is allowed to enter into the search field. As displayed in Figure 8, the first bug 
was found in the advanced search page. One of the text fields for the advanced search 
allowed the user to input more text than the field could handle. This generally causes the 
system to overwrite memory space that is being used to hold other information. In this 
case, the system then produced a session information error.  
The second issue that needs to be addressed is the error message. The session error in 
turn caused the Web page to produce an error page that provided information which 
included the technical explanation for the problem, the line on which the error occurred, 
the drive path along with indications as to the language in which the system had been 
written and the platform on which the system was running. The system is giving away 
too much information when it does crash. This information could be useful for future 
malicious attacks. All messages should be changed so that a generic error message is 
displayed when a problem is encountered. 
10.4.5.2 Second Problem - Unhandled Expression  
The steps are as follows: 
• Registered  
• Modified the post code line 
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• G38pxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; select * from user;    
• Clicked update 
Figure 9 - Hunterian Screen Shots Error Number Two 
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Unhandled expressions suggest that there is the possibility for successful SQL injection 
attacks. As mentioned in chapter four, SQL injection attacks are one of the more popular 
vulnerabilities that hackers like to exploit. The second address line in the user detail 
page was flooded with text; however, text entered at the end of the input field was not 
random text. This part of the input was constructed using the Structured Query 
Language (SQL) and attempted to retrieve data from one of the database tables. The 
actual query was not successful. However, the page that was returned to the user of the 
system provided information that could be used against the system in future attacks. This 
information included the error statement, information that could be used to help 
platform and to what extent the system executed the SQL code.  
itly handles specific exceptions and general Web errors needs to 
sons for using PayPal as the payment service 
determine the database 
Hence, code that explic
be implemented in all production code to alleviate this issue. Again as noted in the first 
problem, there is too much information being given away when the application fails. 
10.4.6 Trust and Accountability 
The Hunterian accepted and implemented the suggestion to implement the payment 
solution via PayPal. There are several rea
provider. These reasons range from marketability, to code practicality, to security. 
PayPal is a world wide organization that is recognized as a legitimate payment service 
by the global public with over one hundred million account members worldwide [145]. 
PayPal has been very successful at establishing itself as a technology leader in the area 
of payment solutions, receiving several awards for technical excellence [145]. Since 
HOPL is geared to the general public it is wise to use such a provider.  
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More importantly, it is an even wiser decision from a coding and a security perspective. 
PayPal provides excellent reference materials along with a development center for 
developers. The development center is a sandbox area constructed so that developers can 
test their code before going live. The developer documentation also goes into detail on 
the encryption of Website payments. This information even provides a reference link to 
developers for creating their own certificates. The recommendation was for the 
Hunterian, if they had time, to encrypt the payment. If they did not have the time to 
was built in, from the perspective of accountability, is the 
notification to the developer when anyone other than PayPal attempts to post to the 
The business idea behind the project is to enable the Hunterian to display water marked 
images on the Internet and sell high quality versions of those images over the Internet. 
This includes the ability to conduct payment transactions on-line and, on successful 
payment, allow the end-user to download images. The application of the Essential 
Elements establishes the context of the development environment. All of the elements 
revealed potential areas of improvement.  
The application of the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD) 
demonstrates that there are strengths and weaknesses in the Hunterian’s application 
development process. The strengths and weaknesses can be viewed as lessons learned. 
SCWAD identified Active Organizational Support, Security Visibility, and Trust and 
Accountability as overall strengths within the current application development process. 
The organization supports the implementation of security and it is visible through most 
of the development process. Minor improvements can be made in the security visibility 
in that the developers could initiate contact without the prompting of the project 
manager. The organization did very well with the Trust and Accountability aspects of 
the project. They established the need in the requirements phase, designed the solution 
figure out the encryption piece of the code, then they should use the PayPal 
configuration for the exchange of the payment information and the encryption could be 
added later. The developers took the security issue on board and implemented an 
encrypted payment system with PayPal.  
Overall, the PayPal services were highly utilized by Hunterian’s developers in the design 
of the payment aspect of the HOPL system. This includes developing the code necessary 
to encrypt the transaction information before it is sent to PayPal and configuring HOPL 
to act accordingly upon the automated response from PayPal. The way HOPL is 
constructed it actually waits for a real-time response from PayPal before allowing a 
customer to proceed. This is an excellent feature for HOPL and provides a level of 
security in the payment transaction that is beneficial for the organization. Another 
security feature that 
PayPal response page. The use of the public and private keys helps establish trust 
between the Hunterian system and the PayPal system. This trust is supported by the fact 
that the Hunterian system enforces accountability through the system log-in process that 
has to take place prior to an order being placed. This meets the SCWAD for trust and 
accountability. 
10.5 Summary 
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appropriately and tested the trust and accountability aspects of the solution to the be
their ability from a resource perceptive.   
AD also recognized 
st of 
SCW areas within the development process that provide an 
 and time resources during the 
development project. The use of the Essential Elements and the Security Criteria for 
ntial security tradeoffs. 
e used to establish the 
opportunity for improvement. The opportunity for improvement exists within Proper 
Controls in the Development Environment and Prompt, Rigorous Testing and 
Evaluation. There is the opportunity for improvement in the policy, knowledge and 
process sections of the Controls segment of SCWAD. The organization needs to 
consider moving from an implicit style of operation to an explicit style of operation. 
Vast improvements can be made in the Testing and Evaluation segment through the 
involvement of end-users. Another area in which there is opportunity for overall 
improvement is the delivery of a cohesive system integrating business requirements, 
software and security. While the museum does a good job of integrating the business 
requirements into the software, the previous issues demonstrate that there are 
improvements that can be made with the integration of the business requirements, the 
software and security. 
This exercise illustrates the fact that security is a trade-off with financial resources, 
human resources, the employee knowledge base
Web Application Development (SCWAD) can help identify pote
Hence, the use of the Essential Elements and SCWAD can b
environmental context and analyze a development process helping organizations to 
make informed secure managerial decisions. The next chapter discusses the 
implementation of WES in a commercial environment. 
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11 Global Fortune 500 Financial Service 
Case Study 
Chapter five presented evidence that the financial service sector organization, that 
employed the author during his PhD internship, faces multiple issues with application 
development security integration. The financial organization presented an excellent 
opportunity for testing the WES methodology due to the natural concern for security in 
ines the Design Architecture Documents 
(DAD) versions along with the information that was actually captured in the documents. 
 recommendations to the 
organization on how to strengthen process security. Although the organization appeared 
 responses provided answers to the 
Essential Elements and established the Security Criteria for Web Application 
order to acquire data, changes to this process were held to a strict minimum from 
October, 2005 through August of 2006. 
the financial industry. Section 11.1 presents the initial background information for the 
commercial implementation of WES via a Security Improvement Initiative (SII) in a 
Global Fortune 500 financial organization. Section 11.2 demonstrates how WES was 
applied to the organization’s existing application development environment. Section 
11.3 presents the SII implementations that were executed within the organization. 
Section 11.4 examines the quarterly analysis of the assigned security conditions within 
the development process. Section 11.5 presents the results of a follow up survey with 
that organization’s staff. Section 11.6 exam
Section 11.7 examines the implementation obstacles that were experienced during this 
case study and section 11.8 summarizes the chapter. 
11.1 Security Improvement Initiative (SII) 
An internship was accepted, from July 2005 through August of 2006, with a Global 
Fortune 500 financial services organization with the objective of conducting a Security 
Improvement Initiative (SII) in a commercial environment. As of July 2004, the 
company was listed in the top fifty Global Fortune 500 financial services organizations 
[69]. The internship agreement consisted of examining the organization’s security 
practices throughout the development process and making
to be supportive of the security initiative, there was no guarantee that the organization 
would accept the recommendations or implement the changes into the production 
environment.  
The SII was conducted in the following manner. As discussed in 5.3, in order to gain a 
better understanding of the security within the organization’s development process a 
survey was conducted. The analysis of the survey
Development (SCWAD). The WES methodology was applied to the observed 
development process. Several recommendations were made to the organization and 
some of the recommendations were accepted. The accepted recommendations were 
implemented into the production environment. This directly affects all large application 
development projects implemented by the United Kingdom arm of the organization. In 
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In order to encourage open communication during the SII, the name of the organ
is being withheld to ensure organizational anonymity. Following this idea, the na
cuments, the names of th
ization 
mes of 
the do e processes and the names of the groups have all been 
pproach 
when conducting Web application development and all other forms of software based 
ir seats on the board months before the SII was initiated.  It should 
also be noted that a preliminary DAD (PDAD) could be constructed in the Initial Design 
e DAD could 
be accepted by the committee with conditions, or third, the DAD could be rejected. Once 
amine the effects of security on the overall development process 
is the quarterly analysis of the assigned security conditions. 
altered. The results of all interviews are presented anonymously. Maintaining 
organizational anonymity facilitates the exchange of accurate information and creates an 
environment where all parties are comfortable presenting commercially sensitive 
information. 
The organization develops and supports Web applications. As noted in chapter nine, 
there are a variety of methodologies that can be used to develop Web applications that 
range from agile processes to traditional plan driven software engineering processes. 
This organization uses a customized plan driven document centric waterfall a
initiatives. Within this process approach the business comes up with an idea and 
develops a business case to support the project. Once the business case is accepted, then, 
a project manager is assigned to the project.   
The project manager contacts the necessary personnel to have resources assigned to the 
project. In general, these individuals include the architect and possibly a project risk 
analyst. The architect is responsible for completing a Design Architecture Document 
(DAD) and presenting it to the Design Architecture Committee (DAC). There are eight 
voting members on this committee, all have veto authority. If any of the members on the 
committee vetoes the project, then, the design is rejected and has to be resubmitted with 
identified committee objections addressed. It should be noted that all of the members 
had established the
stage for early feed back, however, this was rare. Most projects skipped the PDAD in the 
design phases going straight to the construction of the DAD. 
Based on member voting, there are three possible outcomes when a DAD is submitted to 
the DAC. First, the DAD could be accepted by the committee. Second, th
the design is approved, then the coding teams produce a Detail Design Document 
(DDD) based on the DAD. The DDD in this organization was actually completed by the 
programmers and then the design was built, tested and implemented into the production 
environment under the governance of the architect. 
All of the voting members have the right to assign conditions within their area of 
expertise. If a DAD is accepted with conditions, then these conditions must be satisfied 
prior to progression into the next stage, which in this case would be the build stage. An 
interesting gauge to ex
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11.2  eb Engineering Security (WESW ) Methodology 
ment process 
independent solution designed to address the lack of security that is inherent in 
onment is shown in Table 30. This table reveals how the process 
should operate by outlining the project phases of the application development life cycle, 
es of the WES methodology. The 
of t Stages’ specifically details the 
It should be noted that the WES methodology does not mandate deliverables from the 
individual areas within the methodology. The methodology lets the organization 
determine what is appropriate based on the size of the organization, the application 
development methodology that is being utilized and the corporate culture. In this 
particular case study, the organization is already pro-documentation.  Hence, the feasible 
approach is to expand the current documentation so that it incorporates the new security 
functionality. The organization already produces a Business Case Document (BCD), 
Design Architecture Document (DAD), a Detail Design Document (DDD) and Testing 
Documentation (TD).  
Implementation  
Seamless security integration into an organization’s existing development process and 
environment is desirable in order to maximize existing core competencies while 
providing a road map for areas that need to be strengthened. As discussed in chapter 
seven, the Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology is a develop
application development methodologies. The initial survey conducted in the Global 
Fortune 500 organization, discussed in chapter five, helped to attain an understanding of 
the development process and the role security plays within that process. The 
recommended changes were based on the application of the WES methodology. 
The organization has customized the individual phases within this approach by 
subdividing them into stages. The application of the WES developmental methodology 
to the current envir
the associated generic project stages, and the phas
section  the table titled ‘WES Applied Projec
integration of the WES methodology with the company’s generic project stages. The 
application of the WES methodology is conducted in conjunction with the knowledge 
derived from the survey. Since WES is a flexible methodology it can be tailored to suit 
the needs of an existing organization. In this case, aspects of the WES stage Security 
Design / Coding were split into two separate stages which were Security Design and 
Security Coding.  
The application of WES reveals the opportunity to investigate and possibly propose 
multiple changes in the development process. The group most receptive to the idea of 
changes to the development process was the architecture group. The Design Architecture 
Document (DAD) is the primary instrument utilized by the architecture team in the 
organization. Hence, the logical place to implement changes is the DAD.  
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11.2.1 Project Developm
Du cept he Project Risk Analyst conducts a risk analysis. The 
P k A s ld also d the appropriate 
coding teams in order to determin ss unit develop 
the project’s e. The need for early 
interaction bet ness un of the organization. An issue 
that should be addressed during the risk analysis is the risk compatibility.  
The application of the WES met he risk analysis should be 
determining critical functionality w ining appropriate service 
levels, identifying all possible th ck, the probability of 
success and the cost associated w otection [154]. All of the 
stakeholders, i.e., the architect, project manager, coding team representative, sponsor, 
and business unit representative sh ess case 
document. Realistically, the busine  driver 
for this interac
11.2.2 Application Security Requirements 
One of the ide  generating
this can be use e conv uirements gathering. When the 
business requirements are being ld be 
interacting with the project manage t, and members 
fr propria ams. Th  interaction is to 
facilitate the g  a fairly ements. 
Specific security requirements exp
the business unit so that they can ents 
should identify specific envir with addressing 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Once the security requirements are gathered, 
they should be ed from a cr  how they will 
comply with the organization’s nd technology 
compatibility.  
ent & Risk Analysis 
ring con development, t
t shouroject Ris naly be speaking with the architect an
e the project risk and help the busine
business cas results of the survey support the 
ween the busi it and the technical side 
hodology indicates that t
ithin the application, determ
reats, the probability of atta
ith the desired level of pr
ould have input into the creation of the busin
ss unit representative should probably be the
tion. 
as behind
d to stimulate th
 the risk assessment in the very beginning is so that 
ersations around req
gathered, members of the business unit shou
, the architecr t, a project risk analys
d this diverse groupom ap te coding te
g of
e thought behin
atherin  comprehensive listing of the security requir
licitly recognize all of the security requirements from 
be addressed successfully. The security requirem
onmental requirements along 
 examin itical perspective in order to determine
security policy, corporate culture a
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Table 30 - WES Application 
Project 
Phases 
Generic Project 
Phases WES Stages 
Idea 
Concept 
Development 
Initiate & 
Assess 
Business Case 
(BCD) 
Project Development Risk Assessment  
(Cost / Risk / Effort / Probability of Success) 
• Data Protection Legislation, Attack Trees  
• Risk Analysis Techniques 
Business Application Security Requirements  
Requirements (What needs to be secured & for how long for this specific project?) 
al CompatibilityOrganization  
• Corporate Culture Compatibility 
 Technological Compatibility 
• Security Policy Compatibility 
•
Initial Design 
) (PDAD
Initial Technica
Evaluation (DAC
l 
) 
Design Architecture 
Document (DAD)  
Design 
Technical 
Evaluation (DAC) 
• Establish intended use of  W3C Standards, Coding Practices 
• Describe the Establishment of Secure Data, Establishment of 
Accountability & Trust 
• State the use of Standards (Encryption, Architecture, 
Infrastructure) 
• Security verification of project viability 
Security Design 
(Effectively Secure Individual Security Requirements) 
• Satisfactorily address risk identified in risk assessment and 
application security requirements  
• Verify security requirement compliancy with organizational 
compatibility  
Construction 
(DDD) 
Security Coding  
(Effectively Secure Individual Security Requirements) 
• Implement W3C Standards, Coding Practices, Code Reviews 
ountability & Trust, • Secure Data, Establishment of Acc
• Utilization of Re-usable Components 
Controlled Environment  Implementation  
• Application Environmental Compatibility 
• Regression testing  
• Load Testing  
Build 
Testing 
Testing 
(Prompt, Rigorous, Security Testing and Evaluation)  
• Application Testing 
• Verification of risk and  requirements satisfaction 
• Incident Management 
• Disaster Recovery Management 
Implement Implementation Deployment in Production  
• Personnel Availability 
• Production Deployment Verification 
Feedback Feedback End User Feed Back  
• Usability Feedback  
• Appropriateness Feedback  
• Patching 
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11.2.3 Security Design 
Once the security requirements have been ascertained and they have been examined in 
reference to the security policy, corporate culture and technology compatibility, then the 
design should take place with this information in mind. The proposed design 
improvements concentrated on the architecture
solutions, which is the Desig
 team’s main instrument for creating 
n Architecture Document (DAD).  The following changes 
urity  Requirements Gathering 
3. Signature Section 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. DAD Socialization 
were proposed to the design process and some of which are reflected in the DAD. 
1. Owner / Creator Contact Information 
2. Conversation Checklist for Sec
Risk Compatibility Section  
Identity Management  
Threat Management 
Trust Model 
Owner / Creator Information 
The idea behind capturing the owner-creator information, the conversion checklist for 
security requirements gathering, and the signature section, is not only to expedite 
communication but to assign accountability. Regardless of the existence of questions 
around various topics in the document, it is necessary to assign ownership of the 
proposed architecture solution. The owner / creator information tells anyone, who picks 
up the documented solution, who created the solution’s architecture. 
Conversation Checklist for Security Requirements Gathering
The conversation check list, for security requirements gathering, helps aid the project 
manager to ensure that all of the necessary parties are involved in the creation of the 
DAD and in the overall project. This should be the responsibility of the project manager. 
However, the survey and observation alludes to the fact that the skill level among the 
project managers in the organization varies widely. The goal of having the conversation 
checklist for the security requirements is that there is increased communication with the 
project members encouraging a higher level of security awareness.    
Signature Section 
The proposed signature section consisted of three names: the project manager, the 
ind g off on the business 
req e nsible for matching the design 
to t a  should be included in the DAD 
sinc t lusion of the project 
ma e d help 
foster s r the individual 
who is responsible for providing approved user requirements helps to encourage 
communication when there are questions and to assign responsibility. The DAC 
ividual in the business unit who was responsible for signin
uir ments, and the individual on the DAC who is respo
he ctual production product. The project managers
e he document is being created at their request. The inc
nag r in this process will help educate management on the design process an
olution buy-in; including the name and the contact information fo
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sign u  
follow lication being delivered is the 
sam s 
signatu member and application accountability to the DAC.  
Ris
at re should list the individual (and their contact information) who has agreed to
up on the proposed application to verify that the app
e as the application that was proposed in the design submitted to the DAC. Thi
re provides 
k Compatibility Section 
The e
prop s ents. A 
Ris w level 
security
egree of 
confidence that is intentionally or unintentionally granted to individuals, computer 
n
t
A t t  levels such as an Internet tier, a 
DM t  then state the interaction between the 
def d ut 
into la the 
trust model in order to determ t is concerned. The reality is that 
both should be checked for ea re is a system of checks and 
balances. This ensures that the s ith the organization trust model 
and policies, while verifying that there are no discrepancies between the policies and the 
trust model.  
The trust model compliance can be examined from two perspectives. The first is the 
network architecture perspective and the second is the application architecture 
perspective. The architect would need to learn the organization’s network architecture 
trust model and the application trust model. An assessment of an organization’s trust 
models naturally leads to a discussion about new application integration into both 
architecture models making sure to identify any violations to the model and the 
acquisition of appropriate exception authorizations. 
Figure 10 provides a network model for discussion purposes. An example of an Internet 
network trust model could look something like this: 
• Outside Internet traffic must pass through approved ports 
• The Internet network must implement direct trust. 
• All users must be identified and authenticated.  
 id a behind the Risk Compatibility section stage is to ensure that the security design 
ed by the architect is compatible with the Risk teo am’s policy requirem
k Compatibility section examines tier trust policy compatibility, proposed lo
 practices, and data security.  
“A trust model is a tool that helps one visualize and understand the d
etworks, and systems, based on the associated risks that are inherent with granting 
his confidence” [181].  
ier rust model is a model that consists of one of more
Z ier, and an intranet tier. The model would
ine  tiers. The trust model contributes to the foundation for the policies that are p
p ce in an organization. Hence, applications can be applied to the policies or 
ine compliancy where trus
ch solution so that the
olution is compatible w
• Trust and authentication can never be implied or assumed. 
• No transitive or assumptive trust can exist between any component of the 
organization’s computing environment and any external system. 
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• Uniquely identified and authenticated entities may only be trusted to access data 
and resources on a predefined need-to-know basis. 
• All data transferred between the organization and an authenticated user must be 
encrypted. 
• Internet clients can only access DMZ servers 
• DMZ servers can only access specifically defined Intranet Level 2 servers 
hat the application should address would include: 
Figure 10 - Network Model 
• Data must be pulled from all Level 2 Servers to Level 1 Servers and Clients, i.e., 
no data can be pushed lower than Intranet Level 2. 
• Application users on the network are established and maintained via the 
organizations’ Identity Management (IM) System 
Examples of the issues t
• Assurance that the application does not violate the Internet network trust model 
• That the applications use the organization’s Identity Management (IM) system 
and, if not, explains why not and acquires the necessary exception  
• How does the application establish direct trust? 
• How does the application maintain trust? 
• Does the application implement proper encryption policies? Do these policies 
comply with the Internet network trust model? 
 
Another point that surfaced with the application of the WES methodology is an 
overview of the application and the impact on the organization’s low level security 
practices. The idea behind identifying the proposed low level security practices is to 
ensure that the application’s low level practices are compatible with established security 
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policies. If they are not compatible, then, they have to be acknowledged appropriately. 
Example: An application that has to have access to the kernel level of a UNIX box 
would need to be acknowledged via an appropriate risk analysis. If the risk is deemed a 
the appropriate exceptions would have to be sought and granted necessary risk then 
within the organization.  
The thought behind data security is that the organization needs to identify any sensitive 
data held within the proposed system design. The organization also needs to document 
that this data is being protected by successfully addressing appropriate risk in reference 
to encryption policies, transaction policies and storage policies. 
Identity Management 
Identity is a key factor in establishing and maintaining the security of a system. The 
physical world places multiple meanings on the term ‘identity’ depending on the context 
to which it is applied [137]. These meanings include everything from names, to 
t the 
bler: being able 
rvices, to understand, manage 
in nvironments, and audit and archive design. 
addresses, to financial information, to citizenship [137]. “ ‘Digital identity’ is, a
core, an effort to recreate, organise, automate and integrate all those aspects in the online 
electronic world and (increasingly) link them to existing ‘offline’ identities”[137]. 
Hence, Identity Management (IM) has the potential to impact business processes, 
policies and the organization’s technology in order to attempt to provide access and user 
control to Web applications.  
“In this context, identity management is also a key e-business ena
to recognize the digital identity of people and Web se
and validate their profiles and rights is fundamental in order to underpin 
accountability in business relationships and enable commercial transactions” [137]. 
As far as the organization is concerned, IM should be viewed as a re-useable component 
within the organization. Under the IM heading, architects should be addressing issues 
such as role based access and controls, authentication and authorization, user 
provision g, access and control to e
Threat Management 
Threat Management attempts to identify all of the known threats to the proposed 
solution and how these threats are being mitigated. This solution should also take into 
consideration interaction with existing software like host-based intrusion detection 
systems, network-based intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and antivirus software.  
eing Another area that needs attention is the use of any compliance tools that are b
utilized by the organization and the solutions compatibility. 
Trust Model 
Trust is critical when establishing security. The architect should describe how trust will 
be established and maintained between the various application tiers. Another issue that 
needs to be addressed is how deep a user’s identification (id) can be traced within the 
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application. This helps the organization identify a level of risk that it is willing to live 
with when it comes to identifying the actions of a user. 
DAD Socialization 
The organization has an interesting environment where the architect is supposed to 
formalize their solution with all of the members of the group. To formalize a solution 
with the members of the Design Architecture Committee (DAC) means that the architect 
meets with each member individually to discuss the proposed solution. This gives the 
architect and the group member the opportunity to work out any issues prior to the 
formal DAC meeting. However, observation indicated that this was not taking place 
effectively. The proposed solution to the problem is built on the idea that improved 
communication improves overall security. Hence, a mandatory socialization table that 
included 
in the Design Architecture Docum
the names and titles of all of the voting members of the DAC was implemented 
ent (DAD). 
11.2.4  Controlled Environment Implementation 
In the e  recommendations were made: capture 
authent t tion techniques, implementation of coding standards and 
pra ognition of the information that 
nee ption solution. Controlled environment 
implementation takes place in the testing area of this organization.  
11.2.5 Testing & Deployment in Production 
The organization, overall, appeared to be pretty adept at testing Web facing applications. 
The issue raised by the survey was in regard to the time involved to complete this task. 
The survey indicated that there are potential gains to be made by the organization from a 
time-to-market perspective. Hence, implementing dual testing units to shorten time 
windows would be advantageous from a time-to-market perspective. 
11.2.6 End-User Feedback  
End-user feed back, in the case of application security, is critical to the success of the 
application. The survey indicated that, realistically, there was very little feedback from 
end-users on the success of an application and no feed back specifically on security. The 
recommendation was made that the organization needs to start interfacing with the end-
user to establish the effectiveness of the security implemented in their applications. 
11.3 Security Improvement Initiative Implementations 
As discussed in the previous section, several recommendations were made based on the 
application of the WES methodology. Some of these recommendations included 
identifying areas for additional in-depth analysis. The group that was receptive to 
process improvements and exploring the information attained from the application of the 
WES methodology was the Architecture Design group. The main tool used during the 
  Security Coding &
ar a of secure coding, the following
ica ion and authoriza
ctices, identification of re-usable components and rec
ds to be secure along with the proposed encry
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development of a design hitecture Document (DAD). 
prove the DAD. The changes to 
AC approval process as all other 
vailable in 
was added to the document in May notifying architects that the 
itions 
sation 
The sections that were added to the document are included in Figure 11. 
is the Design Arc
Recommendations were made to the organization to im
the DAD went through the same formalization and D
projects. Some of the recommendations were accepted and implemented. Updates to the 
DAD template were frozen from October of 2005 to August of 2006 with two 
exceptions. A paragraph was added to the document in April. This paragraph 
specifically asked the architects to identify any situations where a new design touched a 
system that was being sold to another financial institution. This paragraph is a
Appendix IX. One line 
security non-functional requirements and documentation were now available in the 
Organization’s General Site (OGS). It should be noted that this information was 
previously available from the risk group; it was just not in the OGS. Nothing else was 
changed in the document. The recommendations that were accepted and implemented 
include: 
¾ A new security section that specifically recognizes the following security areas:   
• Identity Management 
• Threat Management / Compliance 
• Trust Model 
¾ A new table to record assigned DAC Cond
¾ A modified record of DAC Sociali
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Figure 11 - DAD Updates 
Security Design (Security Model Overview) 
The purpose of this section is to describe the Security Model with direct reference to 
tier of the 
proposed solution. See Contact Name (Architecture Team Member) and the Information 
n  for guidance thr section. uires 
regardless of the implementation of an internal or external solution. 
 Ma
The purpose of this section is to describe posed s
organization’s Identity Management infr ess Control and User 
Credential management. Describe how the being managed and used 
within the solution. Reference should be t Identity Management 
components, i.e. IBM’s Tivoli Access Man and Control); IBM’s Tivoli 
Identity Manager (for User Provisioning) er Associates’ eTrust Directory 
or directory services). For more information regarding the Identity Management 
frastructure and its capabilities, refer to the “Identity Management Architecture: 
ent or contact Employee Name (Title). 
Role Based Access and Control (RBAC) 
ca tion 
• User Provisioning 
• Access & Control to Environments 
 Design. 
ote: Identity Ma to brow er based applic ions. 
hreat Managem
• List any kn ion a  how these are eing 
mitigated. ana ment software can help to 
counteract , ., state how these interface 
with existi et ction System (NIDS), Host 
based Intru nti-V us, Application nd OS 
routers, and network appliances, etc. See Employee Name 
(Security Team for more details on the Threat Management system  portfolio). 
• List all of the compliance tools in this section that eing utilized 
 Trust Model 
• Within and between each tier, in the proposed architecture, describe how trust 
will be established between each application component.  
• Describe how the trust model will be maintained. 
• Layer Traceability  
 
Identity Management, Threat Management and Trust Model between each 
Security A
attention 
alyst’s Team oughout this Each section req
Identity nagement 
 how the pro
astructure for Acc
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made to the relevan
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Figure 11 - DAD Updates - Continued 
DAC Conditions 
List all of the conditions assigned by the DAC in the current DAD document. 
Condition 
Number 
Description Stakeholders DAC Due Date / 
Progress 
e.g. C# A brief description of the 
design challenge to be 
addressed. 
List the technology 
and business 
stakeholders 
required to resolve 
and agree solution 
to design challenge. 
e.g. Engineering 
rooms, etc. 
DAC date for 
resolution and follow-
up DAC presentation. 
 
 
Record of DAC Socialisation 
Date Stakeholder List Summary Actions 
DD/MM/YYYY e.g. Brad Glisson Overview of 
discussion. 
Briefly list 
outcomes and 
any agreed 
actions 
Mandatory Socialization 
 Security  - Contact Name   
 Infrastructure - Contact Name   
 Architecture -  Contact Name   
 Networks  - Contact Name   
 Vendor Relations Contact Name   
 Testing Services - Contact Name   
 Business Relations - Contact Name    
 Sarbanes-Oxley - Contact Name   
Additional Socialization 
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11.4 Security Conditions Analysis 
As a general indicator of the effectiveness of the Security Improvement Initiative (SII), 
all of the conditions assigned to new and existing projects from December of 2004 to 
August of 2006 have been captured for analysis. The numbers used in the observations 
are simply very general indicators as to the impact of the SII and nothing more. As 
discussed earlier, the internship consisted of five main stages that included an initial 
survey / p tion and 
data gathering stage, a data an
the imp tion aspe rd st nduct y, 200 ober, 
2005. ing portion of th e wa t from mber, 
2005 u e pr analysis stage and write up 
stage e at point. The security condition data collected during the data 
gathering stage can be analysed from two perspectives. The first perspective examines 
all of the security conditions that were assig  to projects t had a Web interaction. 
The second perspective examines all of the security conditions that were assigned to all 
pro eb ction. 
11.4. actio oject Anal is 
The p eraction’ is broadly used in this text to include projects that 
ackno b in som  form or fashion. This would include everything from 
intranet ems that connect to support back-
end processes, to transferring data over the Internet, to data functionality for Web 
systems. Th  total e hundred a twenty-five p cts that were sented 
to the DAC e life of the SII. Out of these projects, there were ninety-six 
projects tha  with the Web. 
The raw numbers indic ions being assigned to 
projects declined in the period from December, 2004 to June, 2005. A possible 
contribut  second 
and third periods. The number of projects that came through the Design Architecture 
Committee (DAC) during the June, July, August, 2005 period was less than half of the 
ich 
rocess analysis design stage, a recommendation stage, an implementa
alysis stage and a write up stage. The first two stages and 
lementa ct of the thi age were co
e third stag
ed from Jul
s carried ou
5 to Oct
 NoveThe data gather
ntil the end of th oject in August of 2006. The data 
nsued from th
ned hat 
jects regardless of W intera
1 Web Inter n Pr ys
hrase ‘Web int
wledged the We e
 applications, to Internet applications, to syst
ere were a  of on nd roje  pre
 during th
t interacted
ate that the number of security condit
or to the decline could be a decreased number of projects between the
number of projects submitted in the immediately preceding and post periods. This could 
be a result of vacation schedules. Other possible reasons for the variation could include a 
decrease in the complexity of the projects that were being submitted, to variations in the 
skills of the individuals preparing the DAD, to substitute representatives participating on 
the committee for stakeholder groups. It should be noted that, even though there was a 
large dip in both the total conditions and the security conditions, the security conditions 
represent more than half of the total conditions that were assigned for that period. None 
of the other periods have security conditions representing half of the total conditions.  
The security condition assignment climbs back into the twenties for the next two 
periods. Speculation on the return of the increased security conditions assignment for 
these two time frames could be that the Security Improvement Initiative (SII), wh
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was started in July of 2005, raised the awareness of security to a level where more 
employees are making inquiries on the subject. An interesting observation is that the 
number of security conditions assigned to projects during the internship period appears 
to decline for the last two periods. The individual period numbers are given in Table 31 - 
Period Number of DAC Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects and a graphical 
representation is available in Figure 12 - Period Number of DAC Security Conditions to 
Web Interaction Projects.  
T  
Period
able 31 - Period Number of DAC Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects
3 Month % Security Conditions
Total 
Conditions
Project 
Totals
December 2004 
January 2005  
February 2005 
32% 23 71 16 
March 2005 
April 2005 
May 2005 
30% 17 57 24 
June 2005 
Started - July 2005 
August 2005 
55% 12 22 9 
September 2005 
October 2005 
November 2005 
39% 22 56 13 
December 2005 
January 2006 
February 2006 
35% 23 66 12 
March 2006 
April 2006 
May 2006 
32% 16 50 13 
June 2006 
July 2006 
August 2006 
32% 12 38 9 
Note:  Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number 
Figure 12 - Period Number of DAC Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects 
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Security Conditions
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Examining the security conditions as a portion of the total conditions presented an 
interesting perspective on the information. The numbers suggest that there was a slight 
decline rise  assignment of security conditions in proportion to the 
overall conditions during the first three periods. The security conditions during the June, 
July, Aug d r nt over ha  the total conditions that were assigned 
during that period. The security conditions, at is point, represent the highest proportion 
of the total conditions throughout the life of the SII. From the June, July, August, 2005 
periods, the sec onditions  comparison with the total conditions, 
declines thro y, 2006 period. The conditions appear to level off for the last 
period June, July and August of 2006. A graphical representation of this data is available 
in Figure 13 – Period Percentage of Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects. 
It should be noted that the examination of Figure 13 identifies another possible 
interpretation. It is equally possible that there is no increase in the overall assignment of 
the conditions over the life of the SII with a summer spike in the June, July, August 
period of DAC or 
other activities taking place within the organization during that period. If it was simply a 
summer spike due to vacations, substitutions, etc., it is interesting to note that it does not 
appear to have happened in the same period in 2006. 
Figure 13 - Period Percentage of Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects 
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If the data are examined from a traditional quarterly perspective, meaning that the 
December, 2004 data would not be included in the analysis, then the data tell a slight 
variation of the information previously presented. Also, it should be noted that there is 
no data for September in the third quarter of 2006. The lack of data for September means 
that the picture is incomplete from a quarterly perspective and that the period 
information probably presents a more accurate picture of the trends in the environment. 
The trends are less pronounced in the quarterly analysis of the data. The data are in 
Table 32 - Quarterly Security Conditions assigned to Web Interaction Projects. 
Graphical analyses of the data are available in Figure 14 - Quarterly Web Interaction 
Analysis and Figure 15 – Quarterly Percentage of Security Conditions to Web 
Interaction Projects. The quarterly percentage data present a more sporadic picture of the 
security conditions from period to period. It is interesting to note that there is an 
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indication that the overall assignment of security conditions has actually risen during the 
life of the SII.  
Table 32 - Quarterly Security Conditions assigned to Web Interaction Projects 
Quarter 3 Month % Security Conditions
Total 
Conditions
Project 
Totals
January 2005  
February 2005 41% 20 49 20 
March 2005 
April 2005 
May 2005 
June 2005 
32% 12 37 13 
Started - July 2005 
August 2005 
September 2005 
42% 20 48 13 
October 2005 
November 2005 
December 2005 
30% 18 60 12 
January 2006 
February 2006 45% 15 33 10 
March 2006 
April 2006 
May 2006 
June 2006 
29% 18 62 13 
July 2006 
August 2006 43% 6 10 23 
 
Figure 14 – Quarter action Anly Web Inter alysis 
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Figure 15 - Quarterly Percentage of Security Conditions to Web Interaction Projects 
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11.4.2 Overall Projects Analysis 
The reality of the situation is that the changes that were introduced into the organization 
affected all of the projects that were brought before the DAC. Couple this information 
with the fact that the majority of the projects (96 out of 125) had some form of Web 
interaction indicates that it is appropriate to examine the overall impact of the changes 
implemented through security condition analysis. The first three periods mimic the 
November, 2005 period. The individual period 
Number of S  a graphical 
represen f the num ailab re 16  
Conditions assigned by DAC.  
The implication is that the security conditions were having an impact on projects prior to 
changes bein ted into the developm ment. The changes that were 
introduced into the develop environment were initiated as a result of the SII. The 
impact of the SII changes to the development process started in the September, October, 
Nove ith the start of a trend in decreasing 
security g assigned to projects by the Design Architecture Committee 
(DAC) an ars to be a positive indicator of the impact of the SII. 
Examining the data from the perspective of comparing the number of security conditions 
to the tota ndit ssigned fo h period indi e im t of the 
SII actually started prior to the introduction of the changes to the DAD. A graphical 
representation ed ge of Security Conditions 
assigned by the DAC. Again, due to the qua  the data and sm sample 
sizes, it is str this information provides a general indication of the impact of 
the SII and e. E ation presented in Figure 17 indicates 
information provided by the Web interaction analysis in that there is a decline and then a 
rise in both the number of security conditions and total conditions assigned to projects. 
The rise in both conditions is more pronounced in the overall analysis. An interesting 
observation is that the number of security conditions assigned to projects over the 
internship period appears to continuously decline starting with the September, October, 
numbers are given in Table 33 - Period 
ecurity Conditions assigned by DAC to Projects and
tation o bers is av le in Figu - Period Number of Security
g implemen ent environ
ment 
mber period of 2005 which corresponded w
 conditions bein
d that this appe
l number of co ions a r eac cates that th pac
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 nothing mor xamining the inform
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that there could actually have been an increase in the overall number of security 
conditions ass
Figure 16 - Period Number of Security Conditions assigned by DAC to Projects  
igned to the projects by the DAC for the life of SII.  
Total Conditions
Security Conditions
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Dec - Jan - Feb 2004 -
2005
March - Apr - May 
2005
Jun - July  - Aug 2005 Sept - Oct - Nov 2005 Dec - Jan - Feb 2005 -
2006
March - Apr - May 
2006
Jun - July  - Aug 2006
24 78 77 69 48
Security Conditions 25 18 12 35 29 24 18  
 
 
Table 33 - Period Number of Security Conditions assigned by DAC to projects 
Period 3 Month % Security Conditions
Total 
Conditions
Project 
Totals
December 2004 
January 2005  
February 2005 
32% 25 77 22 
March 2005 
April 2005 
May 2005 
30% 18 60 29 
June 2005 
Started - July 2005 
August 2005 
50% 12 24 12 
September 2005 
October 2005 45% 35 78 17 
November 2005 
December 2005 
January 2006 
February 2006 
38% 29 77 16 
March 2006 
April 2006 
May 2006 
35% 24 69 17 
June 2006 
July 2006 
August 2006 
38% 18 48 12 
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Figure 17 -Period Percentage of Security Conditions assigned by the DAC  
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As in the Web interaction analysis, a traditional quarterly analysis of overall data tells a 
slight variation of the information previously presented. Again, as pointed out in the 
WEB interaction analysis, this overall increase in conditions could have taken place with 
a summer spike during the June, July, August 2005 period. It should also be noted that 
the upward trend in the June, July, August period of 2006 is not as high as the same 
period in 2005. The quarterly numbers are presented in Table 34 - Quarterly Security 
Conditions assigned by DAC to Projects and a graphical representation of the numbers is 
available in Figure 18 - Quarterly Security Conditions assigned by DAC to Projects.  
The trends are not as pronounced as in the previous representation of the data. The 
increase in conditions takes place between the second quarter and the third quarter and 
the decreasing trend visible in the previous represenation of the data is shorter in 
duration and even shows a slight increase in the second quarter of 2006.   
Table 34 - Quarterly Security Conditions assigned by DAC to Projects 
Quarter 3 Month % Security Conditions
Total 
Conditions
Project 
Totals
January 2005  
February 2005 
March 2005 
40% 22 54 26 
April 2005 
May 2005 
June 2005 
33% 13 40 17 
Started - July 2005 
August 2005 44% 
September 2005 
31 70 19 
October 2005 
November 2005 71% 20 62 13 
December 2005 
January 2006 
February 2006 44% 
March 2006 
21 48 16 
April 2006 
May 2006 33% 26 
June 2006 
77 15 
July 2006 
August 2006 48% 16 33 9 
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 Projects  Figure 18 - Quarterly Security Conditions assigned by DAC to
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A closer examination of the numbers reveals a slightly different story. Specifically, 
extracting the monthly security conditions from the data reveal an interesting 
observation. There appears to be a greater disparity in the number of security conditions 
after the security section has been made available in the DAD template at the beginning 
of October, 2005. The total number of projects and the total number of security 
conditions for each month used in this observation are avaiable in Figure 19 - Monthly 
urity Conditions  
Security Conditions. 
Even though the new template was available in October there were no DADs submitted 
to the DAC with the new template in October. The first DAD that was submitted to the 
DAC with the correct template was in late November. Hence, October is counted in the 
time period before the changes. 
Figure 19 - Monthly Sec
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If the number of security conditions assigned to projects for the first eleven months is 
compared to the security conditions assigned to projects starting in November, there are 
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slightly fewer security conditions assigned after the security section has been added to 
the DAD template. The monthly average for the number of conditions is slightly lower 
after the change. However, it should be noted that the number of projects presented to 
the DAC decreased drastically during the second half of the study. The number of 
conditions assigned to the projects did not decrease proportionally. The number of 
security conditions actually increased slightly during the second half of the study. It 
rovider 
 project 
the DAD 
• the individual members who show up to participate in the DAC 
icipating in the DAC 
The knowledge of the architect creating the DAD has a reasonable impact on the success 
e monetary amounts assigned to projects, the project 
profiles and the demands on human resources for the projects that were being submitted 
to the DAC. The overa iod security conditions 
assigned to projects is probably the best overall indicator of success or failure of the SII. 
This is due to the fact that it contains a more complete data set and that it helps to keep 
the information in context.  
should also be noted that the number of conditions introduced by the service p
also increased; indicating that there were other factors encouraging the increased
condition assignment. This information is available in Table 35 – Condition Data. It 
should be stressed that the conditions captured during a DAC are somewhat subjective. 
There are multiple factors that affect a specific DAD that is submitted to the DAC. 
These factors include: 
• the knowledge of the architect creating 
• the knowledge of the members part
• the political power struggles within the committee 
• the capability of the individual capturing the minutes  
of the DAD that is being presented to the DAC. The author observed a fairly high 
employee turnover and utilization of contractors in the organization under discussion. 
The individual members who showed up to participate in the DAC did change from 
time-to-time for reasons that ranged from employees being off work for medical reasons, 
to promotions. The working knowledge of the committee and the individual’s 
personality could affect the assignment of conditions to a project. Other factors include 
power struggles and support staff. If one group thought it was not being properly 
recognized and consulted on a project, they could create problems for current and future 
projects presented by the offending group. The capabilities of the support staff would 
directly affect the reporting of the conditions since they are captured in the minutes. 
Even though the architects are responsible for capturing their project conditions, less 
than attentive architects would likely call on the support staff for condition verification 
after the meeting. 
Understanding these issues, it is only practical to take the data on project conditions as a 
very general indicator as to the methodology’s impact on the organization. There are 
additional factors that logically could have had an impact on the projects that were being 
presented to the DAC during the later part of the study to which the author was not 
privy. These factors include th
ll project analysis that examines the per
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Table 35 - Condition Data 
Se it 88 cur y condition count before November, 2005 
Se t 73 curi y condition count after October, 2005 
M s 11 onth  before November 
M s 10 onth  after October 
Av g 8.0 era e monthly security conditions before November 
Av g 7.3 era e monthly security conditions after October 
Total project count before November 75 
Total project count after October 50 
Average number of security conditions per project before November 1.17 
Average number of security conditions per project after October 1.46 
Service Provider condition count before November 85 
Service Provider condition count after October 97 
Average number of Service Provider conditions per project before November 1.13 
Average number of Service Provider conditions per project after October 1.94 
11.4.3 Condition Analysis Summary 
The Web interaction and the overall analysis of the data indicate that the security 
conditions were having an impact on projects prior to the initiation of the SII in July of 
2005. Even during the unexplained dip identified in both the Web interaction analysis 
and the overall condition analysis, there was still a problem with the assignment of 
security conditions. This is due to the fact that the security conditions represented at 
least half of the overall conditions assigned during that period; the highest ratio of 
security conditions to overall conditions during the entire case study.  
Fewer projects were brought to the DAC during the second half of the case study. Even 
thought the total conditions that were assigned to projects during that time frame were 
elevated, the overall condition analysis indicates that the assignment of overall security 
conditions experienced a steady decrease for the period from September, October, and 
positive effect on the organization. This could be due to either providing a decreasing 
November, 2005 to the end of the case study. The Web interaction projects experienced 
a decrease in security conditions starting in the December, January and February, 2005 – 
2006 period. 
The monthly breakdown of the data reveal that there were five months that experienced 
fewer security condition assignments than any of the months in the first part of the case 
study. While these results are by no means conclusive, they provide a general indicator 
as to the positive effect of the SII, driven by the WES methodology, on the development 
process within the organization. This initial indication encourages future implementation 
testing of the WES methodology. Due to the wide range in the number of projects 
submitted to the DAC and the subjective nature of the conditions, additional data 
analysis was deemed to provide little value. 
The important information to ascertain is that the SII appears to have had an overall 
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trend in the overall analysis of period security conditions assigned to projects starting in 
the September, October, November, 2005 time frame. It could also be due to raising the 
awareness of security within the organization. However, it can not be claimed that the 
d. This is due to the fact that, it is 
nt where multiple groups interact and 
 D as available in October of 2005. A possible 
in security conditions being assigned to projects by the Design 
11.5 Design Architecture Document (DAD) Analysis 
DAD. Past DADs 
were examined based on expected information. The criteria for determining the version 
Oxley Paragraph to the DAD 
• rity Section to the DAD 
tes in conjunction with the version of the 
itted to the DAC. This highlights the distribution of the used 
yed acceptance of the new DADs within the organization. This 
SII is the sole cause for the change in the tren
impossible to totally control a business environme
link results to a single action. 
The implication is that the security conditions were having an increasing impact on 
projects on at least two of the four periods prior to changes being implemented into the 
development environment. The changes that were introduced into the development 
environment were initiated as a result of the SII.  
The new AD associated with the SII w
decreasing trend 
Architecture Committee (DAC) can be identified in the data along with a possible 
overall elevation of security condition assignment. Both results are perceived to be a 
positive indicator of the impact of the SII on Web related projects. 
All of the Design Architecture Documents (DAD(s)) that were submitted to the Design 
Architecture Committee (DAC) were examined from November, 2005 through August, 
2006. The purpose behind this exercise was to acquire an understanding of how much 
information was actually being recorded in the security sections of the 
of the DAD that was submitted is as follows:  
• Version 1.2 - Previous Template   
• Version 1.3 - Added a Sarbanes 
 Version 1.4 - Added the Secu
• Version 1.5 - Added a paragraph on the sale of a division to the DAD 
Although version 1.4 of the DAD was available in October of 2005, the changes to the 
template were not utilized immediately. The DAC did not mandate that architects utilize 
the new template. In fact, the DAC has not enforced the changes to the template to date. 
The older templates are simply not available anymore unless they are taken from 
previous copies of the DAD. The earliest that the changes were observed in DAD’s is 
November of 2005. However, the adoption of new templates, by the architects, in the 
organization was very slow. This is demonstrated by the fact that the architects 
continued to submit older versions of the template to the DAC as late as July of 2006. It 
also shows that they submitted documents to the DAC that were not DADs throughout 
the life of the SII. Figure 20 - DAD Versions and Total Conditions depicts all of the 
conditions that were assigned for specific da
DAD that was being subm
DADs and the dela
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information provides some insight into the difficulties involved with implementing 
changes in large organizations. These changes have to have the full support of upper 
management and there has to be some employee repercussion for not complying with the 
new changes. That said, be it right or wrong, most businesses will not stop a several 
thousand pound project that is in motion in order to update its documentation so that it is 
compliant with a new template. 
Figure 20- DAD Versions and Total Conditions 
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 Forty-seven of these documents were DADs. 
ADs. 
le  1.2 
hese DAD’s were version 1.3 
the DAD with at least one of the sections within the new security part of 
The overall numbers for the submission of DAD’s to the DAC from November, 2005 
through August, 2006 are as follows: 
• There were a total of 50 project documents submitted to the DAC 
•
• Three of these documents were not D
• E ven of these DAD’s were version
• Six of t
• Seven of these DAD’s were version 1.4 
• Twenty-three of the DAD’s were version 1.5 
A practical analysis of the numbers indicates that there were seventeen DADs that were 
submitted to the DAC with the incorrect template version. Out of the seven DADs that 
were submitted with version 1.4 which originally contained the security section, four of 
the DADs either had sections deleted or the entire section was left blank. There were six 
1.5 versions of 
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the document that was either left blank or deleted. Three more DADs had at least one 
section completed with the line “n/a for all components” and two had at least one section 
completed with “Solution to be discussed with security”. In other words, fifteen DADs, 
out of twenty-nine, were submitted to the DAC with the correct template version and 
odels. For 
me degree for 
these projects. It also opens the door to last minute questions from DAC if necessary. 
e were several DADs where this level of detail was not present. 
on on whether IM is needed or not. If it is not needed, an explanation as to 
why it was not needed would be helpful. On the other hand, if it is needed from a 
ective, what is the proposed solution and what is the justification for not 
at springs to mind is why are no threats 
currently identified? Also, will there be any threats identified in the future? This answer 
ha either did not care about the section or does not understand 
 security issue. 
ganization. The goal of the survey was to assess 
stakeholder perception of the changes that were implemented. The survey questions are 
 individual answers are available in Appendix VIII. 
survey questions are summarized below. 
ignored some aspect or all of the security section of the document. Meaning that only 
fourteen documents were submitted with something semi-relevant written in the all of 
the sections. The competency of the answers varied in these sixteen documents. The 
information used in the version analysis is available in Appendix XI. Some of the 
answers were very detailed providing specific information addressing the needs of the 
applications in terms of identity management, threat complicacy and trust m
example, one even provided a detailed diagram displaying a high level overview of the 
trust model while another provided detailed information about the establishment of trust 
for individual components. Examples of DAD answers for IM, Threat Management and 
Trust are available in Appendix VI. These answers provide enough information to 
recognize that the subject area has been acknowledged and addressed to so
However, ther
There were also DADs that were completed with a minimum understanding of the 
purpose of the section. One example is the completion of the IM section with the 
following statement: “Identity Management will not be used within this solution”. This 
is the only information that was completed for the Identity Management section. This 
statement offers no explanation as to why IM is not being used for this solution. It offers 
no informati
security persp
using the in-house IM configuration? The author of this document missed the point 
behind this section either through a willingness to ignore the section or through a lack of 
security education and understanding. Another example of a poorly completed section 
has been provided in the Threat Management section with the answer: “No threats 
currently identified”. The first thought th
implies t t the author again 
how to accurately address the
11.6 Follow-Up Survey Analysis 
The follow-up survey was conducted in August of 2006. The participants in the survey 
consisted of individuals who had a direct experience with the development process 
changes implemented in the or
available in Appendix VII and the
The answers to the 
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11.6.1 Foundational Information 
Questions 1 & 2: 
The first two questions established the interviewee’s current role in the organization and 
provided a brief idea of his/her history. These questions revealed that the interviewees 
are highly qualified IT professionals who have direct experience in the architecture 
aspect of the organization. 
Questions 3 - 6:  
These questions attempted to ascertain how important security is to the organization, the 
impact security has on the respondent’s job, if they are involved in the architecture 
design process and, if so, how much experience they have in the field. 
The result is that most of the respondents feel that security is very important and that it 
has a large impact on their daily jobs. All of the respondents are involved in the 
architecture design process and, together, the respondents have a rough average of 
approximately seven years experience. 
Questions 7 & 8: 
These questions determine if the respondents have actually created a DAD and if so, 
source. Eleven out of thirteen of the 
nt f the respondents indicated that they 
ence, in 
reality, everyone is getting the latest version of the document from OGS. It should be 
at ndents indicated that they got the versions that they were 
m nd one did not remember where they got the version they 
r interesting point is that the two people who do not create DADs 
er than in the past. There is more 
involvement from the security team, more guidance in the DAD template and more 
Question eleven simply attempts to determine if the respondent was aware of the 
what version they used and the document’s 
responde s have created a DAD and one o
contributed to high level designs. Nine of the respondents indicated that they have used 
the latest version of the DAD and that they retrieved this version from the local team 
room or from the organization’s general site (OGS). The OGS is a document repository 
for the organization. The local architecture team room provides a link to OGS. H
noted th two of the respo
using fro  the architects a
were using. Anothe
both knew where to get the latest version. 
Questions 9 & 10:  
The purpose behind these questions is to determine if there have been any major 
differences in the way security is addressed over the past few years and, if so, gain an 
understanding of those differences. The majority of the respondents (eleven) indicated 
that major changes had taken place in the design process. While only two of the 
respondents indicated that it had not. The general consensus appears to be that security is 
more visible, more focussed and appears to be tight
representation in the organization. 
Question 11:  
security initiative in the architecture group. Just over half of the respondents (7 out of 
13) were aware of the security initiative and the rest were not (6 out of 13).  
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Question 12:  
Question twelve attempts to ascertain the respondents’ opinion of the organization’s 
design process and its applicability to security. The results were almost fifty - fifty. Six 
of the respondents gave fairly positive answers in regard to the current development 
an , while seven of the respondents gave negative 
s er evaluation reveals that one of the negative 
er that this author submitted to security had come to the attention of the 
employees within the organization. The result is that most of the interviewees did not 
w  thirteen) of its existence. 
at were added in version 1.4 of the DAD. The answer was a 
unanimous ‘Yes’ with one interviewee volunteering that they ‘liked the fact that it was 
dents indicated that they did not have a problem with the section. 
However, a closer examination of the responses reveals a slightly different story. One 
section 
of the DAD”.  
So, in reality, there were five negative answers to the question. Along with one 
derstand IM. The purpose for the creation of a 
One of the most positive answers to the section started out as a negative response - ‘in 
the beginning, (the respondent had a problem) trying to understand (the) scope of the IM 
process d its applicability to security
response to question twelve. A clos
responses was really not about the process but the people involved in the process and a 
general lack of knowledge. 
Question 13: 
The motivation behind question thirteen was to ascertain the depth to which the original 
white pap
even kno  (eleven out of
Question 14: 
Question fourteen attempted to determine whether the interviewees were familiar with 
the security sections th
all in one section - helped with discussions with security’. 
11.6.2 Identity Management (IM) 
Question 15:  
Question fifteen attempts to determine any problems with the completion of the new 
Identity Management (IM) section that was added to the DAD.  The initial thought is 
that seven of the respon
interviewee indicated that they had previous experience with IM. The reason three of the 
individuals did not have a problem with the section is that they were simply not using it. 
One of the respondents’ jokingly said “Not applicable works quite nicely in that 
Four individuals stated that they had problems with the section; one said that it was not 
relevant to the interviewee’s area due to the fact that each application has its own IM 
solution and one had no experience with the section.  
individual who clearly does not un
specific IM group was to prevent the financial organization from having to support 
multiple applications with custom IM solutions. Hence, re-inventing the IM solution for 
every architecture solution would not be passed by the DAC. 
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(section) and what was expected but, by the end, there were no problems. The guidelines 
nd the ones in the DAD template were very helpful”. 
 the respondents see the added value of 
ally. 
t forces a conversation between the architect and the security team that may or 
may not have been happening previously. The reasoning behind this conclusion is based 
s, logically, see the benefit of the section. The 
at it assisted overall or indicated that it did not 
11.6.4 Threat Compliance 
hteen through twenty attempted to determine any problems and/or any 
s were asked if there is any benefit to the section, there were really 
six positive answers to the question. The non-committal answers were positive, in that 
e respondents to think about the issues and determine if it was relevant to 
from the IM group a
Question 16: 
This question attempts to determine any benefits from the completion of the new IM 
section in the DAD. The result is that eight of
having the section in the DAD. One respondent does not think that it is currently helping 
but indicated that it should be helping. This respondent thinks there is an education issue 
around IM and why it is worth while. Three of the respondents indicated that it was not 
relevant to the projects on which they were working and one did not have any 
experience. 
Question 17: 
Question seventeen attempts to determine the overall effect that adding the IM section 
has on the overall development process. Seven of the respondents think that it assisted 
the development process. Five think that it did not have an effect either way and one 
thinks that it both assisted and hindered the process. One respondent thinks that it helps 
internally but creates problems extern
11.6.3 IM Summary: 
In summary, the survey indicates that the IM section appears to have been helpful 
overall. I
on the fact that most of the interviewee
majority of the interviewees indicated th
hinder the development process. 
Questions 18 - 20: 
Questions eig
benefits with the completion of the threat compliance section along with its effect on the 
overall design process. Six of the individuals indicated that they did not have a problem 
with this section. One of the five positive respondents indicated that they went to the 
security group for help and one indicated that they used the guidance notes in the 
template. There were also five individuals who indicated that they had problems with the 
section. One respondent indicated that it had no effect and one did not have any 
experience. The re-occurring theme is a general lack of understanding of what the 
section is asking or the topic in general.  
When the respondent
they forced th
the project. There were five negative answers to the question and one ‘did not affect’ 
answer. 
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When asked if the addition of the section hindered or assisted the overall process, six 
respondents indicated that it did not have an effect, four indicated that it assisted, one 
had no experience and only two indicated that it hindered. One of the hindered responses 
went on to caveat the response with the comment that there was not a lot of clarity 
around the security area but that the security section will benefit the organization 
overall.  
11.6.5 Threat Compliance Summary:  
tion, along with its effect on the 
overall design process. Four individuals indicated that they did not have a problem with 
f the respondents indicated that they did have a problem 
ion. Four individuals did not provide a clear yes /no response to the 
ive individuals indicated that it 
assisted the overall process; five respondents indicated that it had no effect, one 
atively, one did not have any experience and one indicated that it did not 
As a result of the summary, the threat compliance section did not hinder the 
development process. How much it actually helped is debatable. If anything, at best, it 
forced the architects to consider the issues. A point that was echoed by six of the 
respondents and, at worst, five respondents indicated that it was a non-event.    
11.6.6 Trust Models 
Questions 21 - 23:  
Questions twenty-one through twenty-three attempted to determine any problems and/or 
any benefits with the completion of the trust models sec
the trust model section. Four o
with the sect
question. However, a critical reading of the responses indicates that two of the four 
vague responses were not positive responses and two indicated the responses could be 
taken as initially positive. In fact, the two initially positive responses support the idea 
that there is a lack of understanding on trust models. 
Seven of the respondents did indicate that they either experienced or perceived benefits 
to the completion of the trust model section. Five respondents gave negative responses 
to the question and one respondent did not have any experience.  
As far as the overall effect on the design process, f
responded neg
hinder but did clearly question the necessity of the section and whether it helps with the 
understanding of the architecture. 
11.6.7 Trust Model Summary: 
The responses indicate that there is a clear need for education on the subject of trust 
models. The majority of the respondents see a benefit in the completion of the section 
and there were four individuals who indicated that it assisted the process. There were 
also four individuals who indicated that there was no effect on the design process. 
Hence, from a survey perspective, it was neither a glowing success nor an outright 
failure.   
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11.6.8 Condition  
Questions 24 - 26: 
ine any problems and/or 
ion section along with its effect on the 
mpletion of this 
section in the DAD. One respondent want
con
along w
Three o
one of 
vehicle
Wh
the con
respond
When 
were e
assist. ponse that indicated that it did not hinder except when 
con
not hav
11.6.9
This qu
overall
conditi
process
11.6.1
n through twenty-nine attempted to determine any problems 
a problem with the modified 
socialization section of the DAD. One respondent did say that it has not been used in all 
Questions twenty-four through twenty-six attempted to determ
any benefits with the completion of the condit
overall design process. 
Eight respondents indicated that they did not have a problem with the co
ed clarification on the terminology of a 
dition vs. a comment. One indicated that adoption of the section has been a problem 
ith voicing discomfort about modifying a document that has been approved. 
f the respondents indicated that they had not gotten that far in the process and 
them went on to elaborate that they did not feel that the DAD was the appropriate 
 for this issue.  
en the respondents were asked if they received any benefit from the completion of 
ditions section, twelve respondents gave positive answers to this question. One 
ent gave a negative answer and then went on to add a positive comment.  
asked if the conditions section hindered or assisted the overall processes there 
ight strong assist responses. There was a response that indicated that it did not 
There was also one res
ditions were really project conditions and not design conditions. One respondent did 
e any experience in the area and there were two ‘neither’ responses.  
 Condition Summary: 
estioning reveals that there is some misunderstanding as to the operation of the 
 process and as to how the conditions section fits into the process. Overall, the 
on section was well received and appears to be adding value to the design 
. 
0 Socialization 
Questions 27 - 29:  
Questions twenty-seve
and/or any benefits with the completion of the modified socialization section along with 
its effect on the overall design process.  
Eleven respondents indicated that they did not have 
of the DADs and one respondent indicated that they issued the DAD before doing the 
socialization. This indicated that there is a practical timing issue with the completion of 
the socialization section and issuing the final version of the DAD.  
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Twelve respondents indicated that they either experienced or perceived benefits to the 
completion of the modified socialization section in the DAD. One of the positive 
respondents went so far as to say that they knew of one DAC meeting that it basically 
11.6.12 Template & Process 
ting the security section of 
the DAD. The lack of education could help explain the lack of respondent answers in the 
ecurity section. It could also help explain the use of repeated / stock style of answers in 
the security section. 
Question 31: 
Question thirty-one attempts to determine the overall security strengths in the current 
version of the DAD template. The general theme that appears to be prevalent through the 
majority of the ten respondents who provide strengths is that it highlights explicit 
security information. There is better documentation and guidance to the security section 
along with prompting appropriate questions. One respondent did indicate that they were 
not sure what the organization was trying to establish with the DAD template. One 
respondent indicated that a fully completed document has not been presented for 
assessment and one respondent indicated that there was an overlap between the security 
section and the security non-functional requirements. 
Question 32: 
Question thirty-two attempts to determine if there were other factors that contributed to 
the successful or unsuccessful attempt to integrate security into the design process. Four 
individuals indicated access to security personnel support is important from a resource 
perspective. Two mentioned the loss of two employees within the architecture group 
saved. One respondent indicated that they had not completed the section and basically 
had no experience with the section.  
Ten respondents indicated that the modified socialization section assisted in the overall 
design process. One indicated that it did not have an effect either way; one respondent 
did not notice a change in the section and one respondent had no experience with the 
section. 
11.6.11 Socialization Summary: 
Overall, the survey revealed that the majority of the respondents felt that the modified 
socialization section assisted in the design process. 
Question 30: 
Question thirty attempts to determine the overall security weaknesses in the current 
version of the DAD template. Only two respondents indicated that there were no 
weaknesses in the document template. The weaknesses that surfaced as a result of this 
question ranged from the coordination of the information being asked for in the DAD 
with the security group, to the DAD not being compatible with external software builds, 
to repetition in the document, to the use of stock answers. One issue that did surface 
twice is that of the security education of the people comple
s
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who were very strong in securi
mentioned the fact that highlig
ty. Three mentioned the importance of education. One 
hting security brought it to everyone’s attention. One 
ey worked on 
expanded a solution that already had security in place. One said that number three was 
sure if the question was from an 
dents had nothing to add. One mentioned the 
need for standards, one indicated that the organization has document management 
issu ucture team is not as clear now as 
wit
on security expanded to the other components ne thinks that the conditions 
sec ease managers and one stressed the 
need for education in security, infrastructure and tools. Another respondent also 
indicated that there is a high turnover in the architecture group which contributes to the 
ad time to penetrate the 
organization. 
11
The
summa ertia, political scope and lack of cultural ownership. 
enced a great deal of resistance to the modification of 
the Design Architecture Document (DAD) which is the primary instrument 
 completing the revised document.  
respondent mentioned that the security group is perceived, generally, as a hindrance by 
the project teams. The same respondent indicated that this perception is changing in the 
organization so that security is viewed in a better light.  
11.6.13 General Survey  
Question 33: 
Question thirty-three attempts to determine if any of the questions were vague or 
difficult to follow. Eight of the respondents indicated that there were no problems with 
the questions. One said that number two was vague. One said that it was difficult to 
answer number thirty-two. This was due to the fact that the project th
difficult to answer. The respondent was not 
organization’s perspective or a personal perspective. One respondent indicated that 
number four could be examined from a design and from an everyday work perspective. 
One respondent indicated that it had been a while since they had completed his last DAD 
and had to stop to remember some of the information.  
Question 34: 
Question thirty-four gave the interviewee the opportunity to add any additional 
comments to the survey. Four of the respon
es, one thinks that the interaction with the infrastr
h the security team, one would like to see the same type of work that was conducted 
of the DAD, o
tion should become the responsibility of the rel
education problems and puts more pressure on the security team. An interesting 
comment was made about the survey itself, one respondent indicated that they would 
like to take the survey again in a year after the changes h
.7 Implementation Obstacles 
 obstacles experienced during the implementation of the WES methodology can be 
rized as in
1. Inertia. The author experi
utilized by the architecture team in the organization. The survey reveals that 
several of the architects acknowledged the benefits in the changes and the focus 
on security. However, when it came to actually filling in the sections of the DAD 
there was obvious resistance to actually
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2. Political Scope. Individual recommend
application of the WES methodology due t
ations were dismissed during the 
o the lack of support and interest from 
tuitively fostered a culture that 
continually decreases ownership of activities and processes within the 
ryone, the chosen deployment process 
ty. The surveys and the application of 
 
to a project, it is suppose to be brought back to the DAC for final approval after the 
ll of these people in a room and they should be able to 
tell you about all of the systems in the organization. Even though most of these 
lp the architects complete the new 
security section. This case study results provides support for the necessity of the 
other groups within the organization. Modifications to the DAD had to be 
approved by the individual groups that were represented by various sections 
within the DAD. Some groups used the opportunity to attempt to assert political 
influence on the approval process and others attempted to use the approval of the 
security changes as an opportunity to insert additional changes, which they 
desired, into the DAD. 
3. Lack of Cultural Ownership. The organization in
organization. This lack of ownership for activities and processes contributes to 
an environment where everyone is trying to defend their actions leading to a lack 
of initiative. This lack of initiative is visible through high turnover rates in the 
organization and a high dependence on contractors. This leads to a situation 
where people want “cookie cutter” styles of answers to problems. Hence, there 
appears to be a lack of understanding of the project approval process and a lack 
of knowledge in the security area. The architects appear to want a resource that is 
available to answer their security question in the design arena so that they do not 
have to concentrate on learning that aspect of the job.  
11.8 Summary 
While no development process is going to suit eve
needs to meet the business requirements for securi
the WES methodology, as a guide to addressing their security problems, appears to have 
had a positive effect on the security of the organization.  
The follow-up survey also brought to light the general lack of understanding of how the 
architecture process is supposed to work. Comments were made like: ‘…lot of 
discomfort with changing a document that has been approved’. If a condition is assigned
condition has been satisfied. This comment indicates that there is either a lack of 
understanding about the process or a breakdown in the operation of the DAC. 
The surveys and the document analysis clearly support the need for education. The 
architects, referenced in this research in the financial institution, are considered the elite 
of the banking IT staff. Gather a
individuals clearly understand the importance of security and see the benefits in having 
security in the development process, there is clear resistance to the practical 
implementation of this in the development process. The case study also demonstrated 
that security knowledge is lacking among the elite IT staff in the organization. Security 
was added into the design process along with general guidance notes. However, this 
information was not enough, as a general rule, to he
Page 174 of 262 
practical implementation of a security education program along with the practical 
implementation of security into the development process.  
Another idea that the case study supports is that security in the development process is 
really a product of heightened awareness and the promise of a conversation. The 
conditions that were being assigned did decrease over the life of the Security 
Improvement Initiative (SII). Although the security section was either not filled in or 
filled in very poorly in a lot of cases, the fact that these sections were not being 
mandated in the conditions section of the DAD indicates that there is the probability that 
there were some security conversations taking place. It also indicates that these security 
conversations were not being properly recorded in the DAD. 
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12 Conclusion 
My hypothesis is that developing a process impartial security methodology applicable to 
different Web Engineering development processes will help organizations strengthen 
security in their Web application development process. Therefore, a flexible process 
neutral security methodology is required for Web Engineering application development. 
This process neutral methodology should explicitly integrate security throughout 
existing Web engineering application development methodologies. The first four 
sections of this chapter address the research questions that were presented in chapter one 
and to what extent they have been answered. The fifth section examines the WES 
methodology in conjunction with Siponen’s criteria for fifth generation methodologies 
[171] and the final section of the chapter examines areas for future work. 
pact 
b engineering application development 
rity processes. Chapter ten presents a 
12.1 Thesis Research Question 1 
The answer to the first research question ‘Is it possible to define a set of criteria that a 
Web Engineering Security process must fulfil?’ is yes. Chapter five established the 
empirical evidence and discussed in detail the criteria entitled Essential Elements (EE) 
which need to be established prior to implementing a Security Improvement Initiative 
(SII) and the Security Criteria for a Web Application Development (SCWAD). The 
empirical evidence for both criteria is based on surveys. The Essential Elements are 
based on a Web survey and are as follows: 
1. Web Application Development Methodology 
2. Web Security Development Process Definition 
3. End-Users Feed Back   
4. Implement & Test Disaster Recovery Plans 
5. Job Related Im
The empirical evidence presented in chapter five for SCWAD is based on a survey 
conducted in a Global Fortune 500 financial organization. Chapter five also discussed, in 
detail, the six criteria for a Web engineering security process: 
1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process  
2. Proper Security Controls in the development environment 
3. Security Visibility throughout all areas of the development process  
4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software and 
security 
5. Prompt, Rigorous Security Testing and Evaluation 
6. Trust and Accountability 
SCWAD is used in chapter six to assess We
processes and to scrutinize established secu
practical application of both the Essential Elements and SCWAD in the development of 
the Hunterian Online Photo Library (HOPL). 
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12.2 Thesis Research Question 2 
The answer to the second research question ‘Can a new development process be defined 
to meet the criteria for a Web Engineering Security process?’ is yes. The WES 
methodology is constructed from empirical research that consisted of two surveys.  The 
empirical research for both of these studies and the criteria that resulted from the 
ugh customer 
communications, short development cycles, and practical security solutions to business 
users are 
ent in the execution of an application.  
zational compatibility. 
 In doing so, chapter eight identifies several deficiencies within existing 
security methodologies that WES attempts to address. These issues include 
analysis of the results is discussed in chapter five. The WES process was designed to 
address both sets of criteria which included the Essential Elements and the Security 
Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD).  
The WES developed in this research process is described in chapter seven. The WES 
methodology was designed to complement Web software development thro
problems. The WES process life-cycle is designed to integrate with traditional and agile 
development processes that are used specifically for Web application development. 
Realistically, WES defines a security specific communication approach for management 
and developers that spans the Web application development life-cycle. The WES 
methodology advocates the foundation principles which include security education, 
good communication and cultural support. WES supports heavy end-user involvement 
throughout the security development process. This is due to the fact that end-
the ultimate security assessm
12.3 Thesis Research Question 3 
The answer to the third research question ‘Can it be argued that the introduction of this 
new process strengthens security within Web Engineering application development 
processes?’ is yes. The WES process was developed from an analysis of industry 
surveys that were discussed in chapter five. The WES process, discussed in chapter 
seven, establishes the benefit of a project development risk assessment, the acquisition 
of application security requirements and determination of organi
The WES process then filters the risk and security requirements through the 
development process, attempting to mitigate possible security breaches through security 
focussed design, coding activities, testing implications and end-user feedback. The WES 
methodology promotes industry best practices while providing structure to the 
integration of the practices into the Web application development methodology and with 
the policies of the organization.  
Chapter eight examines the WES methodology alongside existing security 
methodologies.
acknowledgement of security during the business analysis; security policy - cultural - 
technological compatibility (also known as organizational compatibility); controlled 
environment implementation and end-user feedback. 
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Chapter nine demonstrates the compatibility of the WES methodology with both 
traditional and agile application development methodologies. The process neutral 
approach provides the necessary flexibility for organizations to capitalize on existing 
expertise while improving security integration in their existing Web application 
development methodology. 
The level of security that an organization attains through the implementation of the WES 
methodology is dependent upon the Web application security needs of the executing 
organization. These needs will vary between businesses within industries and between 
various industries. No organization is going to construct code that is 100% secure, nor 
do most organizations have a need to construct code that is totally secure. Realistically, 
organizations will implement the degree of security required by the local business 
elements can be mitigated through the components of the WES methodology which 
industry?’ is yes within 
the scope of this research which includes resources, opportunities, corporate obstacles 
th the components of the process and the overall process can be 
commendations embraced and implemented by organizations is 
hapter eleven discusses the limited implementation of the WES methodology into a 
Global Fortune 500 financial organization and the obstacles that the implementation 
encountered. The Security Improvement Initiative (SII) consisted of a pre-WES 
implementation survey, WES implementation, a post-WES implementation survey and 
an analysis of relevant data. The evidence presented in chapter eleven indicates that SII 
environment, the industry or the governmental regulations. Most businesses do not have 
an unlimited budget which means that the security decisions will also be tempered by 
financial resources. The idea behind WES is to improve the security focus of the 
organizations conducting Web application development. The improvement of the 
security focus will allow organizations to mitigate security risk where it is deemed 
appropriate for the business. There are a number of elements to be considered. These 
include the identified risk, the acquisition of specific security requirements; 
organizational compatibility acknowledgement; security design, coding and testing best 
practices; and the attainment of end-user feedback. The elements of the WES 
methodology specifically focus on the security aspects of the application which 
improves security during Web application development.  
12.4 Thesis Research Question 4 
The answer to the fourth research question ‘Is it possible to demonstrate that this new 
Web Engineering Security Process can be successfully used in 
and time constraints. Bo
used in industry. The re
dependant on the needs and the culture of the implementing business. Chapter ten 
discusses the implementation of the individual components which include the Essential 
Elements (EE) and the Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD). 
The Essential Elements and SCWAD were applied to a project being implemented by 
the Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery at the University of Glasgow. The application of 
both of the Essential Elements and SCWAD revealed development process strengths and 
opportunities for improvement in the development process that was used to develop the 
Hunterian Museum’s Online Photo Library (HOPL).    
C
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appears to have had a positive effect on the organization by reversing an increasing trend 
ss within the 
 SII was the 
WES methodology. The application of the WES methodology in the organization 
resulted in several recommendations. Financial organizations, by their very nature, are 
averse to a lot of changes. Some of the proposed changes were accepted and 
imp ente im ion of the WES 
methodology in the organizations affected the development process for all large 
app ions m. or 
enco ered ES m in 
chapter elev al scope and a lack of cultural ownership. 
12.5 Scope and Validity 
Scope and validity issues of the research should be specifically
at this point.  The majority of the respondents to the We s
from the greater Glasgow area due to the email request f m
British Computing Socie ustry 
base Gla g a te
results. Alth ase study, it sho d that 
the initial industry survey, used to help create WES, was conducted in the sam
company where WES was implemented. This does raise t q
other organizations and should be investigated through future work. The fact that the 
industrial case study was implemented in a Fortune Five Hundred organization does help 
to mitigate this concern due to the fact that most of the orga
broadly sha uc y
The once roc s
organizations.  
Also e a tune F to 
implement W s visibility naturally raises the question of the author’s impact on 
the lts o dy, it be w 
much influence the author had over the success of the experim ere 
was ew f idu ed 
questions around the development process, etc., all need to be acknowledged in 
refe e t shou the 
opportunities presented by both of the case studies supported plan driven development 
of Web app uccessfully address WES compatibility 
wit le a  no empirical case study to support this 
analysis. Th tudy with an agile development 
process should be explored in future work.  
12.6 Fifth Generation Analysis 
As discussed in chapter three, Siponen identified five on 
security methodologies. He proposed four criteria that fifth generation methodologies 
in security conditions assigned to projects and raising security awarene
organization. The catalyst for the recommendations proposed during the
lem d within the organization. Hence, the plementat
licat  being implemented in the United Kingdo The obstacles that the auth
unt  during the implementation of the W
en and included inertia, politic
ethodology are discussed 
 recognized and discussed 
urvey probably originated b 
ro  the local chapter of the 
ty (BCS). While this is not negative, due to a diverse ind
sgow, it should be recognized as havin
ough this should not impact the c
 in po ntially bias affect on the 
uld be acknowledge
e 
he uestion of applicability in 
nizations in this category 
re common attributes in terms of size, burea
rns lead to a broadly similar application p
rac  and legislative concerns. 
se c es  being developed in these 
, th uthor worked visibly within the For
ES. Thi
ive Hundred organization 
resu f the study. As with any empirical stu comes difficult to know ho
ent. The fact that th
 a n ace in the organization, that the new indiv al was asking security relat
renc o potentially impacting the study. It ld also be noted that 
lications. While chapter nine does s
pplication development, there wash agi
is issue of conducting an empirical case s
 generations of informati
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should striv criteria making it a fifth generation 
me log  t nt 
design and all types of software development 
me log thods with practitioners; and 
emp l ev 3]. 
WES addre rst criteria through the implementation of the foundational 
prin s, clude security education, good 
communication and cultural support. WES also involves the en
beginning of the process and strives for security vis li
developmen the co
met log opment m th
The  two lev
tha ects pplied ss 
environment. Chapter eleven demonstrates that the WES methodology can be applied in 
ind  wit here sis 
and ollo even, i he 
app ion a positive effect on the organization. 
12.7
The research reported in this dissertation identified sever
Web engineering, security, business, cultural and legislation. F
Web Engineering and security should include an attempt d
interpretations of the definition of security among an assor
should also attem ation on an organization’s in-house 
developmen ne im
and their effectiv ents.  
Future research should investigate WES implementations in 
and organizations in other industries. This should include specifically working with a 
financial organization that implements an agile devel  in order to 
strengthen or disprove the theoretical argument proposed i h
com le on o
sho exa dividual sta s
Interdependencies should be examined between the WES m ies and security 
activities th organizations. These interdependencies 
cou rov  of r in 
organization
The business perspective should be explored in future research to determine any 
inte end nd ed 
Return on I the individual stages of the development life cycle and 
specific ROI for security within each stage of the life cycle. 
e to achieve. WES meets all of these 
y. The criteria are the use of social ideas and
user expectations; integration with 
thodo echniques ensuring congrue
thodo
irica
ies; painless adaptability of security me
idence of their usefulness [17
sses the fi
ciple as discussed in chapter seven, which in
d-user from the 
ibi ty throughout the entire 
t process. Chapter nine demonstrated 
y with both traditional and agile devel
mpatibility of the WES 
hodo e odologies.  
 last
t asp
 criteria are addressed in chapters ten and e
 of the WES methodology can be a
en. Chapter ten demonstrates 
 successfully in a busine
ustry h relative ease. The empirical evidence gat d from the condition analy
 the f
licat
w-up survey, as discussed in chapter el
of the WES methodology had 
ndicates that SII driven by t
 Further Work 
al areas for future research in 
uture work in this area of 
to rill down into the various 
tment of organizations. It 
pt to acquire more detailed inform
t process approaches to security, exami
eness in ‘real-world’ environm
plicit approaches to security 
other financial companies 
opment process
n t e dissertation that WES is 
patib
uld 
with agile processes. Future implementati
mine refinements of the in
s f the WES methodology 
ge  of the methodology. 
ethodolog
at are currently being conducted in 
ide opportunities for capitalization
s. 
ld p eusable components with
rdep encies between the Essential Elements a
nvestment (ROI) for 
the actual and/or perceiv
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Additional work should include investigations into the creation of tools to help 
dev ers a dolog
include the development of configurable applications that ity 
rela n develop
databases. T tion on eve to 
process dev fic security requirements. The 
cap g o ould be mined to provide organizations with an 
abundance o re Web applications. These tools 
should be researched and developed in a m
iterations o  on “Lessons Learned” and 
ma
In utur  to 
methodolog ith results stated in previous research 
[129 he i cou rm 
of ral al scope, and a lack of cultural ownership. 
Investigatio of organizational resistance to 
me log ations could provide valuable info
The isla uld e nd 
productivity of the processes and procedures implemented, by individual organizations, 
to ss t ing im is 
research sho  of international and domestic cyber 
leg n f  perspective, in of 
cyber crime ent. Research may also 
wan  in een le 
resolutions to any such conflicts. The Web engineering perspective should investigate 
and identify the role in the development team where the re o
aspect of the application development project should be plac d
12.8 Summary 
The researc  seve l 
research def nts (EE) and the eb 
Application Development SCWAD, which a Web Engineeri st 
fulfil. The EE and SCWAD provided the foundation fo h
Engineering Security (WES) methodology which is a fift
security process that strengthens Web Engineering Application developm
The research then confirmed that the WES methodology, within the scope of the 
research, ca
 
 
elop nd managers implement the WES metho y. Some of these tools could 
 capture a variety of secur
ted issues experienced in the applicatio
hese tools could capture informa
ment process in tailorable 
rything from coding bugs, 
elopment issues, to organizational speci
f this information cturin
f practical information for developing secu
anner that utilizes feedback from individual 
f the development process capitalizing
ponents of the process. ximizing reusable com
the f e, cultural research needs to be conducted
y adoption in industry which concurs w
into the barriers and aids 
]. T
cultu
mplementation of the WES methodology en
change, i.e., inertia, politic
ntered resistance in the fo
ns into the reduction and/or elimination 
y implementthodo rmation to businesses.  
 leg tive perspective in future research sho xamine the practicality a
addre he legislative requirements that are be posed on organizations. Th
uld examine the practical effectiveness
rom a successful prosecutionislatio  respect to the deterrence 
s and the practical effects on the business environm
vestigate any legislative conflicts betwt to countries and the possib
sp nsibility for the legislative 
e . 
h presented in this dissertation achieved
ined criteria, the Essential Eleme
ra goals. The results of the 
 Security Criteria for W
ng Security process mu
r t e development of a Web 
h generation information 
ent processes. 
n be successfully implemented in industry. 
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Appendix I - Web Survey Questions  
Question 
N rumbe Question Answer
10 ary, would you be available to respond YES - NO 
20 et site? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
house? 
ent process? 
nt? 
ss 
(Extreme Programming, Dynamic 
Systems Development Method) 
lopment 
Processes (Water Fall Approach, 
Spiral Model) 
nation of 
Traditional and Agile 
 Use both Agile and Traditional 
process depending on the nature 
• In-House 
l design phase 
ing phase 
plementation phase 
Does your organization have a defined 
 
80 Does the process contain a risk analysis 
90 YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
esign 
110 YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
120 e that  to security? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
 NOT KNOW 
131 Is the Internet security process followed by the employees?  YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
If necess
to a few specific questions? 
Does your organization have an Intern
30 Does your organization develop any of its Internet applications in- YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
40 Does your organization have a defined Internet application developm YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
50 What type of Internet development process does your organization impleme
• Agile Development Proce
• Traditional Systems Deve
• A process that is a combi
Development Processes 
•
of the project. 
60 Where does security design fall in your Internet application development process?  
• During the initia
• During the coding & test
• During the im
• Not at all 
70 application development Internet security 
process? 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW
phase? 
Does the process contain application security 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
requirements phase? 
Does this process contain a security d
phase? 100 YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
Does this process contain a controlled 
implementation environment phase? 
Does this process contain a testing phas
is specific
130 Does the process attempt to acquire feedback from the end-user? YES - NO - DO
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132 
Is there an individual on the team or in the 
organization that is responsible for insuring that 
the Internet security process is followed?  
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
133 Is there any job reurity process?  S - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
34 o rnet security preffec YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
 Does  contract out any of its Web YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0 At what point does sewhen con s? 
• During the initial design phase 
• During the coding & testing phase 
• l tati
• at all
60
 develop 
2 YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
170 Does your organization have an intranet site? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
o n p
pplications in-house? 
190 
ur orga tion ha  a define
ion development process for intranet 
lications? 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0 What type of intranet development process does y ? 
Ag r
(Extreme Programming, Dynamic 
Systems Development Method) 
 Traditional Systems Development 
Processes (Water Fall Approach, 
Spiral Model) 
pr th  com  of 
ad  a ile 
Deve ent cesses 
Use both Agile d Tradi
proce epe n the nature 
of the project. 
In-Ho  
0  intranet 
During the init design p e 
During the cod  & testin hase 
During the implementatio hase 
Not at all 
0  - NO O N  KNOW 
0   - NO O N  KNOW 
0 tion security  - NO O N NOW 
lated impact for not following YEthe Internet sec
In y1 ur opinion, is the Intetive?    
ocess 
140  your organizationsite development? 
15 curity become an issue sidering outside application  During the imp emen on phase 
Not  
1  or implement an Internet site in the next 1
Does your organization have plans to
months? 
180 Does your intranet a
rganizatio  develo  any of its YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
Does yo
applicat
app
niza ve d 
20 our organization implement
• ile Development P ocess 
•
• A 
Tr
ocess 
i al
at is a
n g
bination
tion
lopm
d A
 Pro
•  an
nding o
tional 
ss d
• use
21  Where does security design fall in yourapplication development process?  
• ial has
• 
• 
ing g p
n p
• 
22  application development intranet security 
process? 
Does your organization have a defined 
YES  - D OT
23  Does the process contain a risk analysisphase? YES  - D OT
24  requirements phase? 
Does the process contain applica YES  - D OT K
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250 D ess contain a secur   - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
260  contain a controlled  environment phase? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0 Does this process contain a testing phase that is spec  NO NO OW
ck 
1 ed by the  - NO  NOT NOW 
Is there an individual on the team or in the 
n
t s ce llo
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
ny job related impact for not following 
et secu process YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
28  your opinion, is the intranet security process effective?    YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
290 
 h  to p 
or implement an intranet site in the n O - DO NOT KNOW 
300 zation have an extranet? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0 Does yo  of its YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0
 
r extranet YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
s 
• le Dev pmen rocess
treme Program ng, Dy ic 
tems D elop nt Method) 
• ditiona ystem evelo ent 
cesse r ll App ch, 
ral Mo ) 
• t is a combination of 
ditional and Agile 
pment Proce ses 
•  both le and Traditio  
cess d nding on the nature 
he pro  
• ouse
340 xtranet application development process?  
• ing th tial design phase 
• ing the coding & testing ase 
• During the implementation phase 
• Not at all 
350 
Does your organization have a defined 
application development extranet security 
process? 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
oes this proc ity design
phase? 
Does this process
implementation
YES
27 ific to security? YES -  - DO T KN  
280 Does the process attempt to acquire feedbafrom the end-user? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
28  Is the intranet security process followemployees? YES  - DO  K
282 organization that is re
the intrane
spo
ecurity pro
sible for in
ss is fo
suring that 
wed? 
283 Is there athe intran
4 In
rity ?  
Does your organization ave plans  develo
ext 12 
months? 
Does your organi
YES - N
31 ur organization develop anyextranet applications in-house? 
32  application development process fo
Does your organization have a defined
applications? 
330 What type of extranet development procesdoes your organization implement? 
Agi elo t P  
(Ex
Sys
mi
me
nam
ev
Tra l S s D pm
Pro s (Wate  Fa roa
Spi
A process tha
del
Tra
Develo s
Use Agi nal
pro epe
of t
In-H
ject.
 
Where does security design fall in your e
Dur
Dur
e i in
 ph
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360 Does the process contain a risk analysis N
0 rocess contain application security irements phase YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
380 rocess contain a security design YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
Does this process contain a controlled 
n se
0 n a estin tha 
410 Does the process attempt to acquire feedback from the YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
1 y the YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
2
the 
ing that 
 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
3 llowing YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
4 t security process YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0
our organization have plans to develop 
 YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0
consider 
d /or extranet 
• impo t 
• Somewhat important 
• Important 
• Very Im tan
0 nt d o se de nt process? 
• Unimportant 
o rtant 
portant 
 Very Important 
450 zation take any actions to mployees about computer security? YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0
ur organization have a disaster 
 plan that includes individual 
ons in the rity design
ents? 
ES - NO  NOT KNOW
470 
rganization tested (by execution) this 
disaster recovery plan within the last 12 
months
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
0
le 
er S t Ans
phase? 
Does the p
YES - NO - DO NOT K OW 
37  requ
Does this p
phase? 
? 
390 implementation enviro ment pha ? 
g phase 
YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
t 40  Does this process contaiis specific to security?
 t YES - NO - DO NOT KNOW 
 end-user? 
41  Is the extranet security process followed bemployees? 
41  organization that is responsible for insur
Is there an individual on the team or in 
the extranet security process is followed?
41  Is there any job related impact for not fothe extranet security process?  
41  In your opinion, is the extraneeffective?    
Does y
42  or implement an extranet site in the next 12
months? 
43  
rtant does your organization 
security in its Internet, intranet, an
How impo
applications? 
Un rtan
por t 
44 How importasecurity in th
oes your 
velopme
rganization con ider • S
• Im
mewhat impo
•
 Does your organieducate e
Does yo
46  recoveryapplicati
requirem
Has your o
secu  Y - DO  
? 
48  for monitoring information and comput
security within your organization?  
What position/title in the company is responsib
hor wer 
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Appendix II - Web Survey Answers 
Table 36 - Web Survey Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Meaning 
Nbr Question Number 
Rspdts Respondents 
DKN Do Not Know 
A.D.P. Application Development Process 
Table 37 - Web Survey Answers 
KN Nbr Abbreviated Question Rspdts YES NO D
10 a few specific questions? 53 43 10   Available to respond to 
20 oe 2  D s your organization have an Internet site? 53 51 
30 4 Develop any of its Internet applications in-house? 49 39 6 
40 3 Have a defined application development process? 36 14 19 
 
Nbr b
Q A&T
In-House 
 
A breviated 
uestion 
Rspdts Agile Traditional Combination Both 
50 
pro
6 Internet 
development 
cess 
13 2 3 2  
 
Nbr Abbreviated 
Q s
Testing 
t all
ue tion 
Rspdts 
Design & 
Initial Coding Implementation Not a
60 Security design
your Internet A.D ?
  falls in 
.P.  
13 11 1 1 
 
Nbr Abbreviated estion Rspdts YES NO DKN Qu
70 
ro
4 Defined application development Internet security 
p cess? 
35 17 14 
80 Doe e? 16 12 2 2 s the process contain a risk analysis phas
90 Contain application security requirements phase? 16 14 0 2 
10 urity design phase? 16 13 2 1 0 Contain a sec
110 on n environment 
ha
16 14 1 1 C tain a controlled implementatio
p se? 
120 oe ting phase that is 16 12 4 0 D s this process contain a tes
specific to security? 
130 tt dback from the end-user? 16 9 6 1 A empt to acquire fee
131 d by employees? 16 14 1 1 Internet security process followe
132 di  security process is 
ll
16 15 0 1 In vidual responsible
fo owed? 
 for Internet
133 ob following the Internet 16 4 6 6 J  related impact for not 
security process 
134 ss effective? 15 13 2 0 Is the Internet security proce
140 rg ent? 44 17 19 8 O . contract out any of its Web site developm
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Nbr Abbreviated 
Question 
Rspdts Initial 
 
Coding Impl
Design & 
Testing 
ementation Not at all
150 
su
ut
17 13 1 1 2 Point security becomes an 
is e when considering 
o side applications? 
 
 DKN Nbr Abbreviated Question Rspdts YES NO
160 Plans to develop or implement an Internet site in the 2 1 0
next 12 months? 
 1 
170 Does your organization have an intranet site? 42 32 9 1 
180  in-house? 31 27 2 2 Develop any intranet applications
190 ef for intranet applications 27 13 11 3 D ined A.D.P. 
 
Nbr b
Q
In-
House
A breviated 
uestion 
Rspdts Agile Traditional Combination Both 
A&T 
200 Type  
proce
13 1 6 2 0 4  of intranet
development 
ss 
 
Nbr b ntation Not 
at all 
A breviated Question Rspdts Initial Coding & Impleme
Design Testing 
210 Security design falls in your 13 10 1 0 
in anet A.D.P? tr
2 
 
Nbr DKN Abbreviated Question Rspdts YES NO 
220 App t intranet security process? 27 10 12 5 lication developmen
230 2 2 Does the process contain a risk analysis phase? 10 6 
240 Application security requirements phase?” 10 9 1  
250 Does this process contain a security design phase? 10 9 0 1 
260 se? 10 7 2 1 Controlled implementation environment pha
270  security? 10 5 4 1 Testing phase that is specific to
280 cq 2 A uire feedback from the end-user 10 6 2 
281 Intr rity process followed by employees?” 10 9 0 1 anet secu
282 Individu re
security proc
10 9 0 1 al sponsible for insuring that the intranet 
ess is followed? 
283 Job rela  i
process?
 3 ted mpact for not following the intranet security 
 
10 5 2
284 Is the intranet security process effective? 10 8 1 1 
290 la n intranet site next 12 months? 9 2 7  P ns to develop a
300 41 12 D r organoes you ization have an extranet? 18 11 
310 Develop any of its extranet applications in-house? 12 11 0 1 
320 Have a defined A.D.P. for extranet applications? 11 6 4 1 
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Nbr A b ouse b reviated 
Question 
Rspdts Agile Traditional Combination Both 
A&T 
In-H
330 Ext e
dev p
pro ss 
imp me
ran t 6 0 2 2 0 2 
elo ment 
ce your org 
le nt? 
 
Nbr Ab re at all b viated Question Rspdts Initial Coding & Implementation Not 
Design Testing 
340 Security design falls in your 
extranet A.D.P.?
6 5 1 0 
 
0 
 
Nbr DKN Abbreviated Question Rspdts YES NO
350 
dev
3 Does your organization have a defined application 
elopment extranet security process? 
11 5 3 
360 Doe 5 3 1 1 s the process contain a risk analysis phase? 
370 Does the process 0  contain a risk analysis phase?”  5 5 0 
380 Does this process 5 5 0 0  contain a security design phase? 
390 Controlled implem ent phase? 5 5 0 0 entation environm
400 Testing phase tha curity? 5 4 1 0 t is specific to se
410 Acquire feedback r? 5 5 0 0  from the end-use
411 Is the extranet se
employees? 
5 5 0 0 curity process followed by the 
412 Individual respon
security process is fo
5 5 0 0 sible for insuring that the extranet 
llowed? 
413 Job related impac urity 
process?
5 3 1 1 t for not following the extranet sec
 
414 Is the ex 0 tranet security process effective? 5 5 0 
420 Plans to deve ement an extranet site in the next 
12 mont
18 3 13 2 lop or impl
hs? 
 
Nbr Abbr
ortant 
eviated Rspdts Unimportant Somewhat Important Very 
Question Important Imp
430 Imp
extr
plication
4 8 23 ortance of 37 2 
security in Internet, 
intranet, and /or 
anet 
ap s? 
440 p
secu
oc
Im ortance of 
rity in the 
37 3 7 11 16 
development 
pr ess? 
 
Nbr KN Abbreviated Question Rspdts YES NO D
450 Act r security? 37 27 5 5 ions to educate employees about compute
460 Disaster recovery plan that includes individual 
applications in the security design requirements? 
37 19 9 9 
47 thin the last 12 months? 19 10 4 5 0 Tested disaster recovery plan wi
 
Page 188 of 262 
Appendix III - Pre -WES Implementation 
Indus
1. Wha s 
3. H  years have you worked in IT?  
4. Brie  d
5. Does he
 E
le application development processes used 
/ DNK  
tion 
ation 
6. From the cess life-cycle are you 
engaged:  
 
 c. _ _D
loyment  
try Survey Questions  
t i your current job title/role?  
2. Briefly describe the key areas of your job function/role?  
ow many
fly escribe your career history in IT?  
 t  company have a defined (documented) application development process? 
Y S/NO/DNK  
 a. If YES, briefly describe the company’s development process.  
 b. If YES, in your opinion, what are the good points of the application 
development process?  
 c. If YES, in your opinion, what are the bad points of the application 
development process?  
 d. If YES, Is the application development process used on all projects? 
YES/NO/ DNK  
 1. If NO, What are some of the reasons that it might not be used?  
 2. If NO, Are there multip
in the company? YES/NO
 1. If YES, please list the type of application and the 
corresponding development process and their excep
criteria.  
 e. If the company does not have a defined (documented) applic
development process? Why not?  
se Generic categories, in what areas of the pro
 a. ___Business Analysis  
b. ___Requirements  
_ esign  
 d. ___Implementation  
 e. ___Testing  
 f. ___Evaluation  
 g. ___Dep
 h. ___Maintenance and Evolution  
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7. In your opinion, is the application development process effective? 
YES/NO/SOMETIMES/ DNK  
, when is it effective?  
8. How on
9. In your opinion, do you feel that the time-line for project delivery should be longer, 
sho er
 
S/NO/ DNK  
frame?  
 b. If YES, What are the reasons for exceeding the estimated time frame for 
development?  
 c. If YES, Are any of the reasons listed in 10.b. security related?  
11. Do development projects exceed the estimated budgets? YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. If YES, How often do development projects run over budget?  
 b. If YES, What are the reasons for exceeding the estimated budget for 
development?  
 c. If YES, Are any of the reasons listed in 11.b. security related?  
12. Is there a documented corporate recommendation for an optimal overall 
development timeline? YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. If YES, what is it?  
 b. If YES, Is that recommendation for a specific type of project? YES/NO/ 
DNK  
 1. If YES, What type of project is it?  
 2. Does that project have a specific number of requirements?  
13. Do Projects always follow the in-house development process? YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. Why?  
14. What do you feel a security development process should contain?  
15. In your experience of the company’s development process, in what parts of the life-
cycle does security play a role? (In other words, how does security affect the 
development process?)  
 a. Business Analysis _______________________________________  
 b. Requirements___________________________________________  
 a. If NO, why not?  
 b. If SOMETIMES
 c. If SOMETIMES, when is it not effective?  
 l g does it currently take to get a project from inception to delivery?  
rt  or no different?  
a. Why?  
10. Do development projects exceed the estimated time frames? YE
 a. If YES, How often do development projects exceed the estimated time 
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 c. Design________________________________________________  
_________________________  
_________________________  
3. If NO, to which ones does it apply?  
f YES, in your opinion, what are the good points of the SECURITY 
application development process?  
 d. If YES, in the SECURITY 
application development process?  
your opinion, are there currently any problems with the security 
 Or, is there anything you would like to see changed?  
is there any point, in your opinion, at which the Security 
  
oes the company does NOT have a defined (documented) urity 
ment process, Why Not?  
17. d from a security perspective; i.e., how is an 
application deemed secure?  
 d. Implementation_________________________________________  
 e. Testing_______________________
 f. Evaluation ____________________
 g. Deployment ____________________________________________  
 h. Maintenance and Evolution________________________________  
16. Does the company have a defined (documented) security development process? 
YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. If YES, Briefly describe the company’s development security process.  
 b. IF YES, Does the security development process apply to all types of 
application development? (ex. Web development, mainframe, ATM, stand 
alone applications) YES/NO/ DNK  
1. If YES, What are the types of applications that the security 
process has to support? ___Internet  
___Intranet  
___Extranet  
___Standalone Applications  
___Distributed Applications  
___Other – Please Explain  
2. If NO, to what type of application development process does it not 
apply?  
4. IF NO, why does it not apply to all forms of application development?  
 c. I
 your opinion, what are the bad points of 
 e. If YES, in 
process?
 f. IF YES, 
velopment process breaks down?de
 g. IF d  sec
develop
How are applications measure
 a. Do the same security criteria apply to all applications? YES/NO/ DNK  
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 b. If NO, please describe the difference(s) in the criteria between the different 
Security application development processes?  
18. How is security measured from a development perspective; i.e., how is it tested?  
ers are responsible for ensuring security is represented and in what 
phases?  
 d. Implementation____________________________________________  
_________________________________  
during the application development process? YES/NO/DNK  
 do you think security should play a larger role in the development 
environment, a smaller role, or is the current role accurate? Why?  
 a. Do the same security tests apply to all applications? YES/NO/ DNK  
 b. If NO, what tests apply to which applications?  
19. Which stakehold
 a. Business Analysis__________________________________________  
 b. Requirements_____________________________________________  
 c. Design___________________________________________________  
 e. Testing___________________________________________________  
 f. Evaluation ________________________________________________  
 g. Deployment ______________________________________________  
 h. Maintenance and Evolution__
20. Is there an individual in the security area or in the organization who is responsible 
for insuring that the security process is followed from a development standpoint? 
YES/NO/DNK  
 a. IF YES, what is his/her title?  
21. Do conflicts arise between stakeholders responsible for security and application 
developers 
 a. If so, what are the conflicts?  
22. Do you contract out any of your development work? YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. If YES, are Contractors held to the same application development process 
requirements as employees? YES/NO/ DNK  
 1. If NO, Why not?  
 b. If YES, are contractors held to the same security process requirements as 
employees? YES/NO/ DNK  
 1. If NO, Why not?  
23. What is your opinion on the emphasis security plays within the organization’s 
development process?  
24. Do you think that the elements of the existing security development process are 
always followed? YES/NO/ DNK  
 a. Why?  
25. In your opinion,
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26. Is there a job related impact for an employee not following the development security 
process? YES/NO/ DNK  
27. What areas do you feel require more or less emphasis on security within the 
company process? Why?  
28. From your perspective, what are the major security threats during application 
development?  
 a. Which of these issues are successfully addressed by the current security 
development process?  
 b. Which of these issues are NOT successfully addressed by the current 
security development process?  
29. Were any of the survey questions vague or difficult to follow?  
30. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about the questions?  
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Appendix IV - Pre - WES Implementation 
Industry Survey Answers  
of a documented 
application development process with fourteen ‘Yes’ responses and two ‘Do Not Know’ 
 structure to the environment, to being well 
understood in the organization, to providing accountability, to flexibility at the granular 
level. The bad points of time-to-market, heavy 
documentation, and one-size-fits all (non-flexib pproac
indicated that the process was used on all projects. Out of th g three answers, 
two ind t used on all jects an one did not answer. The reasons for 
not using the process ranged from individual choice, to experimentation, to time 
pressur erall business s gy and hesiveness. e two who indicated 
that th rocess was not used on all projects did say that multiple 
develop cesses are used in the o nization. The two people who indicated that 
they did not know of a process, in the initial query, could not offer an explanation as to 
why the company did not have one.  
Questions 1 – 4: The first four questions were used to establish the interviewee’s current 
role in the organization, their number of years experience and a brief idea of their 
history. These questions revealed that the interviewees who were selected are highly 
qualified IT professionals who have a variety of backgrounds and, in general, several 
years experience. The average number of years among the 16 responders is 13.9.  
Question 5 – 5.e: Question 5 firmly established the existence 
responses. There was some discrepancy on the process specifics but the general idea is 
that the organization uses a customized plan driven version of the waterfall approach. 
The good points ranged from providing
 the process generally focused on business 
le) a h. Eleven out of fourteen 
e remainin
icated that it was no pro d 
es, to a lack of ov
e development p
trate  co Th
ment pro rga
Question 6: Question six indicates the areas in which the interviewees are engaged in the 
product life cycle. The Answers are summarized in Table 38 – Interviewees Life Cycle 
Engagement. 
Table 38 - Interviewees Life Cycle Engagement 
STAGE  YES  NO  OTHER  
Business Analysis  8  6  2  
Requirements  15   1 
Design  16   
Implementation  11  2  3  
Testing  11  3  2  
Evaluation  10  3  3  
Deployment  12  4   
Maintenance and Evolution  8  6  2  
 
Question 7 – 7.d: Only six out of sixteen indicated that the application development 
process is effective. The balance, of the respondents, obviously thinks that there are 
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some problems with the current application development process. Four indicated that it 
was not successful and six indicated that it was successful “Sometimes”.  
Out of the four who indicated that the development process is not effective, these 
individuals indicated that the process was not cost effective; too heavy on the 
Out of the respondents who indicated effectiveness “Sometimes”, they thought that the 
ubjective view of the numbers from the answers the 
mathematical average appears to be 10.9.  
desire for a shorter process range from the loss of potential business 
opportunities, market competitiveness, and the need to take advantage of new 
 ten returned a unanimously positive result, indicating that 
projects exceed estimated time frames within the organization. Ten out of the sixteen 
 the organization. This common counter measure is 
implemented in an attempt to stay on track from a project time frame perspective. One 
documentation, too slow, and applications are chosen based on business need and not 
organizational fit.  
application development methodology was good for project structure and repeating 
projects. They thought it was not effective when considering time-to-market issues and 
rapid application development needs, introduction of new technology, and a lack of 
efficiency.  
Question 8: There was a range of answers to the inquiry about the amount of time it 
takes to get a project from inception to delivery. The reality of the answer is that it 
depends on the project requirements but the average appears to be a year, give or take a 
couple of months. Taking a very s
Question 9 – 9a: Thirteen out of sixteen respondents indicated that they feel that the 
project time-lines should be shorter. Two respondents feel that it really depends on the 
business / project requirements and one feels that it should be longer. The reasons 
behind the 
technologies.  
Clarifying the longer time frame response reveals that the respondent works a lot on 
reactive types of projects where the business unit appears with a product and the 
technical group has to make it work. Hence, the respondent would like more time for the 
implementation of the product. The underlying desire is really for the technical side of 
the organization to be engaged earlier in the project life cycle.  
Question 10 – 10c: Question
indicated that it is a very frequent occurrence for projects to run over allotted time 
frames. Two individuals indicated that it was rare. Three individuals, including the two 
rare respondents, indicated that scope-cut and an increase in man-days and hours per day 
is a common counter measure in
individual indicated that he did not know how often projects exceeded time scales and 
one indicated that he was new to the company but was sure that it happened. One 
individual indicated that highly complex projects exceed time frames due to a lack of 
skills at all levels.  
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The reason for exceeding time scales ranged from changing business requirements, to 
complex technical environments, to a lack of technical expertise, to inadequate 
estimation techniques, and to inexperienced project managers. Only one respondent 
indicated that security did not contribute to elongated timeframes. Fifteen respondents 
indicated that it contributed to the issue in some form or fashion.  
 issues, to changing business requirements.  
Question 12 – 12b.2: The purpose of this question is to determine the existence of any 
 the overall development cycle processes.  
Question 13 – 13a: Eight ways follow the in-house 
development project. One of the “Yes” respondents did indicate that this was a 
presumption e s did not follow the 
development process. On  but he 
suspected th  
“Sometimes”
The reasons behind the “Yes” indicate that the interviewees were responding to the 
Question 11 – 11c: Fifteen out of sixteen respondents indicated that projects exceed the 
estimated budgets. Nine of the respondents indicated that projects run over budget on a 
regular basis. Three responded that they did not know and three responded that it was 
rare for projects to exceed the budget. The reasons ranged from poor managerial 
planning, to resource
Seven of the respondents indicated that security issues have contributed to budget over-
runs and three indicated that it is possible that security contributes to over-runs. Three 
indicated that it does not make such a contribution to overruns. There was effectively 
one “Do Not Know” answer and one answer that placed the emphasis on the project 
manager.  
corporate recommendations in terms of optimal overall time frames for development. 
The effective answer to this question, in the organization, is that one does not explicitly 
exist. That there may be expectations from various business units and time frames exist 
within specific pieces of
 individuals indicated that projects al
. Five of th  respondents indicated that all project
e of the respondents indicated that he did not know,
at they did not. Two of the respondents indicated that it happened 
.  
extent of their knowledge. Even though some of the responders initially indicated that all 
of the projects followed the in-house development life cycle; further discussion reveals 
some underlying doubt. Two of the individuals who answered yes would not elaborate 
any further. One indicated in a post answer that this was to his knowledge and another 
one indicated that things happen out of order, i.e., start building before the design is 
complete.  
The “No” responders indicated that reasons ranged from people attempting to 
circumvent the process, to critical time scales, to poor project planning. One point of 
interest that did surface during this line of questioning is the fact that after the design 
approval by Design Authority Committee (DAC), the development process has the 
potential to break down and be discarded in the name of project completion.  
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The individuals who answered “Sometime” indicate that it is up to the project manager 
to follow the development process and that exceptions have been made in the past in 
order to get around following the methodology.  
Question 14: Question fourteen attempted to ascertain what individuals, in the industry, 
 clear, straightforward answer indicates 
a potential discrepancy in the definition of the term ‘security’ and the interpretation of 
feel a security development process should contain. There were a wide range of answers 
for this question with several answers indicating the security development process 
should contain specific stages of the development life cycle. Additional answers also 
indicated best practices, guidelines, communication, training and accountability. All of 
which are valid responses, however, the lack of a
the phrase “a security development process” within the organization.  
Question 15: The idea behind question fifteen is to determine areas where security is not 
engaged in the development life cycle. The answers are summarized in Table 39 – 
Security in the Development Life Cycle. 
Table 39- Security in the Development Life Cycle 
STAGE YES NO OTHER 
Business Analysis 4 9 3 
Requirements 10 1 5 
Design 13 3  
Implementation 9 4 3 
Testing 9 3 4 
Evaluation 5 6 5 
Deploym 4ent 9  3 
Maintenance and Evolution 6 5 5 
 
The results, in the table, indicate that there are clear deficiencies in the overall 
development process security visibility. Security is severely lacking in the business 
a ysi  C e ue cur e ev on, ena
evolution stages. the n ers are relatively in the testing ep
stages, it could be argued that there is a potential problem or perception of a problem, in 
these stages as well. In fact, the only two stages where security is clearl eived to be 
involved in the developmen s a ui nd sig es.  
Question 16 – 16g: This question ascertains the number of people who think there is a 
documen ecurity develop process. The company doe lly  document 
security process in the P ojec urit es reveal that the knowledge 
of the document ricted to spec s. Three of t re  indicated 
that the ity pm ess was really f el if
There were five “Yes” answers, ten “No” wers and one “D Kno
Of the Yes ers, as una us that the sec eve ent process 
applies to all types of application development. The general response to the application 
nal s stage. learly, th
Since 
re are iss
umb
s with se ity in th
 close 
aluati maint
 and d
nce and 
loyment 
y perc
n stagt proces re the req rements a  the de
ted s ment 
t Sec
s actua  have a
r y team. Their respons
is rest
 develo
ific group
 ans
he five 
the dev
o Not 
sponses
opment l
w”.  
 secur ent proc part o e cycle. 
five “ ” answ it w nimo urity d lopm
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support question is all / everything. However, one individual did indicate that the 
company does not have an Intranet o Extran here one vidual who 
indicated that only the large projects actually go through the process. However, they did 
say that those who do not go through the process have an approved exception.  
The good points of the security development process include high structure which helps 
to provide documentation. The highly structured process creates an environment that is 
conducive to audits and future reference needs.  
The documentation was also listed as a draw-back to the process along with explicitly 
making one group responsible for security verses making everyone responsible for 
security. Security awar ne point that was mentioned that still needs to be 
d lop hin aniz   
The problems that were discussed with the current security process included a lack of 
e has he e; a of  o nt ss f
ent after the design has been signed off, a lack of security awareness and a lack 
addressed.  
The ge the lack roc  o
to be around the fact that the individ n s
e done ople ar s a resourc d are 
evelopment process. However, there is some confusion 
re the Security Team actually gets invo d in the proces his is 
wed as the a ects’ problem ere is also the  that 
s a bolt-on issue that is addresse plete. Hence, the 
ation is only giving security lip pursuing a security 
venteen mpts to deter e how applica s are 
ation. Th  were a variety of answers to this query. 
irements, to licies, to security standards, to processes, 
  
vious parag
andards are se y the Security team and 
 used to help insure security within the organization. The 
on of the DAD d submitting AC. The testing 
n testing and third party testing.  
r an et. T  was  indi
eness was o
 the orgeve ed wit ation.
mp is on t  employe  lack utilization f the curre  proce , a lack o  security 
involvem
of stakeholder buy-in to security.  
The point of break down appears to be around the entire development process. The 
process takes too long. The business has the power to circumvent the process to keep 
projects on track from a time-line and budget perspective; while a shortage of personnel 
and problems around post implementation and change management need to be 
neral thought behind of a security p
ua d i
ess within the
ecu ot record the process; 
rganization seem 
ls involve
. These pe
rity do n
e viewed athey just go do what needs to b
accessed as needed during the d
e an
over when and whe lve s. T
taken to the point that it is vie
security i
rchit . Th  view
d after the coding is com
 service and not truly organiz
architecture infrastructure.  
Question 17 – 17b: Question se
deemed secure within the organiz
The answers ranged fro
atte min tion
ere
m requ
to testing, to audits and reviews.
 po
The requirements, in the pre
irements. The policies and st
raph, refer to the business and technical 
application requ t b
industry standards that are
iprocess refers to the creat
refers to internal penetratio
 an it to the D
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Within individual areas there definitely would be similarities and, across the board, there 
might be similarities in certain policies, but as to the criteria applying to all applications, 
the general consensus was that it depends on the environment; the amount of risk 
presented and the application-facing that determines the security criteria that would be 
applied.  
eds of the application based on the functional and non-functional 
requirements. The general rule is that high risk applications require more testing and 
 tests used on specific applications depend on the needs of the 
application. Outwardly facing applications are more rigorously tested than inwardly 
Question 18: Question 18 attempts to determine how an application is deemed secure 
from a development perspective. The result is that testing is subjective and tailored 
around the ne
third party testing.  
Twelve respondents indicated that the same tests do not apply to all applications. There 
were also two “Yes” answers, one “Yes” / “No” and one “Do Not Know”. One of the 
“Yes” answers indicates two different possible paths negating that answer. Again the 
answers indicate that the
facing applications.  
Question 19: The idea behind question nineteen is to determine the stakeholders who are 
responsible for security at the various stages of the development life cycle. The results 
are displayed in Table 40 - Stakeholder Consistent Answers and Table 41 - Stakeholder 
Inconsistent Answers.  
Table 40 - Stakeholder Consistent Answers 
Survey  Answer  
Number 2  Project Manager and Head of Security  
Number 6  Security Team – Project Manager – Release Manager 
Number 7  Project Manager  
Number 11  Everyone  
Number 14  Security Team  
The results displayed in Tables 40 – Stakeholder Consistent Answers and 39 – 
Stakeholder Inconsistent Answers indicate that there is a lot of confusion about who is 
responsible for what and at what stages of the life cycle. An analysis of the information 
in Table 41 - Stakeholder Inconsistent Answers reveals that the Security Team is 
perceived to have the most responsibility through the various stages of the development 
life cycle. This is due to the recurrence of various responses to question number 
nineteen. This information is available in Table 42 - Response Occurrence. The ‘Blank’ 
response reveals that the respondent did not know the answer, indicating that there is an 
educational issue within the organization. An interesting observation is that the 
developer is number six down the list if the data from Table 40 - Stakeholder 
Inconsistent Answers is analysed alone and it is 8th if the data from Table 41 - 
Stakeholder Inconsistent Answers is taken in conjunction with Tables 40 – Stakeholder 
Consistent Answers. This information is useful in providing some insight to the 
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importance of security within the culture and who is perceived to be responsible for 
security within the organization. The point is that the individuals responsible for 
developing the code are not the primary parties being held responsible for creating 
secure code!  
lt to 
know where security is involved in the process.  
he respondents 
indicated that there was an individual responsible for security within the organization. 
wenty-one attempts to determine if conflicts arise between 
the stakeholders and the individuals responsible for security. Fourteen of the respondents 
nswers 
Survey Business Maintenance 
This confusion over which stake holders are responsible for security supports the results 
obtained from question fifteen where there were clearly areas in the development life 
cycle where security is not involved in the process. If you do not know which 
stakeholders are responsible for security, it stands to reason that it would be difficu
Question 20 – 20.a: Question twenty is designed to try to pin point a specific individual 
title that is responsible for security within the organization. Eleven of t
There were two “Do not Know”, two “No” answers, and one blank. Out of the eleven 
positive responses some form of the Security Team was identified by name six times.  
Question 21 – 21a: Question t
indicated that conflicts arise between the two groups. There was one “Do Not Know” 
answer and one “No” answer. It should be noted that the one “No” answer indicated that 
the conflicts arise between the individuals responsible for security and the business unit; 
not between those responsible for security and the developers.  
Table 41 - Stakeholder Inconsistent A
Nbr  Analysis  Requirements  Design  Implementation  Testing  Evaluation  Deployment  & Evolution  
1  Blank  Blank  Architecture Team  
Architecture 
Team  
Architecture 
Team  Blank  
Architecture 
Team  Blank  
3  Project Originator  
Author 
Business 
Requirements 
& Project 
Manager  
Security 
Team – 
Architecture 
Team – 
Project 
Manager  
Infrastructure 
Team  
Testing 
Manager – 
Project 
Manager  
Project 
Manager  
Infrastructure 
Team – 
Project 
Manager  
Security 
Team – 
Architecture 
Team – 
Business Unit  
4  None  (No One)  
Project 
Manager  
Architecture 
Team - 
Security 
Team  
Infrastructure 
Team – Security 
Team  
Infrastructure 
and Security 
Team  
Project 
Manager – 
Infrastructu
re Team  
Security 
Team – 
Project 
Manager – 
Release 
Everyone  
Manager  
5  None  (No One)  Security Team  
Security 
Team  Security Team  Security Team  
Security 
Team  
Security 
Team  
Security 
Team  
8  Business Analysts  
Business 
Analysts - 
Designer  
Architect  
Programmers - 
Infrastructure 
Team  
Testers  
Programme
rs - 
Infrastructu
re Team  
Programmer 
– 
Infrastructure 
Team  
Infrastructure 
Team  
9  
Business 
Project 
Manager  
Release 
Manager  
Architecture 
Team  
Architecture 
Team  Test Manager  
Architectur
e Team  
Security 
Team  
Security 
Team  
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10  BusineUn
Security 
ss 
it  Blank  
Team – 
Architecture 
Team  
Blank  Blank  Blank  Blank  Blank  
12  Blank  Development Team  
Security 
Team – 
Architecture 
Team – 
Infrastructur
e  
Security Team  Testing Services  Blank  
Security 
Team - 
Infrastructure 
Team  
Security 
Team - 
infrastructure 
Team  
13  Sponsor  Sponsor  
Architecture 
Team – 
Specific 
coding teams  
Specific Coding 
Teams  Tester  Sponsor  
Infrastructure 
Team  
Testers – 
Infrastructure 
Team – 
Specific 
Coding 
Teams  
15  No One  
Security Team 
& Identity 
Management 
Team  
Security 
Team  Security Team  
Project Team -  
Security Team  
Architectur
e Team  
Security 
Team  
Security 
Team  
16  No One  
Security Team 
and Business 
Unit  
Specific 
Coding 
Teams  
Security Team  Testing Team  No One  Infrastructure Team  
Infrastructure 
Team  
 
The types of conflicts range from financial and time constraints, to conflicts over 
security solutions. The disagreement over the security solution appears to have its roots 
in the perception of the level of risk that is perceive with an application. Hence, a higher 
level of risk would necessitate a stronger security solution. This disagreement in risk 
could logically take place between both the business unit and the application developers.  
Table 42 - Response Occurrence 
Response Grouping  Number of 
Occurrences  
Table 41  
Number of 
Occurrences  
Table 40  
Total Number of 
Occurrences  
Security Team / Head of Security  28  24  52  
Infrastructure Team  16  0  16  
Architecture Team / Architect / 
Designer  
16  0  16  
Blank  12  0  12  
Project Manager (IT) / Project Team  9  24  33  
Release Manager  2  8  10  
Every One  1  8  9  
Development Team / Programmer 
/ Specific Coding Team  
8  0  8  
Business Unit / Analysts / Author 
Requirements / Project Manager  
7  0  7  
Tester(s) / Test Manager / Testing 
Services / Testing Team  
7  0  7  
None / No One  5  0  5  
Project Originator / Sponsor  4  0  4  
Identity Management Team  1  0  1  
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Question 22 – 22.b: The questions in section twenty-two are designed t
extent contractors are used in the organization and to determine if they 
o determine the 
present a major 
sk n. The initial result is that the company uses contractors very 
eav
he  are held to the same 
ppl  use a different process, 
en individuals within the 
rga
he ontractors are also held to the same 
ecu ines in 
onv
ey could be 
isc  to be up 
 th
ue three seeks the interviewee’s opinion on the emphasis 
ecu The answers to this question were widely varied. 
om  to outside factors 
uch
el d over the past several months while others feel that 
e s d. Some individuals feel that security plays a large role in 
e t the emphasis is small and that security is 
ffe abler in the development process.  
ue ills down to the heart of the matter to 
ete n-house security process are always followed. 
he  respondents indicted that it was not always 
llo icted that it was always 
llo
he cess range from time pressures, to 
ure lvement in certain aspects of 
e p  the lack of a process all together 
nd  face the Internet or is it internal.  
ue eals that the majority of the individuals who 
ere ty should play a larger role in the 
rga  the individuals’ surveyed feel that the 
ent is accurate and one feels that 
there are cases where it should play a smaller role. The individuals who feel that the role 
should be larger base their opinion on several different reasons. The reasons that seem to 
re-occur through out the answers to this question are around the business. They indicate 
that the organization is relatively small in the financial world and protection of the 
ri
h
to the organizatio
ily. There was only one group that did not use contractors.  
T  majority of the respondents indicated that contractors
 as employees. If they doa ication development methodology
th  the process is examined and approved by the proper 
o nization.  
T  majority of the respondents indicated that c
s rity requirements as employees. However, reading between the l
he testing for them on the applications that c ersation, the organization does not do t
th  are building. Hence, there is the underlying possibility that there 
monitored appearsd repancies in application testing. How effectively this is 
to e project manager.  
Q stion 23: Question twenty-
s rity plays within the organization. 
S e individuals think that the emphasis on security is strong, due
el that the emphasis is weak. A couple of individuals s  as legislation, while others fe
rovefe that the emphasis has imp
ecurity focus is mis-aligneth
th
e
organization while others feel tha
ctively seen as an inhibitor rather than an en
Q stion 24 – 24.a: Question twenty-four dr
d rmine if the elements of the existing i
nT  result is that seven out of the sixtee
fo wed. There was one “Sometimes” answer and the rest ind
fo wed.  
T  reasons for not following the development pro
ck of security invob aucracy, to lack of awareness, to a la
th rocess. Other reasons that were mentioned include
es the applicationa where the application sits, i.e., do
Q stion 25 – 25a: Question twenty-five rev
w  surveyed (11 out of 16) feel that securi
o
curren
nization’s development environment. Four of
t role security plays in the development environm
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reputation is critical. In the current environment, security can be de-scoped due to 
 cut 
elieves that there is a good 
n between security and the development environment. One of 
them indicated that it would be good to see it extended throughout the development life 
 one indicated that there is a need to engage the Security Team 
as early a
The one ent 
process w t. He /she believed 
that the role wa
Question 26: Eight of the individuals surveyed feel that there is not a job related impact 
for not fo t 
they do not know if there is an im
ere is a ted impact.  
Question pted 
to determ in the 
company rring themes as briefly outlined as 
follows: four in ents, four interviewees talked 
about educatio out testing. These themes indicate that 
there are proble tion.  
Question  
asked abo  
include –  
ehaviou ntioned policy circumvention and enforcement – 2 mentioned viruses. 
here were a variety of answers to the question inquiring which of these issues are being 
et by the existing process, which ranged from “None” to “All”. A theme that did 
urface in a few of the answers is that separation of duty, code reviews and testing is 
ufficient within the organization. There were several “None” responses to the question 
asking which issues were not being satisfied by the existing process. Other answers 
ranged from a lack of documentation to internal and external coding issues, to a lack 
security in the solution design.  
Question 29: The purpose behind question twenty-nine was to analyse the survey 
instrument. Eight individuals indicated that there were no questions that were vague or 
difficult to follow. Three individuals indicated that there was some confusion over the 
term application development versus the term that the organization uses which is 
product life cycle. One individual thought that question twenty-three was difficult to 
follow and prevented him from delivering a clean concise response. Two individuals 
numerous reasons; integrating security into the development process up front would
development overhead and increase security awareness within the organization.  
One of the individuals who thinks the role is accurate b
balance in the organizatio
cycle. However, another
s possible. The last one believes that the current role meets project needs.  
individual who indicated a possible smaller security role in the developm
as specifically targeting internal application developmen
s accurate on outwardly facing business critical systems.  
llowing the development security process. Two of the responders indicated tha
pact and the balance of the responders (6) feel that 
job relath
 27: There were a variety of answers to question twenty-seven which attem
ine the areas that require a greater or reduced emphasis on security with
 process. However, there were some re-occu
terviewees talked about business requirem
n, and five interviewees talked ab
ms with these areas in the organiza
28 – swers to question twenty-eight, which
ut the major security threats during application development. Common themes
 7 mentioned code/design/testing /requirements – 3 mentioned People and
r – 2 me
28b: There were a variety of an
b
T
m
s
s
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thought that there were a lot of questions about a security development process that does 
not exist.  
ws 
y. 
rs 
 ranged from 
y, to the 
dy 
re 
pefully, in the near 
Question 30: The purpose of the last question is to provide a forum that allo
interviewees to add any additional comments that they feel are relevant to the surve
Five of the interviewees did not have any additional information to offer. The answe
rom the balance of the responders were extremely varied. Their answersf
discussing interviewee backgrounds, to general discussions abut the surve
definition of security, to the skill sets and training of employees. The results of the stu
indicate that there are areas within the organization’s development process that a
xperiencing deficiencies in security and need to be addressed, hoe
future.  
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Appendix V - Legislative Guidance 
 US Legislation
 Electronic Communications Privacy Act  
 Federal Information Security Act (FISA) of 2002 
 Executive order - National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace  
 Homeland Security Act of 2002  
 Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7)  
 Cyber Security Research and Development Act  
 Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act  
 The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
 The Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was passed into law in July of 2002 [216] 
 The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003   
 The Family Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 
 Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 2004. 
 ures Act Electronic Signat
  of 1984 The Computer Fraud Act
 h nformation Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996  T e National I
 t of 2001 The USA Patriot Ac
 The US Safe Harbor Act 
 
 United Kingdom Legislation
 t Act 1968 - applicable to fraud The Thef
 The Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 
 The Criminal Damage Act 1977  
 The Protection of Children Act 1978 
 The Telecommunications Act 1984  
 The Public Order Act 1986 - applicable to racist materials 
 The Criminal Justice Act 1988  
 The Malicious Communications Act 1988 
 The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988  
 The Computer Misuse Act of 1990 
 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994  
 The Data Protection Act of 1998 
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act(RIP) 2000  
 Electronic Communications Act 2000  
 unications Regulations 2000  The Telecomm
 The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 
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Appendix VI - IM / Threat Management / 
Trust Model Examples 
Example Number 1 
Identity Management 
The organization’s Identity Management solution will not be used for these 
 by the projects involved with the initial 
ebsite 
ication 4, Application 5 
 rolling out these existing services to a new set of 
 
at Management is not being specifically undertaken for this solution. 
reat management, i.e.: 
 for Application 1 
Organization 4 for Application 4, 
ntrusion Detection System is being used for 
eb 
 
applications.  
Exemptions from IM were sought
deployment of these applications i.e.: 
AAA Investment Platform project for AAA W
Phase 2 - Release 1 for Application 1, Application 2, Application 3, 
Appl
BBB Release 
DAD is just concerned with
users 
Threat Management / Compliance 
Thre
The outsourced providers of the external services have been engaged to 
perform their own th
Organization 1 for AAA Website 
Organization 2
Organization 3 for Application 2,  
Organization 5 for Application 5 
Organization’s existing Network I
internal system threat identification for Application 5, Application 3 and W
access. 
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Example Number 2 
Identity Management 
The solution will use a modified v
Internet banking. WebSEAL, as a 
ersion of the IM mechanisms already in use within 
reverse proxy, will authenticate the client using a 
structure, passing the authentication 
ill be externally hosted. 
The i it requires in order 
to function. The primary defences for the project are the same as for Internet banking 
sinc h
 
See e
 
 
 IM / Threat Management / Trust Model Examples - Continued 
 
Tru  M
Trust will be established between each component in the system in the following way: 
WebSEAL 
herefore, the channel is 
ation credentials through the 
 which allows us to trust the overall session. 
 
low for network IDS. 
 
 
 
 
 
*N : he name of the 
company and the names of the applications involved are kept anonymous 
remote call to the pilot project authentication infra
credentials. It is expected that this infrastructure w
 
The user identifier and the authentication result will then be propagated to the 
WebSphere environment, where the WebSphere TAM plug-in will be used to provide 
Role Based Access and Control (RBAC) for protected components. 
 
Th trea  Management / Compliance 
 for the project is the exposure to the Internet that  pr mary threat
e t e threat is the same and the infrastructure used for each project will be the same. 
 th  XXXX banking DAD for more details. 
Figure 17 -
st odel 
 
Browser to 
SSL, 128 bit encryption. 
This portion of the communication is most vulnerable; t
encrypted. The users provide their authentic
encrypted channel
WebSEAL to IHS 
MA-SSL, MD5 Signed. 
Internal communication. MD5 signed to allow for mutual authentication, null 
encryption used to allow for network IDS. 
 
IHS to WAS Plug-In 
MA-SSL, MD5 Signed. 
Internal communication. MD5 signed to allow for mutual authentication, null 
encryption used to al
ote  the following information has been modified to ensure that t
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A p
In u
Thank ire. The purpose of this exercise is to 
ass  
there is no right or wrong answers, it is your ought. Therefore, this 
ue o . Understand that the 
nfidence and that I will not record or disclose any 
I woul
com n
le?  
3. Ho
 Unimportant 
• 
. How much impact does security have on your job? 
 in the solution design process? YES / NO 
6. 
pro
. Do you have experience in creating a DAD? YES / NO 
u use and 
ing place in the solutions 
rsion 1.4? YES / 
, Threat Compliance, Trust Model, Conditions, Socialization 
p endix VII - Post WES Implementation 
d stry Survey Question  
you, for participating in this brief questionna
ess the company’s development process. You are not being examined. As a result 
opinion that is being s
sti nnaire will be conducted with your anonymity ensuredq
interviews are conducted in co
personal information.  
d request that participants do not discuss the survey with anyone else in the 
pa y as this may invalidate the survey results. 
1. What is your current job title/ro
2. Briefly describe the key areas of your job function/role/responsibilities? 
w important do you think security is to the organization? 
•
• Somewhat important 
• Important 
Very Important 
4
5. Are you involved
If “YES” to question #5 - How long have you been involved in the overall design 
cess? 
7
8. If “YES” to questions #7 - What version of the Design Template did yo
where did you get that version? 
9. In your experience, have you noticed any major differences in the way that security 
has been addressed over the past few years in the design process? YES / NO 
10. If “YES” to question #9, - What differences? 
11. Were you aware of the security initiative that has been tak
design group? 
12. What do you think of the organization’s design process and its applicability to 
security? 
13. Have you read the security white paper (Solutions Design’s 2005 Security Initiative) 
that I submitted to the Solutions Design group? YES / NO 
14. Are you familiar with the sections of the DAD that were added in ve
NO (Security   - IM
Modification) 
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If Y on 14’s answer was 
“NO  
15. Did
Ma
16. Did  completion of the new Identity 
17. Did st with the 
18.
Co
19. Did ion of the new Threat 
hin the DAD? 
20. id the addition of the Threat Compliance section hinder or assist with the overall 
? 
21.
Mo
22. Did you experience /perceive any benefits with the completion of the new Trust 
Model section within the DAD? 
he Trust Model section hinder or assist with the overall design 
24. Did
sec
5. Did you experience / perceive any bene Condition 
? 
p o
27. Did
oc
/ perceive any benefits with the completion of the modified 
29. id
des
ES to question 14, questions 15-29 refer to that answer; if questi
”, please go directly to question # 30 
 you experience /perceive any problems with the completion of the new Identity 
nagement (IM) section within the DAD? 
 you experience /perceive any benefits with the
Management (IM) section within the DAD? 
 the addition of the Identity Management (IM) section hinder or assi
overall design process? 
 Did you experience /perceive any problems with the completion of the new Threat 
mpliance section within the DAD? 
 you experience /perceive any benefits with the complet
Compliance section wit
 D
design process
 Did you experience /perceive any problems with the completion of the new Trust 
del section within the DAD? 
23. Did the addition of t
process? 
 you experience / perceive any problems with the completion of the Condition 
tion within the DAD? 
fits with the completion of the 2
section within the DAD
26. Did the addition of the Condition section hinder or assist with the overall design 
r cess? 
 you experience / perceive any problems with the completion of the modified 
ialization section within the DAD? S
28. Did you experience 
Socialization section within the DAD? 
D  the modification of the Socialization section hinder or assist with the overall 
ign process?  
30. What do you perceive as the overall weaknesses in terms of security in the current 
version of the DAD template? 
31. What do you perceive as the overall strengths in terms of security in the current 
 design process? 
version of the DAD template? 
32. What other factors contributed to the successful or unsuccessful attempt to integrate 
security in the
33. Were any of the survey questions vague or difficult to follow?  
34. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about the questions? 
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Appendix VIII - Post WES Implementation 
Survey Answers 
Question 1 - What is your current job title/role? 
Nine of the respondents indicated that they worked in the architect area of the 
organization. One indicated that he was a business designer who worked as an architect 
when needed. Another respondent is a Lead technology consultant and portfolio lead. 
One respondent was an infrastructure architect and two were security analysts. 
Architecture Responses: 
• Technical Consultant within the architect team 
Architect  
Architect  
• 
• 
em into designs – 
• 
• 
 
Oth  
• Technical consultant - I take business requirements and turn th
conforming to architecture and security standards. 
Technology Consultant in Architect group 
• Infrastructure Architect – Design hardware component end-to-end for a given 
solution 
• Architect  
• Architect 
Architect  
er Responses: 
Business Designer but working as a soluti• ons designer when needed 
 
• Security Analyst 
Qu i s? 
Eig o
system
the s
Sol o
• Lead Technology Consultant and Portfolio Design Lead
• Security analyst within the security project team 
 
est on 2 - Briefly describe the key areas of your job function/role/responsibilitie
ht f the respondents are directly involved with the architecture design of new 
s. Two of the respondents work in security, one works with data, one works with 
 bu iness and one respondent provided a very general answer to the question.  
uti ns Architect / DAD Creation Responses: 
High level Design - • which leads to the DAD creation and later design 
implemented 
ecurity 
t 
governance (in terms of the detail design that is produced by the individual 
engineering rooms) 
• Creating DAD, input into technology and solutions that are being 
into the organization, working with 3rd parties and ensuring that they adhere to 
our standards.  Coordinate the design with different departments such as s
and architecture standards. 
• Analyze and evaluate solutions, i.e., solutions architec
• Producing DADs providing governance for engineering rooms 
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• Proposing solutions architecture for projects run by the organization - 
syndicating and seeking approval for the proposed solutions. 
• Shaping Architecture in the early stages of a project, providing a high level 
costing of the project, governances of designs (in my auspice) and line 
es. 
• 
 
Sec i
management, and resource responsibiliti
• Lead project role – responsible for design and delivering technical solution for Large 
scale projects 
Producing High level Designs for high level development 
ur ty Personnel Response: 
• Responsible for making sure solutions meet internal policy, standards, external 
regulation and, in general, good security practices.  Also, responsible to raise 
security risk where appropriate if first bit is not met. 
• Analyse solutions to find gaps in analysis - contents – and reduce risk 
ss Perspective Response:
 
Busine  
• Take Business requirements and come up with business solutions within the 
business application suite. 
anagement Response
 
ata M :D  
e regulatory and compliance space – dealing a lot with data 
 
Genera
• Working in th
management and data mapping 
l Response: 
• Ensuring that existing or newly deployed systems are capable of providing 
performance, resiliency and security to meet the needs of the solution. 
on 3 - How important do you think security is to the organization?  
 
Questi
Ele
organiz
persona
organiz
Questi
Eig o
amount. One respondent indicated that it was 
ans r
focus d
Not a L
ven out of the thirteen respondents indicated that security is ‘Very Important’ to the 
ation. One said that it was ‘Somewhat Important’ to the organization but 
lly thought it was Very Important.  One indicated that it was ‘Important’ to the 
ation but that it should be ‘Very Important’. 
on 4 - How much impact does security have on your job?  
ht ut of the ten respondents indicated that security affected their jobs a significant 
not a lot, one said some, one respondent 
we ed by using project experience and one indicated that security has become more 
e . One respondent discussed the role of security in design work. 
ot Response: 
On a day-to-day basis, not a lot – security is a focuse• d activity that takes place 
during design. 
‘A t
 
Lo  / Significant /Pretty High/Huge’ Responses: 
A lot - everything has to be compliant – using secure methods – it is something 
that is always there and you have to be aware of. 
• 
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• 
•  key factor in any design 
rity team 
al impact 
Some Response:
A lot - everything you do has to consider the security impact 
A lot – realistically it is a
• Significant in design role – I spent a lot of time with security working on security 
issues.  A lot of my work involves working with development work conducted in 
external organizations which requires a lot of coordination with the secu
and external organizations on security issues. 
• Pretty High - every solution considered needs to include security requirements – 
if not meeting all of the requirements - detail how risks are mitigated 
• Huge impact, it is what I do. 
• Large Part - Can not design system that is not secure - same as robustness in 
design – equally problematic - All NFRS are there for a reason, ignore at your 
peril – security/ scalability/robustness – pain in the ass 
• 100% Tot
 
 
 think are the) general security 
ipals. 
 
By Project Response:
• Some. The respondent tries to ensure that the shaping he/she is doing from a 
(Design Perspective) is within (what they
princ
 
project very little impact - Second project - Third party company 
inistrating customer data – security in this case 
ively important.  Hence, it is really project dependant. 
Mor  F
• First 
interactions where they are adm
was mass
 
e ocused Response: 
• More focus now than before and, in some respects, it is easier; the requirements 
f what security is looking for  - it is put into 
ore policing) 
is s Response:
are more clearly defined  (in terms o
ing more than in the past and there is mwrit
 
cu sion D  
ty should not have any impact - it should just be there. Secure 
‘Yes’. 
e of responses to this question that included as little as three and a 
half mo
ten int oughly, seven 
yea  
Questi
 
• Good securi
enough to do the job – not intrusive. No real impact - day to day perspective. 
Important part of the design work 
Question 5 - Are you involved in the architecture design process?  
The result is a unanimous 
Question 6 - If “YES” to question #5 - How long have you been involved in the overall 
design process?  
There was a wide rang
nths to as much as sixteen years. A very lose average of the number of years the 
erviewees have in the architecture design field calculated to be r
rs.
on 7 - Do you have experience in creating a DAD?   
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Ele
‘No’. T
security
Qu i
Docum  did you get that version?  
Nine re
Docum
tem
from
not fill
ew Template Responses:
ven responders indicated ‘Yes’, one said ‘High Level Design - Yes’ and one said 
he ‘No’ respondent did indicate that they provided plenty of input into the 
 sections of the DAD. 
est on 8 - If “YES” to question #7 - What version of the Design Architecture 
ent (DAD) Template did you use and where
 spondents indicated that they have used a new version of the Design Architecture 
ent (DAD). One respondent indicated that he/she had used an older version of the 
plate; one indicated that they did not know the version number and that he got it 
 the architects with the skeleton filled in. Two respondents indicated that they do 
 out DAD’s and both of them knew where to get the latest version. 
N  
tes that I worked with are 1.4 for the final DAD and 1.3 for the 
• 
• 
 the organization’s general site (OGS) 
nization’s general site (OGS) - started 
• 1.5
• Go ad done the preliminary DAD 
e. Other-wise, got it form a team 
• Hav
of the organization’s general site (O
• Las
• Org
 
Oth  T
• The last templa
preliminary DAD. The templates were gathered from the DAC team room or the 
architecture team room - do not remember which. 
Version 1.5 got it off of the organization’s general site (OGS). 
Used several different versions and I am currently up to 1.5 – I have used up to 3 
or 4 versions - Got the latest from
• DAC Team room until it went to the orga
working with version 1 ish – last version used 1.4 
 for the last DAD – got it from the architects’ team room 
t the latest version from an architect – they h
and the interviewee picked it up from ther
member. 
e used the last four or five versions – the latest version was 1.5 and got it out 
GS). 
t version used was 1.5 – from the DAC team room 
anization’s General Site (OGS) - Latest version 1.5 
plate Responses:er em  
• Last DAD that I wrote was version 1.3 - I do not remember where I got it. 
Do not know version – but do get it from the architects – get it with skeleton • 
Questi
security
Elev n
cha e
Questi
ut of the eleven who responded ‘Yes’ to question number nine,  there were five 
spondents that indicated that security has increased in some form or fashion. It should 
filled in. 
• N/A – I do not create DADs, but would get it from the organization’s general site 
(OGS). 
• N/A – but knows where to get the information - organization’s general site 
(OGS) and version 1.5 
on 9 - In your experience, have you noticed any major differences in the way that 
 has been addressed over the past few years in the design process?  
 respondents said ‘Yes’ to queste ion nine. However, one of the ‘Yes’ responses did 
ng  the years to months in his/her response.  Two respondents said ‘No’.  
on 10 - If “YES” to question #9, - What differences?  
O
re
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be noted that one of the ‘No’ respondents also gave an answer for this question during a 
discussion after question nine. There were five general discussion responses to the 
o responses question; one of which is a ‘No’ response who went on to elaborate. Tw
implied that security is having a greater impact now than in the beginning. 
Higher/Tighter/Increased Focus Responses: 
• Much higher profile - there are more team members that are involved in security 
urity team. 
rs – the organization is a risk averse organization 
uses on this type of activity. 
 
Ge a
in the various projects that are taking place in the bank in our team (there is a 
person that is security specific) and more resources are available from the 
sec
• Security has been tightened up - the interviewee is experiencing more kick-back 
to look at items. 
• Mainly focus – there is a lot more. An example is the increased focus on the type 
of data and the level of security around the data. 
• More significant - more involvement from security and more information being 
required from external vendo
which foc
• Guidance in DADs more specific - there are additional sections that need to be 
filled out - in general has improved, i.e., more regular – more consistency - from 
a security perspective. 
ner l Responses: 
• In that the way security has been addressed in general - but there have been 
changes to the design template in the solutions design group. (One of the NO 
responses that went on to elaborate) 
Responsibility for design of security moving from security•  to the architect - more 
are of 
al security reviews taking place  - now regularly  - also  - now do not get as 
• 
signs – non-functional security requirements now exist - 
 consistency of 
security analyses of a project. 
security through the NFR addition to the DAD - a lot more 
• 
ot have in-department 
 
Im
use of formal security reviews taking place.  14 to 18 months ago, not aw
form
much opposition to budgeting man days for security as in the past. 
Now security is represented on the DAC with the ability to reject 
/accept/condition de
there is a dedicated team to make sure projects meet security requirements and a 
review process to make sure an external organization meets security 
requirements. Security Project team now has a frame work for
• A little more 
organized now. 
One employee left the organization – another employee transferred to the 
infrastructure design group – the architecture group does n
coverage as far as personnel are concerned. Culture is changing and influence is 
there; issues are currently being addressed as a result. 
plied Impact Response: 
Impact of legal issues SOX• , etc., the emergence of autonomous hackers, i.e., 
being compromised by automated code. In the 
beginning security started with fire-walls, then went to policies, then back doors, 
and then into RAS, etc. Best practices from governments along with some 
virus and worms – systems 
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commercial drivers.  ITDL – UK Web site – governs things - expanded to cover 
• ion of fire walls / virus checkers for Web based systems (Started in 
the late 80’s early 90’s) last few years Java based systems / Web browsers. 
s been around for a few years – as well as hackers. 
u i  the 
rchitecture group?  
ed that he/she was aware more 
standards and methods. 
The introduct
Regulatory influence
Q
a
est on 11 - Were you aware of the security initiative that has been taking place in
There were four ‘No’ responses and one ‘Not really’ response to this question.  There 
were seven ‘Yes’ answers and one respondent indicat
people were focused on it in the group but not aware of a specific project.  He/she also 
indicated that there is still a gap to having it done properly in the group. 
Yes Responses: 
• Yes 
• Yes 
YES – I have been involved in•  the surveys and aware of changes to the design 
template but, otherwise, would have said no. 
• 
• 
 
No s
• Yes 
• YES – aware of DAC process improvement attempts 
Yes 
Yes 
 Re ponses: 
NO - not specifically – there has been a continual beefing•  up of the group in 
e. 
• 
• 
terms of security and it has been gradual over tim
• No 
• Not Really – Started before Arrived 
No 
No 
 
Other Responses: 
• Aware more people were focused on it in the group but not aware of a specific 
project – there is still a gap to having it done properly in the group. 
Qu i
applica
Six
negativ
Positiv
est on 12 - What do you think of the organization’s design process and its 
bility to security?  
 respondents gave fairly positive responses and seven respondents gave fairly 
e responses. 
e Responses: 
• OKAY – with the extra resources being assigned to the projects there is more 
involvement from a high level and a low level design perspective. 
• The process is constantly enveloping - learning and modifying appropriately - 
security is involved in the process – overall the process is reasonably applicable 
to security. 
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• 
 you talked to, you got a bit of opinion - 
• l 
• 
ates are not in the right place.   
• It is certainly applied well enough during the design - sceptical that security 
n – actually implemented into production. Does anyone 
p to be sure we are compliant? 
Gotten better - Non-functional requirements are in a central place – in the past it 
has been ad hock, depending on who
they have formalized the process a bit. 
Overall the design process is very though - security elements being weak up unti
now - it is now very applicable to security. 
Design process is good if not circumvented – gated process which is what you 
want – but people are allowed to go through without satisfactorily satisfying 
gates or g
input, i.e., encryptio
actually follow u
 
Negative Responses: 
• Organization does not focus enough on it and uses it as an escape goat.  Usually 
security is cramped into a specific project that is due by a specific date - projects 
siness. 
d & Convoluted Response:
are not clearly defined before it gets into a project mode – Security is not done 
early enough in the process. Generally, security is put around a product that 
meets the needs of the bu
• Long winde  
s to be 
. 
o Long winded & Convoluted – DAD open to interpretation  - it need
more specific – out of the sections, the security section does  a better job of 
detailing what is expected via the guidelines
• Two Part Responses: 
o Considers the question a 2 part question: 
 The organizations dPart 1 – esign process could do with some improvement – 
er words, 
e. The two 
n to solve a 
en examining the security aspects. 
ity but we miss the start because we do 
 business drive for security – 
ot knowing where to get the latest information. 
process is not very good - Major overhaul needed. Whole end-to-end 
pport governance and to be traceable from end-to-end. Needs a 
• 
ny times makes the delivery slow to market – too many tactical 
generally it is very good. 
thPart 2 – Security seems to be an add-on not the main focus. In o
lyou look at a solution FIRST and then see if security is applicab
ways of approaching the problem include; the most secure solutio
problem vs. looking at the solution th
 process could apply to secur• At large the
not capture security requirements from the start. No
could be fixed if security requirements are gathered from the start. 
• Do not think the process is the problem / people are the problem (hindrance) – 
ex: people n
• The design 
needs to su
phased approach - there is a lack of stage gates. The lack of stage gates and lack 
of traceability is an issue for security as well. Seems to be a bit of disjoint 
between security section and the security non-functional requirements and what 
is used to decide on approval. 
Process slow – hoops that are required are time consuming and high cost –belts 
and braces too ma
solutions - compromises across the board. 
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Question 13 - Have you read the security white paper (Architecture’s 2005 Security 
Initiative) that I submitted to the Solutions Design group?  
n ‘No’ responses and two ‘Yes’ responses to this question. 
Qu i
1.4?
Ther  w
that he discussions with 
sec ty
Questi ceive any problems with the completion of the 
new
The w his question, four respondents indicated that they 
had problems; one said that it was not releva
xp e
There were eleve
est on 14 - Are you familiar with the sections of the DAD that were added in version 
 
e ere thirteen ‘Yes’ responses to this question with one interviewee volunteering 
/she ‘liked the fact that it was all in one section - helped with 
uri ’. 
on 15 - Did you experience /per
 Identity Management (IM) section within the DAD?  
re ere seven ‘No’ responses to t
nt to their area, and one did not have any 
eri nce in filling out the section.  e
No Responses: 
• No – latest DAD that I created there was no IM impact.  Interviewee did say that 
he had IM experience in the past and could tell that the project that he was 
working on did not have any IM relevance. He did indicate that the section may 
• 
• 
 needed from checking it off 
• rviewee was built on existing IM solution 
• how does the solution 
• Something never paid much attention to before – had to get head around  - made 
t security  - ignored for years – but after I thought about it  - 
be a bit tricky for new people that did not have any experience with IM. 
NO – “Not applicable, works quite nicely in that section of the DAD” 
Projects building off existing infrastructure or not applicable - so there have been 
no problems – one issue is the level of detail that is
from a DAC or security perspective. An example would be to use IM in the 
standard way and not have to explain that in every DAD. 
No – DAD produced  by the inte
• NO 
No – might be good to split out specific components - 
specifically address authentication and authorization and, if not, how are you 
going to address it? 
me think abou
everything was okay – did wonder once or twice if too rigorous. 
 
Problem Responses: 
• In the beginning, had a problem trying to understand scope of the IM and what 
was expected but by the end there were no problem. The guidelines from the IM 
 what IM is and where and how it should 
derstanding of the value. 
 to all Projects 
 
shop and the ones in the DAD template were very helpful. 
• Yes – general lack of understanding of
be used by the architects. Section could be evolved to make sure what architect 
needs – but first need to understand & know what it is and how it is to be used. 
• YES – general feeling that no one knows what is suppose to go in there  - no 
un
• Not applicable
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No et R levant Responses: 
Not relevant for applications in interviewee’s area – • each application has its own 
 
No p
IM solution. 
 Ex erience Response: 
No experience –•  too many projects are not embracing IM, is my perception. 
pletion of the new 
Ide t
There was one ‘No’ response, two ‘Not rele
oing it nse, and one no experience response. There were effectively eight positive 
 question. 
No s
 
Question 16 - Did you experience /perceive any benefits with the com
nti y Management (IM) section within the DAD?  
vant’ responses, one ‘Not the way we are 
’ respod
responses to the
 Re ponses: 
‘No’ response - No – IM is not appli• cable to a lot of projects on which the 
 
Not Relevant Responses:
interviewee has been working. 
 
relevant’ response number one - IM was not relevant for the projects that 
 there and understanding the importance and 
defending the design decision in the DAC review process. 
relevant’ response - IM is not relevant for applications in 
own IM solution 
t Response:
• ‘Not 
the interviewee has worked on but the section is important from a learning curve 
and understanding why IM is
• Second ‘Not 
interviewee’s area. Each application has it 
 
Not the way we are doing i  
 are doing it’ response - Not the way we are doing it just now. It 
should be adding value, there needs to be more education to make it worth while. 
efit - cost etc. 
• ‘Not the way we
There is value to be added but it is not sold from a European perspective. People 
are not seeing the ben
 
Positive Responses: 
• 1st positive response - It explicitly calls out IM - it is good to acknowledge it and 
t - it is also query-able by members of the DAC during review. 
ctively a check list for items to be covered or 
- it provides a level of comfort. 
riate and documenting reasons (forcing 
” 
• 4th positive response - YES makes people think of IM first - it focuses people 
 thinking their own AAA (authentication, authorization 
odel is fine. 
IM was our strategic solution 
ve response - Do not see more designs using IM – due to general miss 
n be used  - architecture fault – they are not pushing 
state the impac
• 2nd positive response - Provides effe
specifically not covered 
• 3rd positive response - It is a good section to have forcing designers to make a 
decision on whether IM is approp
information ) for and against “ Getting people to think – not easy to do
into considering IM vs.
and Audit) m
• 5th positive response - Forced you to recognize that 
• 6th positi
conception of where IM ca
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IM use in other areas. It is a benefit to know that it is there – it started the ball 
rolling - but need education program 
• 7th positive response - Made me think about it, which had not done before which 
was good - if not explicitly called out would not have given it a second thought. 
onse - It is good that the section is there if you are changing it - 
ld require the architect to say how they are going to bolt 
 
o Experience Response:
• 8th positive resp
in the respondent’s opinion, securitization should be par for the course. Anything 
outside of the norm shou
it down. 
N  
 
• No Experience 
Question 17 - Did the addition of the Identity Management (IM) section hinder or 
assist with the overall design process?  
There were seven responses saying that it ‘Assisted’. There were six other responses as 
follows: one ‘Both’, one ‘No Change’ one ‘Non-Event’, one ‘Neither’, one ‘No effect’, 
and one ‘No Impact’ response. 
Assist Responses: 
• Assist in the overall process - due to the fact that it explicitly calls it out. 
It did assist due to the fact that you have to give consideration and decide what to 
put into the section from a design perspective. 
Caused p
• 
eople to consider IM, more definitely raised awareness of IM – from 
• awareness for designers - raises profile 
• 
that perspective, it is an assist. 
• Assisted it 
Did not hinder -•  assisted posting IM question earlier - Assisted overall. 
• Did not hinder – assisted in as much as thinking about a specific area 
Assist provides visibility and 
 
No feEf ct / No Change / Non-Event / Neither 
• No Change 
Non-event – it is there for projects that require IM. • 
Bot
• Neither - just confirms existing solution fitted with the existing security package. 
• No Effect 
• No Impact 
 
h Responses: 
Both – Assis• t – forces design down a rout that is more acceptable to service 
d security, removing objections before they happen. Hinders, 
 
Qu i
new h
provision an
causing communication problems with external parties. The architect has to 
explain that they can not simply say no – you have to get them to explain in 
detail as to why. 
est on 18 - Did you experience /perceive any problems with the completion of the 
 T reat Compliance section within the DAD?  
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There w
experience’ response. 
No s
ere six ‘No’ responses, five ‘Yes’ responses, one ‘Did not effect’, and one ‘No 
 Re ponses: 
No - had a specific person from the security•  group that was assigned to help. – 
 completion of the area. 
ght forward – note the section to some extent is open to 
x., do you need 3rd party threats identified, i.e., interviewee put 
ith this section. 
lems at all 
 
Yes Re
They helped with the
• strai No problems - 
interpretation, e
non currently identified – to basically cover unseen threats. 
• No – Not application DADs that have been produced - most of the threat stuff is 
on external facing applications. 
• No problems, used guidance notes in the template - just verified compliance 
tools. 
• No problem w
• No – been aware of for a long time - no prob
sponses: 
• Yes – No definition of threat management or how we should deal with it  - put 
 back-end programs 
red around threat management. 
anization’s standard for threat management? The designer needs 
hould be used - section 
eeds to be backed up with education. 
anagement should be a service that should apply to 
nd of like putting an electricity section in the DAD” 
section in the DAD and expected people to know how to fill it in  - far easer to 
not read the guidelines and moan. 
• Yes – Much clearer definition of trust compliance is needed – I am a fully 
qualified security consultant and I had to look at it twice.  Threat / Identification / 
Management might be clearer   - More information on the
d. that are available within the organization is neede
• Yes - no example given - more education is requi
What is the org
to understand what is available. 
• Yes – people still do not know what it is and how it s
never completed - N
em – threat m• Perceive a probl
all designs – “ki
 
No Effect Response: 
• ‘Did not effect’ response - It did not effect the completion of the DAD. 
 
No Experience Response: 
• No Experience 
Qu i ve any benefits with the completion of the new 
Thr  
The
taken positively, one ‘No effect’ answer, one ‘No experience’ answer and five ‘No’ 
ans r
Positiv
 
est on 19 - Did you experience /percei
eat Compliance section within the DAD?  
re were in effect four positive answers, two non-committal answers that could be 
we s. 
e Responses: 
Assist in the overall process - due to the fact that it explicitly calls it out. • 
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• 
the past – no problems. 
s a safety net there - Post IDS etc. 
 YES - the fact that it flagged up a requirement that needs to be addressed in the 
 
on-committal Responses:
Specifically calling out what is expected makes the approval process better – 
process not as iterative as in 
• YES – focuses design effort in that area to be sure that it is actually being 
considered to ensure that there i
•
design process. 
N  
nk about the requirements in that area. • It made me thi
• Again – important to consider what to give thought to – always unforeseen issues 
exist. 
 
No Responses 
• No – Not applicable to the DAD’s that have been produced - most of the threat 
stuff is on external facing applications. 
• No – do not know anyone that has put anything meaningful in there. 
-ever, never completed - Security needs to educate the • No benefit what-so
designers. 
• NO 
• NO - it did not make the design or the document easier.  It did help to define 
some of the design challenges. 
 
No Effect Response: 
• Did not effect the completion of the DAD 
 
No pEx erience Response: 
• No Experience 
0 - D
 
Qu i id the addition of the Threat Compliance section hinder or assist with 
the overall design process?
There w hinders responses 
and one ‘No experience’ response. 
Positiv
est on 2
   
ere four positive answers, six no effect style of answers, two 
e Responses: 
It assisted with the overall process 
It assisted; helped a lot. 
Does not hinder – does mean that there is more thinking up front and interaction 
with external vend
• 
• 
• 
ors to get answers 
not hinder – assisted in as much as thinking about a specific area 
 
No f onses
• Did 
 Ef ect Style of Resp  
there for projects that require IM. 
• 
• No Change 
• Non-event – it is 
• Neither 
Did not make a difference 
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• 
e DAD. 
 
indered Response:
No – Impact – no interaction with threat management team.  Question the 
usefulness of the whole section - if it needs to be in th
• No Impact - just a few extra words in the DAD. 
H  
 – Lack of info available on threat mitigation software available within 
• 
 
No p
• Hindered
the network or host file. 
At the moment it hindered - not a lot of clarity around the area – overall, it will 
benefit. 
 Ex erience Response: 
• No Experience 
 
Question 21 - Did you experience /perceive any problems with the completion of the 
new Trust Model section within the DAD?  
There were four positive responses, four negative responses, four answers that indicated 
there were issues with the section and one ‘No experience’ response. 
Positive Responses: 
• No difficulty - used security resources while writing the section – on the last 
DAD that this particular interviewee completed, there was more relevance to the 
trust section than the IM section, hence, there was more work done on this 
better. 
about, but would have ignored 
 
Negati
section. 
• No 
• No problems - having each section in there and forcing response makes the 
process 
• Same as IM but more so - should really think 
totally if had not been there. 
ve Responses: 
• Yes - understanding concept trust – confusing for one of the specific projects that 
 to the design that was being implemented. 
 to dispel. 
eted or use standards. 
d trust model exists apply it to all 
the interviewee worked on because it did not appear to be a necessity from a 
design perspective due
• YES, trust mode led me to think of COM application objects at first, but did not 
take me long
• “No trust at all” Basically not applicable for DADs compl
• “Perceived as a pain in the ass” – If standar
(internally). 
 
Issues Responses: 
• Language used was too specialist – level of knowledge expected is not there and 
the interviewee did not know anyone that has put anything meaningful in there. 
rks. 
• It would have helped with an example diagram. What trust is in place in the 
organizations at the moment? An example would be excellent – particularly 
• Built off existing trust model – however, not sure exactly what a trust model is or 
how it wo
Page 222 of 262 
comparing external and internal infrastructure – standards would be good to 
include. 
• Trust Model very important in today’s solutions – there is a lack of 
on where and when to use it. 
No p
understanding 
 
 Ex erience Response: 
• No Experience 
 
Qu i
Tru  M
The w ’ response to 
this
Positiv
est on 22 - Did you experience /perceive any benefits with the completion of the new 
st odel section within the DAD?  
re ere seven positive, five negative responses and one ‘No experience
 question.  
e Responses: 
• Benefit is to call it out early and explicitly. 
• If you have to implement, it helps with the reasoning from a review process 
viding a defence etc. 
•  in there and forcing response makes the 
entication, authorization information is 
ther than add hoc. 
that it flagged up the need to think about it is good. 
 think about it and call it out as an issue 
perspective - Pro
• To help know what you should be looking at 
No problems - having each section
process better. 
• YES - Ensures enter that passing of auth
considered ra
• The fact 
• Made me
 
Negative Responses: 
• No, No, None, None what so ever – not completed, No. 
 
No Experience Response: 
• No Experience 
 
Question 23 - Did the addition of the Trust Model section hinder or assist with the 
overall design process?  
positive answers to this question. There were five answers indicating no 
effect, one non-committal response, one negative response and one ‘No experience’ 
resp s
Positiv sponses:
There were five 
on e. 
e Re  
sted with the overall process 
nitely assist – again knowing what you need to complete. 
d, moved barriers to security and S.P., created barriers when 
rd parties. 
s assist in complementing non-functional requirements but the architects do 
now what to put in that section.  Security should have education of what to 
into that section.  The trust model issues needs to be examined from a high 
• Assi
• Defi
• YES – assiste
dealing with 3
• Doe
not k
put 
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level and discussion around who completes the section from a consistency 
 SD or TRS. 
out a specific 
 
o Effect Responses:
perspective the
• Same as IM - Did not hinder – assisted in as much as thinking ab
area – certainly did not hinder. 
N  
• No Difference, No Effect, Neither, Neither, No Impact 
 
Negative Response: 
• At the moment hindered - slows down production of DAD - especially if on 
shared infrastructure where everyone knows the trust model. 
 
Non-Committal Responses: 
• Did not hinder – question of weather the trust needs to be there and helps with 
the understanding of the architecture of the overall project being implemented. 
 
No p Ex erience Response: 
• No Experience 
 
Qu i
Condit
Eight respondents indicated that they had no 
DA  
experie
No o
est on 24 - Did you experience / perceive any problems with the completion of the 
ions section within the DAD? 
problem with the conditions section of the 
D; two respondents discussed the problem, and three respondents who had no 
nce with the section. 
 Pr blem Responses: 
• No problems - no conditions on projects that the interviewee has been working 
•
central log - can see the benefit form having it in the DAD from an audit 
anagement perspective to have the 
n approval creating 
on as of yet – but sees the necessity – conditions appear regularly in the DAC 
process, 
• No 
• No - problems are with the conditions that are applied to the design – not always 
true conditions for design – some are really project conditions. 
• No Problem 
 No – but have to complete after DAC – would have thought it better to have a 
perspective but better from a DAC m
conditions in a central log. Architects are re-assigned after a
time constraints. 
• No 
• No 
• No – it is good 
 
Discussion Responses: 
• The section itself is straight forward - the big problem is really in the definition 
of true conditions vs. comments.  The DAC suffers from a lack of a good 
 good condition. The minutes are also a problem; there is no definition of a
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differentiation on what is a condition and what is a comment or action – hence 
ion. 
n of it has been the problem and the explanation of how it fits into the 
 a document that has been approved. 
 
No p
everything gets lumped under the condition sect
• Adoptio
process – Lot of discomfort with changing
 Ex ertise: 
 go into the DAD – go to clinics update DAD – not condition • Do not think they
if it gesection – ts to the DAC then it should be added to condition section and 
 care of before it goes live.  However, it is not currently used by the 
ee – due to not gotten that far in the process. 
 through process – have not filled out. 
 gotten to it yet - not gone to DAC 
ue i ce / perceive any benefits with the completion of the 
on within the DAD?  
The er. That same 
spondent also provided a positive comment after the initial negative response. 
Positive Response
then taken
interview
• Still going
• Have not
 
Q st on 25 - Did you experien
Conditions secti
re was only one respondent that gave an initial negative answ
re
s:  
• It is a good place to record what has taken place – the problem is that it goes into 
ides a complete document. 
understanding for conditions in future 
•
• 
• Use a lot - SD becomes responsible for conditions in the design because recorded 
• 
• 
 
Neg i
the DAD after the DAC has meet – who reads it?  And is it the right place to 
record the information? 
• Collect everything needed and prov
• Can see the benefit of having it there but did not use it. 
• As a record it is good to help improve 
DADs. 
• Good addition from an audit-ability perspective. 
 Having them already in a section where we could say how they were addressed is 
very helpful – interviewee picked up a preliminary DAD with the condition 
section filled in by architects and completed the final DAD. 
YES – it has more chance of getting them done. 
• There is no other place where these issues are being tracked – so there is benefit 
in having them there. 
in solution. 
• Better that it is documented - it is a bit more formal now. 
It is good - back to continuity of governance. 
Good Idea - provides understanding of responsibilities 
at ve Responses: 
No - could ensure conditions are not missed. 
on 26 -Did the addition of the Conditions section hinder or assist with the overall 
process?  
• 
 
Questi
design 
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Eight i
process aid ‘Neither’ and one did 
not v
Ass e
nterviewees indicated that the conditions section assisted in the overall design 
. Two indicated that it hindered to some degree, two s
 ha e any experience. 
ist d Responses: 
Assists in keeping things in context with the DAD and provides an audit•
• 
• 
• 
 
Hin r
  trail. 
• Definitely assist on focusing on exactly what the conditions are and what the 
resolution to them is. 
• Assisted 
Assist - YES – it has more chance of getting them done – formalizing and 
focusing on issues that are likely to get dropped. 
• Assisted - overall - more concept of conditions but overall assisted 
• Organization perspective assisted - audit compliance 
Assisted - definitely 
Assisted – formalized it - helps the document 
de ed Responses: 
• Does not assist – considered after the design process and DAC meets.  The 
conditions are added after the DAC. 
• Did not hinder – except where the condition is not a design condition. 
Nei
 
ther Response: 
Neither • 
 
No
• Neither 
 Experience Responses: 
• Did not come across it 
 
Question 27 - Did you experience / perceive any problems with the completion of the 
modified Socialization section within the DAD?  
Eleven of the respondents indicated that they did not have a problem with the modified 
socialization section of the DAD. There were two respondents that had an issue with the 
section. 
No s Re ponses: 
• No problems 
• No - None 
No 
No 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• No 
• No 
• No problems 
• No problems 
No 
No 
• No 
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Problem Responses: 
Not been taken up across the b• oard – used in some DADs, not all. 
is not socialized again. 
 
Questi he 
mo ie
welve  to this question. One 
Ben i
• Issue the doc before you have done the socialization – no one reads, by the time 
it is issued to DAC, the final version 
on 28 -Did you experience / perceive any benefits with the completion of t
dif d Socialization section within the DAD?  
 out of the thirteen respondents gave positive feedbackT
respondent did not have any experience with this section of the DAC. 
ef t Responses: 
 It provides a double check to be sure that nothing has been missed. •
 It is ideal to have due to the fact that it tells you who to socialize with and 
lace to record the conversations that took place. Hence it helps in the 
• Big benefits provides audit trail to process - questions that were asked and the 
o to socialize with - also good for people not 
• 
• 
• 
• 
No o
•
provides a p
DAC process. 
• Helps identify who is supposed to be going through. 
answers – publishing to a wide audience. 
• Good record and reminder of wh
completing the DAD regularly – good check list.  Socialization group seems to 
be growing. 
YES – Mainly preventing socialized individuals claiming no socialization or 
making up new conditions after it has been socialized – know of one DAC 
meeting it basically saved. 
• Definite improvement 
Good in that it keeps track 
• We get to see the designs before going to the DAC - set up clinics that coincide 
with socialization section - improved a lot. 
Good addition - suggest project life cycle check list 
It is good - back to continuity of governance. Record who you socialized with 
and what happened. 
• YES – it benefits because you see all points raised at meetings and go back to 
check to be sure they were covered. 
 
t C mpleted Section Responses: 
• No perception of the completion of the socialization section. 
 
Qu i
overall
Ten s
the ove
notice and one indicated that he/she did not have any experience 
in t o
Assiste
est on 29 - Did the modification of the Socialization section hinder or assist with the 
 design process?  
 re pondents indicated that the modification of the socialization section assisted with 
rall design process. One respondent did not notice any changes, one did not 
a difference either way, 
he verall design process. 
d Responses: 
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• Assist - provides a good checklist 
Assisted to help get the right people socialized 
Assist 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ll 
• 
• Definitely assisted in term of a checklist 
Assisted the design process 
Assisted - know who you are talking too. 
• Assisted overa
• Assisted 
Assisted 
• Assisted 
 
No difference: 
• No difference either way 
 
Did not notice: 
• Did not notice the change in the section 
 
No p Ex erience:  
• No experience 
on 30 - What do you perceive as the overall weaknesses in terms of securi
 
Questi ty in 
the current version of the DAD template?  
Ele
respond
No e
ven respondents indicated that there were some weaknesses with the DAD. Two 
ents indicated that there no weaknesses. 
esses Responses: W akn  
• 1.4 version is the version that I am familiar with – no straight forward weakness 
 so that the architect can be provided with the 
rtunity to provide the necessary details as needed. 
ing springs to mind – the threat compliance section would be good to call 
ecommendations for tools with specific environments. 
– the DAD has got to be fairly non-specific due to the general nature of the DAD 
but at the same time it has to provide the general headings that need to be 
addressed when completing a DAD
oppo
• Noth
out r
 
Weakness Responses: 
• Coordination with the security group - they have been looking for different 
s than are specified in the template – it is difficult to meet the needs of the 
• 
designing using Oracle or the networks – I expect there to be standard 
a UNIX box, security should  be providing a list of things 
thing
individual security specialist expectations of what they are looking for in the 
DAD. 
Weakness – stuff there assumed to be in place is not necessarily there – an 
example 
lock downs in places like roles, etc. The DAD requires the designer to call out all 
of that information every time - even when the exact same set up is used as in the 
past. Another example would be adding applications to a UNIX box – every time 
you put something on 
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to use instead of having to list all of the applications that you will be using every 
  - like using BMC to monitor the application etc. 
• l 
 –not as natural a fit at times when it is an external build situation. 
• 
r the security data model. In section 5.6.1, this section 
• 
t/ Trust sections 
of 
• 
app
uestion 31 - What do you perceive as the overall strengths in terms of security in the 
urrent version of the DAD template?  
Ten respondents gave various responses on the strengths of the DAD. One respondent 
does not understand what the architecture group is trying to accomplish with the DAD. 
Two respondents provided other answers. 
Strength Responses:
time
• The security non-functional requirements are, in general, repetitious. 
Not in the template – most of the design process focus assumes it is an interna
build
• Lack of understanding of security by people completing the DAD and of what 
the security section is looking for. 
Stock answers - cutting pasting out of other DADs – ex. As per existing threat 
management guidelines - Interviewee has been told that “The only way to fill it 
in is to find another DAD and copy it” applies to the security section as well as 
the overall DAD. 
• Data section - security data model – bits of security throughout the document; it 
might be better to consolidate into one security section and just refer to the 
security section fo
overlaps with the security non-functional requirements. Alignment of the non-
functional security requirements needs to be considered. 
Biggest issues - SD not using current security non-functional requirements - Do 
not think needs anymore security section - Major issue – education issues on the 
IM/ Threa
• No full filled out document has been presented for assessment 
• Maybe data protection - otherwise not much missing - Data protection 
personal records very important – maybe move data protection section into the 
security section. 
1 – Threat management and trust model need to go 
 2 – Need to put list of security items in the DAD and Delete what is not 
licable to  your project 
 
Q
c
 
• 1.4 - Pulling out explicit information security information and how it impacts 
various areas - it breaks down the areas that need to be addressed. 
• The overall section (guidelines) is a bit clearer than other sections within the 
DAD - the example is the difference between the Architecture standards section 
and the security section 
• Helps remember what you should be looking for. 
• Having the heading there to promote the appropriate questions. 
• Able to give the NFRs and security section to external organizations and say how 
are you going to do this?  And it worked very well.  The documentation is much 
better than in the past - due to ability to say this - is what we need. 
• Forces people to give it some consideration and some documentation 
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•  
urity 
ch better - more guidance on what is required - be great if we had an example 
urity section to refer to for ideas. 
 forces architect 
•  
 
ot Under
 The way it focuses design to have to consider it – “if not there the level of
consideration that security gets is directly relevant to the amount of sec
knowledge the designer has”. 
• Mu
sec
• Socialization / sign off piece before DAC - Security section
awareness - Reference to non-functional requirements is important to security 
Good template – clearly calls out issues that you need to think about -
IM/Trust/Threat compliance makes you take it seriously. 
stand Response:N  
• ish in 
the
 
Other Res
No definitive answer – not 100% clear as to what they are trying to establ
 DAD template. 
ponse: 
• No fully filled out document has been presented for assessment. 
• Security non-functional requirements – A bit like number 2 through 30. 
 
Questi pt to 
integra ign process? 
•  help. 
ot 
an ile 
com
• Calling out security brought it more into the loop and to everyone’s attention. 
Coordination with people from the security section to comment and help with 
that section - provided a point of conversation. 
• Who you deal with - it is either hit or miss and getting them to understand what 
you are trying to establish – an example – it is not enough to say establish a 
secure connection – you need to understand the security in terms of each stage of 
the system - in other words the connection has to be secure to the Web page and 
any data that is involved can not be tampered with. 
• Better teaching and lessons to help explain the point of what was being asked 
and expected. 
• None 
• Significant factor – access to someone in the security area to foster 
communication between then and the vendor – proved very helpful. 
• Lack of clear requirements and ownership of requirements - “No one has 
explained to the business why it should care” - Losing two people that were 
doing security design (type of work) did not help the situation. 
• Amount of information and support available to the designers who do not have a 
security background - If they have the support, they will fill it in correctly – if 
not, then they will not. 
• Do not have a lot of people on the team with security experience; most people 
have moved to infrastructure design. 
on 32 -What other factors contributed to the successful or unsuccessful attem
te security in the des
The allocation of specific security specialists in the last project was a big
Security is a specialist area of expertise – the interviewee admitted that he is n
expert in the area and that it was helpful to have the recourse wh
pleting that DAD. 
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•  
ect 
• Visibility /clear goals / simple / understandab routine / 
pted an o be a success – the 
organization can not be scared to air kes. 
• Nothing else 
curity team on wha ctions   - 
hat they wa  input on reality’. 
he survey que ut of the 
thirteen respondents only four mentioned  of the 
uestion. 
 – the biggest issue is mpleted 
was before Christmas and he had to he information. 
– du AD completed by the 
urity ba lt on existing solution.  
o the prob  not the question. 
mportant he person – have had 
nversations with the business units in the past on this subject when I think they 
 
 way form everyday work 
 
 
Question 34 - Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about the 
questions? 
• No 
• There is no standardization as to th rent 
 comp ifferently by different individuals. 
Standardization of the DAD comp  the 
sues with ef anagement due to the fact 
 ove . There needs to be one 
e 
development process. 
 People issue / where / how / why security is required – education, Perception of
security - there to hinder – getting better, Security perception within the proj
team having confidence in what they are asking has improved 
le / integral part of daily 
has to be culturally acce d facilitate change t
 dirty laundry to learn from our mista
• Input from the se t they want from specific security se
‘they give us input on w
 
nt and we give them
Question 33 - Were any of t stions vague or difficult to follow? O
 questions that were difficult. None
respondents mentioned the same q
• No, not really  that the last DAD the interviewee co
 stop to remember some of t
• No 
• No 
• Number 2 was vague 
er 32 • Difficult to answer numb e to the fact that the D
interviewee already had sec sically in place – bui
Pretty straight forward - s lem is with the content
• No 
• #3 – To who is security i
co
, the organization or t
are being loose with security.
• No 
• No 
• Question #4 – Look at two s - from design and 
perspective  - the others are okay
• No 
• No 
• No 
e way that the DAD is completed - diffe
sections of the DAD are leted d
letion (as much as possible) would help
process. 
• The organization has is fective document m
that documents are stored all r the organization
location for all of the documents that shows the progression through th
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• No 
• No 
• The DAD process is simpler this tim ion with the 
infrastructure te  as clear now urity area. 
es with the  – all - f you can not integrate please detail how you handle 
ions includ the non ically. They could use 
some tightening and explanation - Overall Process issues with design time table 
being conducted backwards i.e. end date, then testing, then design, vs. design 
time, then testing, then end date. 
• Conditions need to become responsibility of the Release Manager (RM) after 
DAC approval  - RM should be formally notified of conditions that have been 
raised at the DAC 
• General lacking in education, in organization of tools and infrastructure IM 
/threat/trust – need architecture vision for the overall security area – currently do 
not have. High overturn of the architects - constantly educating architects 
because they do not know the process / TRS responsibilities or the whole 
shebang. 
• More questions with a 1 to 7 range would help provide quantitative measures. 
• Added a revisions table - see changes requested - suggestion for future DADs 
Questions are focused - Subject Boring - Life Sucks - Need for business analysis 
information (In particular - business process analysis) now and what is wanted in 
the future (2B) - the business analysis information drives the design. 
• Would like to take the survey again in a year, once the changes have had time to 
penetrate the organization. 
 
 
 
e than in the past. The interact
 – when compared with the secam is not
• No 
• Issu  IM  i
IM / threat / trust - Useful survey - n
sect
eeds to be expanded to the rest of the DAD 
-functional requirements’ specifing 
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Appendix IX - Added Paragraph in DAD 
v1.5 
Project Sell - Legal Obligation to Financial Organization 
¾ State whether the change will affect the data structure of the system. 
¾ State whether the data is being migrated to the financial organization. 
¾ State whether the change/upgrade is planned to implement before the 
end of April 2006.   
 
¾ Where the above conditions apply, we have a legal obligation to 
obtain permission from financial organization prior to implementing 
any changes.  The project team will be advised to go through the 
change control process in order to obtain financial organization 
approval. 
 
For further guidance on any of the points above, please contact the 
Project Sell Change Council. (Name on Phone number or Name on 
Phone Number). 
 
¾ All projects are required to socialise this document with the Sell 
Change Council prior to DAC approval.  Details of the Socialisation 
Clinics are available in the DAC workroom. 
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Appendix X - CLASP / WES Comparison 
CLASP Activity * WES (SCWAD) Analysis 
Institute Security awareness program Principle  - Education  
(Proper Controls in the development 
environment) 
Monitor Security Metrics Principle Recommendation  - Synergy 
Manage Certification Process Management Issue 
Specify operational environment Management Issue 
Identify global security policy Application Security Requirements 
(Proper Controls in the development 
environment) 
Identify user roles and requirements Application Security Requirements 
Detailed misuse cases Project Development Risk Assessment 
(Trust and Accountability) 
Performance security analysis of 
requirements 
Application Security Requirements 
(Delivery of a cohesive system) 
Document security design assumptions Security Design / Code 
Specify resource-based security properties Management Issue 
Apply security principals to design Security Design / Code 
Research and assess security solutions Security Design / Code 
Build information labelling scheme Security Design / Code 
Design UI for security functionality Security Design / Code 
Annotate class designs with security 
properties 
Security Design / Code 
Perform security functionality usability 
testing 
Testing 
(Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation) 
Manage System Security Authorization 
Agreement 
Management Issue 
Specify database security configuration Security Design / Code 
Perform security analysis of system design Security Design / Code 
Integrate security analysis of system design Security Design / Code 
Implement and elaborate resource policies Management Issue 
Implement interface contacts Security Design / Code / Implementation 
Perform software security fault injection Testing 
(Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation) 
Address reported security issues Security Design / Code 
Perform sources level security review Security Design / Code 
Identify and implement security tests Testing 
(Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation) 
Verify security attributes of resources Testing 
(Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation) 
Perform code signing Security Design / Code 
Build operational security guide Management Issue 
Manage security issue disclosure process Management Issue 
* This information is from ‘Security in the software development lifecycle’ by John Viega, 2004 [203] 
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Appendix XI - Version Analysis 
Date Version Security Section Completed 
November – 2005 
4 - DAD  1.2  
1 - DAD  1.4 All three sections filled completed 
5 - Total Projects November 
December – 2005 
3 – DAD 1.3  
1 – DAD 1.4 All three sections filled completed 
1 – DAD 1.5 Identity Management Section was filled completed 
Threat and trust were completed with the statement: 
“Solution to be discussed with Security” 
5 - Total Projects December 
January – 2006 
2 – DAD 1.2  
1 - DAD  1.3  
2 – DAD 1.4 First DAD 
• Identity Management section was Blank  
• Threat Management section was completed.  
• Trust section was Deleted 
Second DAD 
• IM & Threat were Blank  
• Trust Deleted 
1 – DAD 1.5 Identity Management Section was filled completed 
Threat and trust were completed with the statement: 
“Solution to be discussed with Security” 
6 - Total Projects January 
February – 2006 
1 - Not a DAD   
1 – DAD 1.2  
2 – DAD 1.3  
1 – DAD 1.5 IM and Threat  completed with “n/a for all components” - 
Trust completed 
5 - Total Projects February 
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March – 2006 
1 – DAD 1.2  
4 – DAD 1.5 1. All three sections were completed 
2. All three sections were completed 
3. IM left Blank / Threat and Trust sections 
completed 
4. IM and Threat  completed with “n/a for all 
components” - Trust completed 
5 - Total Projects March 
April – 2006 
1 - DAD  1.2  
1 - DAD  1.4 • All three sections were blank 
4 – DAD 1.5 1. All three sections were completed 
2. All three sections were completed 
3. IM and Threat  completed with “n/a for all 
components” - Trust completed 
4. Security section deleted 
6 - Total Projects April 
May – 2006 
1 - Non-DAD   
1 – DAD 1.2  
2 – DAD 1.4 1. All three sections were completed 
2. Security sections blank 
2 – DAD 1.5 First DAD 
• IM section completed with “Identity 
Management will not be used within this 
solution.” 
• Threat compliance completed 
• Trust section deleted 
Second DAD 
• IM Filled in 
• Threat - “No threats currently identified.” 
• Trust Filled in 
6 - Total Projects May 
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June – 2006 
3 – DAD 1.5 1. All three sections were completed 
2. IM modified heavily, threat and trust sections 
completed. 
3. All three section were Blank 
3 - Total Projects June 
July – 2006 
1 – DAD 1.2  
1 – DAD 1.5 Security section deleted 
2 - Total Projects July 
August – 2006 
1 – Non-DAD   
6 – DAD 1.5 1. All three sections completed  
2. All three sections completed  
3. Security section deleted  
4. All three sections completed 
5. IM - heavily modified / Threat and Trust 
completed with the statement that the systems will 
conform to existing... 
6. IM completed with “reuse existing design” and 
Threat completed with the statement “reuse 
existing …infrastructure” / Trust model 
completed. 
7 - Total Projects August 
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Appendix XII – Hunterian Survey 
Design Interview Questions 
1. Where does the current web site currently reside? 
2. What is the environment? I.e. UNIX, Windows? 
3. Does it have ample capacity to handle interactive web pages? 
4. What web authoring tools are currently being utilized in the museum? 
5. What databases are currently being used in the museum? 
6. Does the database have the capability to support the potential volume generated by 
dynamic web pages? 
7. How is security currently handled in the museum for web applications? 
8. As far as the web front-end design is concerned, is there a style sheet that the 
museum uses? 
____ YES       ____ NO  
If YES, can you provide the style sheets?  
If YES, and you can not provide a style sheet, who can?  
If NO, are there any rules that the museum follows, & where can I get a copy? 
9. Do you have any additional advice or suggestions for the system? 
10. Do you need any reports from the system? 
____ YES       ____ NO  
If YES, what kind of reports? 
11. Does a testing environment currently exist in the museum? 
____ YES       ____ NO  
If YES, who do I need to speak with to gain access to the environment? 
If NO, can I get a copy of the current web environment and some sample pictures, so 
that I can set up a testing environment within the computer science department at the 
University of Glasgow? 
12.  Do you have any ideas on how you would like the images to be displayed on the 
web page?  
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Policy Questions 
1. Are there any legal issues that need to be addressed such as: 
A. Copyright display issues________________________________________ 
B. Copyright acquirement issues___________________________________ 
C. Additional comments or issues that need to be addressed______________ 
2. If there are legal issues that need to be addressed in Question Number 1, in the form 
of permissions, how does the museum handle this process? 
3. Do you want the images to be downloadable? 
____ YES        ____ NO   
IF NO, why not__________________________________________________ 
4. If the answer to question 3 is YES, is the customer allowed to conduct multiple 
downloads? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
5. How do you want to handle the payment? ________________________________ 
6. Can we implement a voluntary web survey for customers? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
If YES, what types of questions would you like to ask? ____________________ 
IF NO, why not__________________________________________________ 
7. Does the museum adhere to any standards that need to be followed? 
Security Questions
1. What is the desired level of customer confidentiality within the system? 
____ High 
____ Medium 
____ Low 
____ Other (___________________________________________________) 
2. What is the desired level of the museums confidentiality within the system? 
____ High 
____ Medium 
____ Low 
____ Other (___________________________________________________) 
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3. What is the desired level of system availability? 
____ 24 / 7 Availability 
____ 8 to 5 - Monday –Sunday Availability 
____ 8 to 5 - Monday – Friday Availability 
____ Other (___________________________________________________) 
4. What is the desired level of system operation integrity? 
____ High 
____ Medium 
____ Low 
____ Other (___________________________________________________) 
5. What are the levels of security that need to be addresses from the museums 
standpoint? 
____ Defacement 
____ Communication 
____ Transaction 
____ Other (___________________________________________________) 
6. What are the consequences for the Hunterian Museum of the most server security 
breach imaginable? 
7. Based on the answer to number 1 how secure do you feel the web site needs to be? 
8. Based on the answers to questions 6 and 7 do you want to investigate image water 
marking? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
If NO, why not? 
9. Based on the answers to questions 6 and 7 do you want to investigate image 
security? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
If NO, why not? 
10. Does the Museum currently have procedures, roles and responsibilities defined for 
disaster recovery? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
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If YES, can you provide a copy of the disaster recovery plan?  
If YES, and you can not provide a copy of the disaster recovery plan, who can?  
If NO, are there any rules that the museum follows, & where can I get a copy? 
11. Where will the production servers reside and who will maintain the servers from an 
update and configuration standpoint? 
Testing and Evaluation Questions 
1. Did you find the image that you were looking for? 
____ YES       ____ NO   
2. If the answer to Question Number 1 is NO, please describe the image that you were 
trying to locate. 
3. Do you have any additional suggestions or ideas for improvements to the Hunterian 
Museum’s image purchase internet application? 
4. Please assign an overall functionality rating to the Museum’s image purchase 
internet application. 
____ 5- Excellent 
____ 4-Good 
____ 3-Fair 
____ 2-Poor 
____ 1-Unacceptable 
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Abbreviations 
Agile Web Engineering  AWE 
American Depositary Receipts ADRs 
Automated Secure Systems Development Methodology  ASSDM 
Availability, Reliability and Security Conference ARES 
Business Case Document  BCD 
Business Continuity Plan  BCP 
Common Criteria  CC 
Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process  CLASP 
Data Flow Diagrams  DFD 
Department of Computing Science  DCS 
Department of Home Land Security  DHLS 
Design Architecture Committee  DAC 
Design Architecture Document  DAD 
Detail Design Document  DDD 
Dynamic Systems Development Method  DSDM 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996  EEA 
Entity Relationship  ER 
Essential Elements  EE 
eXtreme Programming  XP 
Extreme Security Engineering ESE 
Facilitated Risk Analysis Process  FRAP 
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Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003  FACTA 
Family Rights and Privacy Act  FERPA 
Feature-Driven Development  FDD 
Federal Information Security Act  FISA 
File Transfer Protocol  FTP 
Freedom of Information Act  FIA 
Global Fortune 500 Financial Organization Surveys Lessons Learned GFFFOS 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7  HSPD‐7 
Host Intrusion Detections Systems  HIDS 
Hunterian Museum and Art Gallery’s Online Photo Library  HOPL 
Identity Management  IM 
Information Systems  IS 
Information Technology  IT 
International Conference on Hypermedia and Interactivity in Museums  ICHIM 
International Conference on Web Engineering  ICWE 
International Organization for Standardization and International 
Electrotechnical Commission standard  ISO/IEC 
Internet Service Providers  ISP 
Management Information Systems MIS 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties  MILAT 
National Institute of Standards and Technology  NIST 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems  NIDS 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation  OCTAVE 
Page 243 of 262 
Organization for Internet Safety  OIS 
Organization’s General Site  OGS 
Preliminary DAD  PDAD 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  PWC 
Public Key Infrastructure PKI 
Rational Unified Process  RUP 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act RIP 
Research Libraries Group  RLG 
Return on Investment  ROI 
Role Based Access and Control  RBAC 
Sarbanes-Oxley  SOX 
Secure Socket Layer  SSL 
Securities Exchange Commission  SEC 
Security Audit and Field Evaluation  SAFE 
Security Criteria for Web Application Development  SCWAD 
Security Development Lifecycle  SDL 
Security Improvement Approach  SIA 
Security Improvement Initiative  SII 
Software Process Improvement  SPI 
Storage Area Network  SAN 
Structured Query Language  SQL 
Structured Systems Analysis and Design Methods  SSADM 
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Systems Security Engineering - Capability Maturity Model  SSE‐CCM 
Testing Documentation  TD 
The Open Web Application Security Project  OWASP 
U.K. Government’s Central Computing and Telecommunications 
Agency  CCTA 
U.K. Government’s Central Computing and Telecommunications 
Agency’s Risk Analysis Management Method CRAMM 
Unified Modelling Language  UML 
Unified Software Development Process  USD 
United Nations  UN 
Viable Information System  VIS 
Viable System Model  VSM 
Web Engineering Security WES 
World Wide Web WWW 
World Wide Web Consortium W3C 
 
Page 245 of 262 
Glossary 
Agile Process A term used to describe lightweight application development methodologies. 
Availability “The assurance that a computer system is accessible by authorized users whenever needed” [90]. 
Bell-LaPadula 
An information security confidentially-based model that 
permits access modes based on a set security policy, i.e., 
Classification: Top Secret, Secret, Classified, Unclassified, &  
Public - Couple with Sensitivity Levels: Rank [91].  
Cobra Security risk analysis product developed by C&A Systems Security LTD [31]. 
Confidentiality 
“The protection of information within systems so that 
unauthorized people, recourses, and processes cannot access 
that information” [90]. 
Cyberspace 
Has been defined as “an interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures” [201]. Realistically it is a term that 
has been created to describe the entire online community, i.e., 
internet and World Wide Web. 
DAC 
Design Architecture Committee approved designs for large 
projects in the Fortune Global 500 financial organization case 
study. 
DAD Design Architecture Document is the instrument used to submit large projects to the DAC. 
End-User The individual using the application 
Facilitated Risk 
Analysis Process 
(FRAP) 
Qualitative risk analysis process developed by Thomas Peltier 
[206]. 
Hackers 
“Someone who bypasses the systems access controls by taking 
advantage of security weaknesses that developers have left in 
the system” [90]. 
Integrity “The protection of systems information or processing from intentional or accidental unauthorized changes” [90]. 
HIS IBM HTTP Server 
Internet A conglomerate of individual networks connected through a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol [90]. 
Masquerade 
A type of security threat where an authorized or unauthorized 
user of the system who has obtained the id and password of 
another user and successfully pretends to be that entity [90]. 
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Message Digest 
(MD) 5 
One way hashing function that generates a 128 bit fixed length 
message [119, 153]. 
RBAC Role Based Access Control 
Risk Analysis “Represents the process of analyzing a target environment and the relationships of it risk-related attributes” [144]. 
Risk Assessment 
“Represents the assignment of value to assets, threat 
frequency (annualized), consequence (i.e. exposure factors), 
and other elements of chance”  [144]. 
Risk Evaluation 
“Evaluation of all collected information regarding threats, 
vulnerabilities, assets and asset value in order to measure the 
associated chance of loss and the expected magnitude of loss 
for each of an array of threats that could occur” [90]. 
Scientific Method 
“A method of research in which a problem is identified, 
relevant data are gathered, a hypothesis is formulated from 
these data, and the hypothesis is empirically tested” [61]. 
Security 
Improvement 
Approach (SIA) 
The SIA is the high level theoretical approach to making 
security improvements. 
Security 
Improvement 
Initiative (SII) 
The SII is the activity that takes place to achieve security 
improvements. 
Social engineering 
“Successful or unsuccessful attempts to influence a person(s) 
into either revealing information or acting in a manner that 
would result in unauthorized access, unauthorized use, or 
unauthorized disclosure, to an information systems, network 
or data” [22]. 
Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) 
“SSL  protocol was originally designed by Netscape to protect 
communication between a web browser and server” [153]. 
The Web 
Engineering 
Security (WES) 
Process 
A proactive, flexible, process neutral security methodology 
with customizable components that is based on the empirical 
evidence and used to explicitly integrate security throughout 
an organization’s chosen application development process. 
Threat “The occurrence of an event of which could have an undesirable impact of the well-being of the asset” [90]. 
Tivoli Access 
Manager 
“IBM Tivoli Access Manager is an authorization and network 
security policy management solution that attempts to provide 
end-to-end protection of resources over geographically 
dispersed intranets and extranets” [99]. 
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Tivoli Access 
Manager 
WebSEAL 
“IBM Tivoli Access Manager WebSEAL is a resource 
manager responsible for managing and protecting Web-based 
information and resources. IBM WebSEAL is a high 
performance, multi-threaded Web server that applies fine-
grained security policy to the Tivoli Access Manager 
protected Web object space. WebSEAL can provide single 
sign-on solutions and incorporate back-end Web application 
server resources into its security policy” [99]. 
Uncertainty 
“Degree, expressed as a percent, to which there is less than 
complete confidence in the value of any element of the risk 
assessment” [144]. 
Value Chain A series of activities to deliver low-cost or differentiated products [3]. 
Value 
Configuration 
Configuration of activities in order to add value that can be 
grouped into three categories: Value Chain, Valued Network 
and Value Shop [3]. 
Value Network 
A series of activities to deliver low-cost or differentiated 
products based on an intermediaries service and technologies 
to provide a connection between parties that wish to remain 
independent [3]. 
Value Shop 
A series of activities to deliver low-cost or differentiated 
products based on intensive technologies through most types 
of services models [3]. 
Vulnerability 
“The absence or weakness of a risk reducing safeguard.  It is a 
condition that has the potential to allow a threat to occur with 
greater frequency, greater impact or both” [144]. 
WebSphere Software developed by IBM to integrate e-business applications using Web technologies [100]. 
World Wide Web  
a.k.a Web 
“An extensive information system on the Internet providing 
facilities for documents to be connected to other documents by 
hypertext links” [10]. 
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